Peasnall v. Curry Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 27 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-37401 |
| Parties | WESTON PEASNALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CURRY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a political subdivision existing under the law of the State of New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY DONNA J. MOWRER DISTRICT JUDGE
Christian P. Christensen Portales, NM Eric D. Dixon Portales NM for Appellant
Atwood, Malone, Turner & Sabin, P.A. Bryan Evans Quincy J. Perales Roswell, NM for Appellee
{¶1} Plaintiff Weston Peasnall appeals the judgment entered by the district court in favor of Defendant Curry County Board of County Commissioners following a jury trial on Plaintiff's complaint alleging violations of the New Mexico Whistleblower Protection Act (the WPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10-16C-1 to -6 (2010). He raises issues related to the jury instructions and contests two of the district court's evidentiary rulings. We hold that the district court erred with respect to the special verdict form provided to the jury; therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. In light of this, it is unnecessary that we reach Defendant's remaining contentions. However, we exercise our discretion to address the district court's exclusion of video footage proffered by Plaintiff and testimony related to its contents, as this question is likely to recur on remand. We affirm in this respect.
{¶2} The allegations in Plaintiff's complaint stem from his employment at the Curry County Detention Center (the Detention Center), where he was promoted to the position of sergeant. About six months after his promotion, Plaintiff reviewed video footage of a tasing incident at the Detention Center. In Plaintiff's estimation, the video footage depicted violations of county policies.
{¶3} Before reviewing the video footage, Plaintiff prepared an initial report regarding the tasing incident. Plaintiff stated that, after reviewing the video footage, he went to his supervisor and requested to amend his initial report to reflect his belief that county policy regarding excessive use of force had been violated. Plaintiff alleged that his supervisor turned him away without allowing an amendment.
{¶4} Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was demoted from the position of sergeant. Plaintiff described this as an act of "retaliation" due to his desire to amend his initial report on the tasing incident to reflect his view that county policies had been violated. Plaintiff alleged that, following his demotion, the working environment became so intolerable that he had no options other than resignation.
{¶5} Prior to trial, Defendant moved the district court to exclude the video of the tasing incident from evidence and to preclude Plaintiff from eliciting testimony regarding Plaintiff's claim that the Detention Center operated under a pervasive system of favoritism and retaliation. The district court excluded the video of the tasing incident, testimony related to its contents, and testimony regarding the operation of the Detention Center.
{¶6} Plaintiff submitted proposed jury instructions, which included the Uniform Jury Instruction for retaliatory discharge and special verdict forms. The district court refused the retaliatory discharge instruction and the special verdict forms proposed by Plaintiff, opting instead to use the special verdict form tendered by Defendant, with slight but significant modifications.
{¶7} Following deliberations, the jury returned a special verdict form. In pertinent part, the jury answered "No" to the following question: "Was Plaintiff's request to change his report regarding the . . . [t]asing incident the reason Plaintiff was [demoted]?" The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We reserve further discussion of the pertinent facts for our analysis.
{¶8} Plaintiff argues that (1) one of the special verdict forms submitted to the jury misstated the law; (2) the district court improperly excluded the video of the detainee's tasing and testimony related to its contents; and (3) the district court improperly excluded testimony concerning operation of the Detention Center.
{¶9} "We review jury instructions de novo, seeking to determine whether the instructions correctly stated the law and were supported by the evidence presented at trial." Lopez v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 2020-NMCA-033, ¶ 9, 468 P.3d 887, cert. denied, 2020-NMCERT-___ (No. S-1-SC-38161, Apr. 28, 2020). Our inquiry centers on whether the instructions complained of would have caused confusion or misdirection among reasonable jurors. Mikeska v. Las Cruces Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC, 2016-NMCA-068, ¶ 23, 388 P.3d 266.
{¶10} Plaintiff complains of the propriety of the jury instructions. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury pursuant to UJI 13-2304 NMRA ("Retaliatory discharge"), and that a question on the special verdict form provided to the jury contained a legal misstatement. Defendant maintains that the jury instructions and special verdict form were legally sufficient, and that, even if there was error, it was harmless. We agree with Plaintiff's contention that the special verdict form was legally erroneous.
{¶11} "An instruction is correct, and thus proper to submit to a jury, when the instruction is consistent with the law and articulates fairly, completely, and succinctly the relevant law applicable to the facts[.]" Mireles v. Broderick, 1994-NMSC-041, ¶ 15, 117 N.M. 445, 872 P.2d 863 (citation omitted). "Trial courts are required to instruct the jury on the applicable rules of law using the Uniform Jury Instructions, unless the instructions are waived by the parties." Benavidez v. City of Gallup, 2007-NMSC-026, ¶ 19, 141 N.M. 808, 161 P.3d 853; see also Rule 1-051(A) NMRA (); Cowan v. Powell, 1993-NMCA-075, ¶ 7, 115 N.M. 603, 856 P.2d 251 (); Sutherlin v. Fenenga, 1991-NMCA-011, ¶ 17, 111 N.M. 767, 810 P.2d 353 (). When applicable Uniform Jury Instructions are not available, such as in WPA actions, instructions outside of the Uniform Jury Instructions, or modified Uniform Jury Instructions, may be requested. See Mac Tyres, Inc. v. Vigil, 1979-NMSC-010, ¶ 17, 92 N.M. 446, 589 P.2d 1037.
{¶12} Plaintiff tendered a proposed instruction on retaliatory discharge modeled after UJI 13-2304. The district court refused the instruction, apparently reasoning that the contents of the instruction were sufficiently captured by other instructions given to the jury. Our review of the record reveals apparent confusion among the parties and the district court as to whether Plaintiff had pled a claim for retaliatory discharge. See Garrity v. Overland Sheepskin Co. of Taos, 1996-NMSC-032, ¶ 14, 121 N.M. 710, 917 P.2d 1382 (); Vigil v. Arzola, 1983-NMCA-082, ¶¶ 23, 27, 102 N.M. 682, 699 P.2d 613 (same), rev'd in part on other grounds, 1984-NMSC-090, ¶¶ 2-3, 101 N.M. 687, 687 P.2d 1038, overruled on other grounds by Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 1989-NMSC-050, ¶ 16, 108 N.M. 643, ¶ 26, 777 P.2d 371. Nevertheless, our own review of the record indicates that Plaintiff's claim alleging a violation of the WPA was the only one presented to the jury. We note that, on remand, if it is determined that Plaintiff did in fact plead a separate retaliatory discharge claim, UJI 13-2304 is an appropriate instruction. See UJI 13-2304, use notes. In any event, we do not proceed further on this question, as our reversal turns on the misstatement of the law contained in the special verdict form provided to the jury.
{¶13} The WPA provides that "[i]t shall be an affirmative defense . . . that the action taken by a public employer against a public employee was due to the employee's misconduct, the employee's poor job performance, a reduction in workforce or other legitimate business purpose unrelated to conduct prohibited by the [WPA] and that retaliatory action was not a motivating factor." Section 10-16C-4(B) (emphasis added); see Velasquez v. Regents of N. N.M. Coll., 2021-NMCA-007, ¶ 43, 484 P.3d 970 (), cert. denied, 2021-NMCERT-___ (No. S-1-SC-38542, Feb. 12, 2021). The special verdict form provided to the jury closely tracked its language; crucially, however, it asked the jury if "Plaintiff's request to change his report regarding the . . . [t]asing incident was the reason Plaintiff was [demoted.]" (Emphasis added.) This is a misstatement of the applicable law.
{¶14} Defendant counters that the jury received a causation instruction sufficient to render any error harmless. The instruction to which Defendant refers states that a" 'cause' of injury . . . need not be the only...
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