Pease v. Ritchie

• Decision Date: 14 May 1890
• Citation: 132 Ill. 638,24 N.E. 433
• Parties: PEASE v. RITCHIE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

132 Ill. 638

24 N.E. 433

PEASE

v.RITCHIE et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 14, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county.

Suit by Walter L. Pease against William C. Ritchie, Francis T. Wheeler, and William E. Hale to quiet title. Defendants' title is derived from an execution sale on a judgment against complainant, and in favor of Wells, Norton & Walker. The land had been previously sold under a judgment in favor of one Chisholm, and was redeemed from such previous sale by Wells, Norton & Walker. Defendants obtained a decree. Complainant appeals. For a former opinion in this suit, see 3 N. E. Rep. 897.

Cook & Upton and Gregory, Booth & Harlan, for appellant.

Frederick Ullmann and Charles A. Dupee, for appellees.

CRAIG, J.

Under the facts as they appear from the record, appellant contends that the Chisholm judgment was paid, and as to him a sale thereunder was a nullity, and a redemption thereupon conferred no title whatever on the party seeking to redeem; second, that the Wells, Norton & Walker judgment against him was not a lien on the premises in controversy, because no execution had issued thereon within a year under the statute, and that, though a judgment may be used to redeem when not a lien, this judgment could not be so employed, because, at the time redemption was attempted, the appellant had obtained his discharge in bankruptcy, and therefore the judgment could not be made the basis of redemption any more than it could be sued over or execution issued thereon, and appellant's property sold, if he insisted on the protection of his discharge, and that Wells, Norton & Walker were not, therefore, judgment creditors, within the meaning of the statute. Various other questions have been raised and discussed in the argument of counsel, but, in the view we take of the record, it will not be necessary to consider them, as, in our opinion, the sheriff's title obtained by Wells, Norton & Walker under the redemption from the sale on the Chisholm judgment, disregarding all other questions, is conclusive of the rights of the parties.

As respects the first proposition, that the Chisholm judgment was paid, upon an examination of the evidence, it will be found that the judgment was rendered against Pease, Dobbins, and others, who were partners. By an arrangement between the partners, the equitable obligation to pay the judgment devolved upon Dobbins and the other defendants, and not upon Pease. On the 30th day of January, 1876, Fuller, on behalf of Pease, purchased the judgment, the latter furnishing the money. On the 1st day of June, 1877, by the direction of Pease, Fuller assigned the judgment to Edward F. Lawrence, and he assigned to Chisholm, the original judgment plaintiff. These assignments were not of record. The transaction was a secret one, known only to Pease and those connected with him acting in his interest. In the schedules attached to Pease's bankrupt proceedings, his oath shows that the judgment was still subsisting against him. The attorneys of Pease sued out an execution, and caused it to be levied on the premises, and caused the premises to be sold on the execution. At the sale Pease had the property bid off in the name of Inslee. A short time before the execution issued, Pease, in answer to a letter of inquiry by appellee Ritchie, in regard to the judgment, wrote as follows: ‘Yours of 25th received. R. B. Chisholm is the owner of the judgment you mentioned, and I understand Mr. Perry represents him in the matter.’

Under the facts, we think Pease is now estopped from claiming that the Chisholm judgment was paid. He held the judgment out to the world as a valid subsisting judgment. He sold the land on an execution issued upon it, and became the purchaser in another name. After having done these acts and invited the redemption and subsequent sale by a judgment creditor, it is too late now for him to assert that the judgment was paid, and the sale an idle ceremony. If authority is needed to sustain this position, Bank v. Dennis, 37 Ill. 385, is a case in point. The statute conferred the right of redemption upon Wells, Norton & Walker, judgment creditors, and in the exercise of that right they had every reason to believe that the sale under the Chisholm judgment was in all respects valid, and obligatory upon Pease and all other persons claiming any interest in the premises under or through him; and, having acted in good faith, they and their grantees ought to be protected.

But it is insisted that, if the sale under the Chisholm judgment is to be treated as valid, it is then claimed that there was no right of redemption in the judgment creditors, Wells, Norton & Walker, because their judgment was not a lien, and the discharge in bankruptcy of Pease was a satisfaction of the judgment. The statute provides that a judgment of a court of record shall be a lien on the real estate of the person against whom it is obtained, in the county for which the court...