Peavey v. Univ. of Louisville

• Decision Date: 13 July 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:09–CV–00484–R.
• Citation: 834 F.Supp.2d 620,280 Ed. Law Rep. 777
• Parties: Jennifer PEAVEY, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

834 F.Supp.2d 620

280 Ed. Law Rep. 777

Jennifer PEAVEY, Plaintiff

v.UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:09–CV–00484–R.

United States District Court,

W.D. Kentucky,

Louisville Division.

July 13, 2011.

Jennifer Peavey, Miami, FL, pro se.

Donna King Perry, Jason M. Nemes, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Louisville, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THOMAS B. RUSSELL, Chief Judge.

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment (DN 106). Plaintiff has responded (DN 109) and Defendants have replied (DN 111). Plaintiff has also submitted a supplemental response where she sets forth objections to the evidentiary record, the discovery process, and Defendants' description of the facts (DN 109–1). This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dr. Jennifer Peavey was a medical resident at the Glasgow Family Medicine Residency Program (“GFMRP”) at the University of Louisville School of Medicine (“University”). She began her three-year residency on July 1, 2007. She executed a Resident Agreement with the University that covered the period from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008 (“2007 Agreement”). DN 106–3 at 1. It defined her rights and relationship with the University.

Peavey's superiors became concerned during her residency that she needed to improve her communication and interpersonal skills. A number of her supervising physicians also stated she had difficulty receiving constructive criticism and completing the records associated with her position. DN 106–4 at 4–6. On March 21, 2008, Peavey met with Dr. Richard Clouse, Assistant Clinical Professor, and Dr. Chris Marshall to evaluate her performance during hospital rotations. There, Peavey asserts that Clouse said she was having cultural problems with staff and patients because she was “black and did not understand how things were done in the good old South.” DN 109 at 2. Clouse denies that he made such a comment. Whatever was said, Peavey did not take immediate action, waiting until April 4, 2008 to tell another one of her supervisors, Dr. Asriel, about Dr. Clouse's remark.

Dr. Brent Wright, Director of the GFMRP, spoke with Peavey on May 8, 2008, discussing some issues she had with communication, performance, and professionalism. On June 26, 2008, Dr. Wright wrote to Dr. James O'Brien, Chairman and Professor of Family Medicine, and asked that Peavey be placed on academic probation effective immediately for a variety of reasons. DN 106–5 at 1–2. On Dr. O'Brien's approval, a letter was sent to Peavey outlining the terms of her probation, including a psychiatric evaluation with the Kentucky Physicians Health Foundation (“KPHF”). DN 106–5 at 3–9. In conjunction with the probationary decision, Dr. Wright contacted the Federation of State Medical Boards (“FSMB”) and reported “[Peavey's] instructors [had] given reports to [the] residency director regarding [her] eccentric behavior.” DN 1–9 at 3.

June of 2008 marked the end of the first year of Peavey's residency. Peavey was required to execute another resident agreement to continue with the University for her second year residency (“2008 Agreement”). Since Kentucky law requires all second-year medical residents obtain a license to practice medicine, execution of the 2008 Agreement by University officials was contingent on Peavey having the license. When Peavey failed to secure a license, the Dean of the Universitydeclined to fully execute the 2008 Agreement. DN 106–8. Still, Peavey was not immediately dismissed from the GFMRP; the University instead kept her on, giving her more time to obtain a medical license. On November 3, 2008, the University sent Peavey a letter explaining that without a formal written agreement, she was on a month-to-month implied contract that would terminate at the end of the year if she was unable to satisfy the licensure requirement. DN 106–9 at 1–2. The letter also indicated that her failure to submit to a psychiatric evaluation with the KPHF constituted a violation of her academic probation, which could also lead to her termination. Id. On January 7, 2009, the University notified Peavey that she had failed for a third time to secure her medical license, and in accordance with the letter of November 2008, she was released from the GFMRP. DN 106–10 at 1.

In response to all of this, Peavey began the University's administrative grievance process, charging her placement on academic probation was a result of racial discrimination and in retaliation for her complaints about Dr. Clouse. DN 109–16 at 1. She also filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 3, 2008. Both the grievance committee and the EEOC found no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Dr. Clouse or the University.

On July 10, 2009, Peavey filed the instant action, pro se, against fifteen defendants, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as claims of breach of contract, defamation, libel, slander, wrongful discharge, breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud and deceit. Currently, the action continues against the University, Dr. Wright, Dr. Roberts, Dr. James O'Brien, Dr. Asriel, Dr. Clouse, Dr. Sherry Jones, Dr. Kevin Flowers, Harvey Johnson, and Dr. James Ramsey (“University” or “Professor Defendants” or collectively “Defendants”). Peavey brings suits against the Professor Defendants in their individual and official capacity. Defendants now offer for this Court's consideration a motion for summary judgment.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

“[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.1989). The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir.1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the plaintiff must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find for the plaintiff. See id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment: “the mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir.1996).

DISCUSSION

I. Counts One and Two: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986

Under Count One of her amended complaint, Peavey alleges violations of her substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth amendment and section 1983. DN 27 at 18–19. For Count Two, Peavey relies upon sections 1981, 1985 and 1986, asserting that Defendants' conduct toward her was impermissibly premised on her race. Defendants advance that both Counts One and Two are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. They also propose there is insufficient evidence in the record for cognizable claims under these statutory provisions.

a. Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution generally bars suits brought in federal court against a state and its agencies. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir.2008). A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is considered a suit against the official's office. Id. (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). Public universities in Kentucky and their directors are state agencies and officials for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 999–1000 (6th Cir.1993) (explaining why the University of Kentucky was an “arm of the state under state law”); Weathers v. Ky. State Univ., No. 3: 09–CV–00004, 2009 WL 1683711, at *3 (E.D.Ky. June 16, 2009) (explaining that lawsuit against university officials including the president was barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Mattingly v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:05CV–393, 2006 WL 2178032, at *5 (W.D.Ky. July 28, 2006) (state law claims against university professor barred by sovereign immunity); Ward v. Members of Bd. of Control of E. Mich. Univ., 700 F.Supp.2d 803, 812 (E.D.Mich.2010) (suit against professors for money damages in their official capacity was barred by the Eleventh Amendment). There are three exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment's bar: (1) when the state consents to suit; (2) when Congress has abrogated a state's sovereign immunity; and (3) when pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), a litigant seeks prospective injunctive or declaratory relief compelling a state official to comply with federal law. S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir.2008). Here however, the present facts do not implicate any of these exceptions since there has been no explicit waiver of sovereign immunity by either the state or federal government and Peavey's requests money damages rather than injunctive relief.

Earlier legal rulings show that these claims against the University and the Professor Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the protections of the Eleventh Amendment. See e.g., Ejikeme v. Violet, 307 Fed.Appx. 944, 951 (6th Cir.2009) (bar of Eleventh Amendment...