Pearson v. Troy Steele & Chris Koster,1

• Decision Date: 12 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 4:11cv1037 TCM,4:11cv1037 TCM
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: ANTOINE D. PEARSON, Petitioner, v. TROY STEELE and CHRIS KOSTER, Respondents.

ANTOINE D. PEARSON, Petitioner,
v.
TROY STEELE and CHRIS KOSTER,¹ Respondents.

No. 4:11cv1037 TCM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

September 12, 2014

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for review and final disposition of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Antoine D. Pearson ("Petitioner") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge a 2008 judgment following a jury trial.² Respondents filed a response [Doc. 6] to the petition, including materials from the underlying state court proceedings [Docs. 9, 14-1, and 16-1].³

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After careful consideration, the Court will deny the petition upon concluding that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because ground two is procedurally defaulted and Petitioner failed to demonstrate either cause and prejudice or actual innocence so as to allow this Court to consider the merits of that procedurally defaulted claim; and because the other three grounds for relief lack merit.

Background

Petitioner was charged with one count of first-degree statutory sodomy, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.062 (Count I), one count of attempt to commit statutory rape in the first degree, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.032 (Count II), and one count of attempt to commit statutory sodomy in the first degree, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.062. (Indictment, Legal File, Resp'ts Ex. A, at 5-6 [Doc. 9].) The charges were based on allegations that, between October 15, 2006 and December 31, 2006, Petitioner had deviate sexual intercourse, attempted to rape, and attempted to sodomize a girl, P.P. ("Victim"), who was less than twelve years old at the time. Id.

The trial court held a pre-trial hearing after the State provided notice of its intent to use at trial, under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.075, statements the minor Victim had made to others, and Petitioner had filed motions challenging that statute and requesting suppression of Petitioner's statements to the police. (See Hr'g Tr., Resp'ts Ex. G, at 5-118 [Doc. 14-1 at 230]; Mots. at Legal File, Resp'ts Ex. A, at 7-15 [Doc. 9].) The trial court subsequently denied Petitioner's motion to suppress, and found the relevant statements made by Victim to four others (Lisa Edwards, Luzette Wood, Kelly Patten, and Officer Robert Connell) were reliable

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and admissible. (Orders, dated Dec. 13, 2007, Legal File, Resp'ts Ex. A, at 16-18 [Doc. 9].)

Prior to trial, Petitioner again sought the suppression of Petitioner's statements to the police, including a videotaped statement, based in part on his characterization of the videotaped statement as constituting "extremely inflammatory hearsay." (Trial Tr., Resp'ts Ex. G, at 126-30 [Doc. 14-1 at 32-33].) The trial court noted that this request was a suggestion "that [the statements] should be excluded in limine," reiterated its denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress, and acknowledged Petitioner's specific objections could be considered once the State determined if it was going to introduce any statement and, if so, to what extent. (Id. at 128, 130 [Doc. 14-1 at 33].)

During the trial in December 2007, and outside the presence of the jury, Petitioner asked the court not to allow his statements into evidence, either in video form or through police officer testimony, urging that Petitioner "has the right not to be tried for . . . prior bad acts, whether charged or uncharged[;] . . .these statements do not show any relation to the charge at hand"; and, as the State pointed out, Petitioner's statements do not include "confessions or admissions." (Id. at 335-37 [Doc. 14-1 at 86]; see also id. at 340-42 [Doc. 14-1 at 87].) In response, the State acknowledged that, in his statements, Petitioner "does not confess to committing the crimes here involved" but reports that he engaged in sexual conduct of a "nearly identical" nature in the presence of and near Victim, during the "same time frame." (Id. at 338-39 [Doc. 14-1 at 86-87].) The trial court concluded the statements constituted admissions against interest, found that the recent state case cited by Petitioner was not on point, characterized the information in the statements as describing circumstances

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surrounding the crime, and denied Petitioner's motion to exclude the statements Petitioner made in a videotaped recording or to police officers at the time of his arrest. (Id. at 340-41 [Doc. 14-1 at 87].)

Later during trial and outside the presence of the jury, Petitioner objected to various aspects of the video recording of Petitioner's statement to the police that the prosecutor advised he was planning to play for the jury. (Id. at 416-35 [Doc. 14-1 at 106-11].) The trial court sustained Petitioner's objections to, and required the deletion of, any references to Petitioner's prior juvenile court history and to any past sexual abuse he had suffered; required the prosecutor to advise the jury that Victim did not have any sexually transmitted disease; overruled Petitioner's hearsay objections, as well as his objections that the statements were coerced; and disallowed the playing of any other portion of the video recording of Petitioner's statement until after the parties and trial court addressed any other objections to it that Petitioner might have. (Id. at 419, 423-24, 426, 428, 429, 431-33 [Doc. 14-1 at 107-10].)

Before the State sought to admit the videotaped recording of Petitioner's statement to the police and before the State questioned a police officer who had interviewed Petitioner about Petitioner's statement, Petitioner reiterated his objection to the introduction of the statements he made during police interrogation. (Id. at 489-90 [Doc. 14-1 at 124].) Petitioner argued the introduction of such evidence violated Petitioner's constitutional rights to due process, to counsel, and not to incriminate himself; and contended any statement was not an "admission or a confession to the charges at hand" and was offered only to show Petitioner has a propensity to commit the charged offenses. (Id. at 489 [Doc. 14-1 at 124].)

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The trial court overruled that objection and admitted the videotaped recording of Petitioner's statement to the police, as well as the police officer's testimony regarding the interview of Petitioner. (Id. at 489-90 [Doc. 14-1 at 124].)

After the testimony of one of the police officers who had interviewed Petitioner and out of the presence of the jury, Petitioner asked the trial court to strike the officer's testimony because it related statements that were hearsay, were not reliable, were "extremely prejudicial[, were] more prejudicial than probative, and were inflammatory." (Id. at 565-66 [Doc. 14-1 at 144].) The trial court denied that motion. (Id. at 566 [Doc. 14-1 at 144].)

The State presented the testimony of six witnesses whose testimony focused on matters pertaining to the charged offenses (id. at 299-568 [Doc. 14-1 at 77-621]); introduced various exhibits, including three drawings of a male body and a female body, which were used during Wood's interview of Victim (id. at 408 [Doc. 14-1 at 104]); played for the jury the videotape of the police officers' interview of Petitioner (id. at 501-10 [Doc. 14-1 at 127-29]); and presented a court reporter who testified to the accuracy of a transcript she prepared of the video-recording of Wood's interview of Victim (id. at 396-99 [Doc. 14-1 at 101-02]), a recording that was also played for the jury (id. at 411-13 [Doc. 14-1 at 105]).

Victim, who was Petitioner's daughter and four years old at the time of trial, testified that Petitioner had done "bad stuff" to her. (Id. at 301, 345, 347, 368 [Doc. 14-1 at 77, 88, 89, 94].) While on the stand, Victim pointed to her vaginal area, what she referred to as her "pie pie," and her buttocks, what she referred to as her "butt," and referred to her mouth, as areas that Petitioner did "bad stuff" to. (Id. at 345-47 [Doc. 14-1 at 88-89].) In part, she

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testified that Petitioner put "his piepie" in her mouth and "[w]ater came out." (Id. at 348 [Doc. 14-1 at 89].) During cross- and recross-examination by Petitioner's counsel, Victim responded to questions indicating both that Petitioner did not hurt her and that the "bad things" Petitioner did to her "hurt." (Id. at 363-64, 369 [Doc. 14-1 at 93, 94].) Victim also reported that she did not hit Simone Hunter's belly when Simone was pregnant and nodded when asked, "[n]obody told you to hurt the baby?" (Id. at 366 [Doc. 14-1 at 93].)

Lisa Edwards, Victim's grandmother, testified that she lived with Victim and Victim's mother, and was alone with Victim in January 2007 when Victim told her on two separate occasions, in a car and at home, that Petitioner "did a bad thing to" her and indicated that he had hurt her "private area" and "her butt." (Id. at 309-10, 312, 324 [Doc. 14-1 at 79, 80, 83].) Victim also told Edwards that Petitioner had put his "peepee in her mouth" and "water" came out. (Id. at 312-13 [Doc. 14-1 at 80].) In November or December 2006, Edwards testified, Victim had spent some time with Petitioner at his house, and afterward Victim "seemed to be withdrawn" and had changed in that she began "bed wetting, [had] nightmares, [was] very clingy[, and was] masturbating." (Id. at 315-18, 323, 326-29 [Doc. 14-1 at 81, 83, 84].)

Wood was, early in 2007, an interview specialist or forensic...