Pease v. Burns

Citation719 F.Supp.2d 143
Decision Date28 June 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08-CV-30222-MAP.,08-CV-30222-MAP.
PartiesSheryl A. PEASE and Little Sprouts Day Care, Plaintiffs v. Karen BURNS, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Robert M. Fuster, Jr., Fuster Law Offices, P.C., Street Pittsfield, MA, William P. O'Neill, Office of the Attorney General, Western Massachusetts Division, Street Springfield, MA, Louis A. Piccone, Road Dalton, MA, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Sheryl Pease and Little Sprouts Day Care (collectively, Plaintiffs) have filed suit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Department of Early Education and Care (“EEC”), and eleven state employees in their individual and official capacities alleging, inter alia, that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Complaint as amended, which also asserts a number of pendant state tort claims, seeks declaratory relief, compensatory damages in the amount of fifty million dollars, and unspecified exemplary damages. All of Plaintiffs' claims relate to a 2007 revocation of their license to provide group day care services in Massachusetts.

Defendants have moved to dismiss all counts pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 27). Defendants contend: (1) that any claims asserted against the Commonwealth and EEC are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) that Plaintiffs cannot show that they have been deprived of any constitutional right as a matter of law; (3) that the Complaint is vague and conclusory and thus fails to meet the pleading requirements enunciated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); and (4) that the court should exercise its discretion to dismiss Plaintiffs' state causes of action upon the dismissal of the federal claims. A hearing on the motion was held on January 7, 2010. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

II. FACTS

The court's summary of the facts is drawn principally from Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). Where appropriate, the court supplements the facts with reference to the written decision of the Massachusetts Division of Administrative Law Appeals (“DALA”). 1

Plaintiff Little Sprouts Day Care (Little Sprouts) is a day care service provider that operated in the city of Pittsfield, Massachusetts from July 2003 through July 2007. (Dkt. No. 38, Pls.' First Am. Compl. (hereinafter “Compl.”) at ¶ 6.) Little Sprouts was licensed by EEC to provide child care services within the Commonwealth. Id. At the height of its operations, Little Sprouts provided services to forty-four children. (Compl. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff Sheryl Pease (Pease), was the sole owner of Little Sprouts and its director from July 2003 through July of 2006. (Compl. at ¶¶ 5, 23.)

Defendant EEC is the agency responsible for licensing and regulating early education and care programs throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Each of the eleven individual Defendants named in the Complaint is a Massachusetts state employee: Defendant Karen Burns is a group child care licensor for EEC; Defendant Erin Murphy Craft is a regional director for EEC; Defendant Linda Lenahan is a group and school age supervisor for EEC; Defendant Eric Lieberman is an EEC policy and training advisor; Defendant Judy Pasko is an EEC investigator; Defendant Denise J. Karlin is an assistant General Counsel with EEC; Defendant Brian LeTendre is a family child care supervisor with EEC; Defendant Iris Crespo is a licensor with EEC; Defendant Constantia T. Papanikolaou is the General Counsel of EEC; Defendant Ann Reale is the Commissioner of EEC; and Defendant John Daly is an employee with the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”). 2 (Compl. at ¶¶ 7-18.)

A dispute among the parties began on June 28, 2006, when Plaintiffs transported eighteen children in their care to a swim lesson without appropriate seat restraints. (Compl. at ¶ 26.) Following the incident, Pease, in what the Complaint describes as “an overabundance of caution,” filed a report with DCF pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 51A 3 explaining that [she] had taken children without car seats to swim lessons and [ ] walked them back to Little Sprouts.” (Compl. at ¶ 27.)

In response to this report, DCF conducted an investigation pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 51B, and issued a report “supporting” allegations of neglect against Pease on August 1, 2006. 4 Investigators concluded that there was “reasonable cause to believe” that the June 28, 2006 failure to use car seats amounted to neglect. (Compl. at ¶ 32.) The report also contained findings that Plaintiffs had transported children without appropriate parental consent-an allegation Plaintiffs deny. (Compl. at ¶¶ 36, 37.) Plaintiffs sought a hearing in regard to the decision with DCF's Fair Hearing Unit. It appears that, due to staffing shortages, no hearing was ever conducted. (Dkt. No. 30, Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A.)

Soon thereafter, EEC initiated its own independent investigation into Plaintiffs' operation; this investigation continued up to July 20, 2007. 5 (Compl. at ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege the EEC investigation was “flawed” and conducted by overzealous investigators whose real goal was their own advancement within the agency. (Compl. at ¶¶ 29, 30.) The Complaint charges that Eric Lieberman, an EEC Policy and Training Advisor, contributed to these deficiencies by failing to properly train other EEC employees on “the legal limits of their investigative abilities.” (Compl. at ¶ 31.)

In October of 2006, EEC produced a report and order entitled “Order to Protect Children: Order to Correct Violations and Notice of Sanctions” (“Order I”). The agency found that Pease and other Little Sprouts staff members had failed to report neglect or abuse children may have suffered at home. (Compl. at ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs dispute this finding. (Compl. at ¶ 40.) Order I required Plaintiffs to freeze enrollment at Little Sprouts and to hire (subject to EEC's oversight and approval) a new director to replace Pease. (Compl. at ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs were also required to post the allegations against them “in a conspicuous location” at Little Sprouts. (Compl. at ¶ 39, 42.)

With notice to EEC, Plaintiffs initiated an effort to hire and train a new director as required by Order I. Plaintiffs selected a candidate who they aver was qualified for the position on EEC's Professional Child Care Qualifications Registry. (Compl. at ¶¶ 44, 45.) However, EEC denied the proposed new director approval based on four-year-old allegations against her. Plaintiffs maintain that the new director did not have a disqualifying background and that the re-activation of the four-year-old investigation was illegal. (Compl. at ¶ ¶ 46, 48.)

EEC investigators made further visits to Little Sprouts. After one such visit, investigators concluded that Plaintiffs had violated the enrollment freeze mandated by Order I. (Compl. at ¶ 50.) Plaintiffs contend that the investigation leading to this finding was insufficient, consisting solely of one EEC investigator entering a room at Little Sprouts, counting heads, and stating that “there's one extra child in here,” to which a teacher responded she's mine.” (Compl. at ¶ 50.)

On June 8, 2007, EEC issued a new order, entitled “Order to Protect Children: Notice of Revocation and Second Notice of Sanctions against Plaintiffs under 102 CMR 1.07(4) (“Order II”). Order II faulted Plaintiffs for having failed to comply with Order I by failing to hire a new director and by enrolling at least one child in violation of the enrollment freeze. (Compl. at ¶ 63.) As a result of these alleged violations, EEC revoked Little Sprouts' group day care license. (Compl. at ¶ 64.)

Plaintiffs timely appealed this revocation to the Massachusetts Division of Administrative Law Appeals (“DALA”). (Dkt. No. 35, Defs.' Reply Br. to Plfs.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A, Department of Early Education and Care v. Little Sprouts Day Care-Sherry Pease, Executive Office for Administration and Finance, Division of Administrative Law Appeals, Dkt. No. OC-07-526 (March 12, 2008) (hereinafter DALA decision) at 1.) While this appeal was pending, it appears that Little Sprouts continued to operate, and EEC continued to conduct monitoring visits. On June 18, 2007, Defendants Linda Lenahan and Karen Burns conducted an unannounced visit. (Compl. at ¶ 49.) On July 5, 2007, EEC made a determination that an emergency situation existed at Little Sprouts that warranted an immediate suspension of Plaintiffs' group child care license. (DALA Decision at 1.) The emergency suspension went into effect on July 20, 2007-prior to any hearing. Id. At this time, Little Sprouts Day Care closed. (Compl. at ¶ 65.)

Plaintiffs filed an appeal of EEC's emergency suspension, which was consolidated with the pending revocation appeal. (DALA Decision at 1). On November 1, 2007, a hearing on both matters was held before a DALA administrative magistrate, and on March 12, 2008 the magistrate issued an opinion affirming both the emergency suspension and the underlying revocation of Plaintiffs' group child care license. (DALA Decision at 28). See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, § 4H (conferring upon administrative magistrates the duty “to provide speedy and fair disposition of all [administrative] appeals”). Plaintiffs filed no objection to the magistrate's decision in the superior court. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 14 (allowing “any person ... aggrieved by a final decision...

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