Peck v. The City of Michigan City
Decision Date | 09 March 1898 |
Docket Number | 18,186 |
Citation | 49 N.E. 800,149 Ind. 670 |
Parties | Peck v. The City of Michigan City |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the LaPorte Circuit Court.
Reversed.
J. F Gallaher, C. R. Collins and J. B. Collins, for appellant.
W. H Breece, for appellee.
This suit was by the appellant, in three paragraphs of complaint. To the first paragraph appellee's demurrer was sustained, and to the second and third paragraphs demurrers were overruled and answers filed, and to said answers demurrers were overruled. Said several rulings are here assigned as error.
Each of the paragraphs of complaint alleged that appellant owned real estate fronting upon the basin of the harbor at the city of Michigan City and maintained docks for the loading and unloading of merchandise to and from the water craft doing business at said city, said business constituting the principal source of value to said property; that in the year 1883 the city had constructed an extensive system of sewers for the drainage and sewerage of said city, the main sewer emptying into said basin near to the appellant's property; that said system of sewers carried and emptied into said basin continually large quantities of sewage and of sand from the surface drainage of said city, so filling said basin at the point where his docks were maintained; that the water became too shallow to admit water craft to approach his docks; that the sewage collected at the mouth of said sewer, becoming so foul and offensive as not only to make it disagreeable and offensive for persons to approach his docks with water craft, but to make it offensive to persons to conduct business upon his docks and upon his premises; and that by reason thereof his premises were rendered valueless, to his damage in the sum of $ 5,000.00.
In each of the second and third paragraphs of complaint it was alleged generally that the appellee had been negligent in the plans and construction of said sewer, in emptying it at said point, the stream in said harbor being sluggish and insufficient to carry away the deposits from said sewer; also, in not removing from the mouth thereof the sand and sewage so emptied, and in collecting said sewage at said point without furnishing any outlet therefor.
The third paragraph alleged that the damage to his property had accrued since the year 1890. All of the paragraphs sought damages and the first sought also to enjoin the further discharge of sand and sewage into said basin. The answers were that the causes of action did not accrue within six years.
It is a general proposition, which we think applicable to the first paragraph of complaint, that, in the construction of sewers and other public works authorized by law, cities are liable for consequential injuries resulting from negligence only. City of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind.App. 482, 48 N.E. 610; City of Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542, 13 N.E. 686; Rice v. City of Evansville, 108 Ind. 7, 9 N.E. 139; City of Evansville v. Decker, 84 Ind. 325; Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491; Weis v. City of Madison, 75 Ind. 241; Macy v. City of Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267.
Said first paragraph does not proceed upon the theory of negligence, and does not seek to require the removal of the obstruction to the uses of the docks, but seeks to enjoin the use of the basin as a place to discharge sewage. The gist of any cause of action, under the facts pleaded, there being no negligence in plan or construction, must be in not caring for the sewage, when discharged into the basin, so as not to create and continue a nuisance, as we shall show hereafter.
The sufficiency of the second and third paragraphs of complaint is not presented. Each of said paragraphs proceeds upon the theory that the appellee, by her negligence, created a nuisance affecting the value of the appellant's property. Were the answers of the statute of limitations available? The argument proceeds upon the question as to whether the cause of action accrued from the time of the act resulting in the alleged nuisance, the construction of the sewer, or from the time of the injury sustained.
Conceding, as we must, from the absence of any question, the sufficiency of the second and third paragraphs of complaint, the cause of action relied upon in each is that by negligence the city has created and maintains a nuisance which directly affects public navigation and the appellant's enjoyment of his private property. If the complaint makes out this cause of action, it may be maintained upon authority. Franklin Wharf Co. v. City of Portland, 67 Me. 46, 24 Am. Rep. 1; Brayton v. City of Fall River, 113 Mass. 218, 18 Am. Rep. 470; Richardson v. City of Boston, 60 U.S. 263, 19 HOW 263, 270, 15 L.Ed. 639; Haskell v. City of New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; Barron v. Mayor, etc., 2 Am. Jurist, p. 203; 2 Dillon's Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), p. 1330, note; 2 Dillon's Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), sections 1047, 1048, 1051 and 1051a; Beach on Public Corporations, section 760; Harrison's Munic. Manual, p. 400; Tiedman on Munic. Corp., section 355; State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268. We must, therefore, look to the character of the liability and of the remedy, to ascertain whether they are of the class against which the statutes of limitation are directed.
In the first of the above-cited cases, a case in all respects like the present, the liability is clearly shown. The rights and duties of the city, the general public, and the private property owners are there given as follows: . ...
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