Pederson v. Lothman
Decision Date | 09 January 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 6270,6270 |
Citation | 1958 NMSC 3,320 P.2d 378,63 N.M. 364 |
Parties | Clinton W. PEDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis B. LOTHMAN and Mid-Continent Exploration Company, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Robert H. Sprecher, Roswell, Joseph L. Smith, Henry A. Kiker, Jr., Albuquerque, for appellant.
Gallagher & Walker, Threet & Ussery, Albuquerque, for appellee Louis B. Lothman.
Grantham Spann and Sanchez, Edward L. Yudin, Albuquerque, for appellee Mid-Continent Exploration Co.
Plaintiff-appellant, Clinton W. Pederson, filed this action in the District Court of McKinley County, asking for specific performance of an alleged oral contract by which the defendants-appellees, Louis B. Lothman and Mid-Continent Exploration Company, had allegedly promised him a five percent interest in certain mineral claims and leases in return for his services in the location of mineral claims and for acting as the 'representative' for appellee Mid-Continent Exploration Company in the State of New Mexico. He asked in the alternative for damages in the amount of five million dollars.
Appellees moved fora change of venue to Bernalillo County, and the trial judge denied the motion on the ground that the action involved an interest in land in McKinley County, and therefore venue was properly laid.
Appellant filed his first amended complaint, and appellees answered by way of legal defenses that the action was barred by the statute of frauds. Appellees then moved for summary judgment, stating as their grounds therefor that there was no genuine issue of fact to be tried, and that the action was for specific performance of an oral contract involving an interest in land, and thus barred by the statute of frauds.
The trial judge granted the summary judgment, and an appeal has been taken to this court. Appellant contends for reversal (1) That the court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, for the reason that the complaint, liberally construed, stated a valid claim against appellees upon a prospector's or grubstake agreement, to which the statute of frauds is not applicable; (2) that the court erred in its refusal to allow appellant to amend his complaint after summary judgment had been granted, in order that he might specifically assert a claim for relief on a prospector's or grubstake agreement.
The procedure of summary judgment is allowed by Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 21-1-1(56) of 1953 Compilation and is available to either party in a civil action.
Rule 56(b) provides:
Summary judgment provides a method whereby it is possible to determine whether a genuine claim for relief or defense thereof exists and whether there is a genuine issue of fact warranting the submission of the case to the jury. Agnew v. Libby et al., 53 N.M. 56, 201 P.2d 775. In a case where the facts are not in dispute, but only the legal effect of the facts is presented for determination, summary judgment may be properly granted. Ades v. Supreme Lodge Order of Ahepa, 51 N.M. 164, 181 P.2d 161; Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., D.C., 104 F.Supp. 59.
Appellant does not actually question the propriety of summary judgment in this case; he contends that it was improperly granted, since a genuine issue of fact was presented. His first point is that there must be liberal construction in his favor on the motion. With this proposition we are in agreement. In McLain v. Haley, 53 N.M. 327, 207 P.2d 1013, 1014, we said:
See, also, 6 Moore's Federal Practice Section 56.15(3); 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, Rules Ed. Section 1235.
This court must determine whether a material issue of fact was presented by the pleadings and the deposition of Clinton W. Pederson, those being before the trial court on its hearing of the motion for summary judgment. The pleadings of appellant, consisting of a complaint and an amended complaint, alleged in all four counts the existence of a contract upon which each count was based. The allegations of the first count being reasserted at the outset of each additional count. Any recovery allowed appellant in this action would have to be based upon a provable contract, and there is no controversy that the alleged contract was not in writing.
The statute of frauds is applicable in New Mexico as a part of the common law. Ades v. Supreme Lodge Order of Ahepa, supra, and cases therein cited.
Appellant asserts that his pleadings and deposition make out a case for the existence of a prospector's or grubstake contract which is not within the statute of frauds. In his deposition he characterized the relationship between himself and appellee Louis B. Lothman as one of a partnership, and referred to him as a partner. His position is that these references are sufficient to present a material issue of fact.
This court has never considered a case involving the so called grubstake contract. The case of Erbele v. Carmichael, 1896, 8 N.M. 696, 47 P. 717, cited by appellant, held that the prospecting agreement therein involved was not void as being within the statute of frauds, but a reading of that case will disclose that the problem presented there was in no wise similar to the one before us here.
The authorities of the other mining states which have ruled on the problem recognize that a true grubstake contract does not come within the bar of the statute. 2 Lindley on Mines Section 858 (2nd Ed., p. 1565); Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th Ed., p. 383; Moritz v. Lavelle, 77 Cal. 10, 18 P. 803 ( ); Murley v. Ennis, 2 Colo. 300; Costello v. Scott, 30 Nev. 43, 93 P. 1, 94 P. 222; Mack v. Mack, 39 Wash. 190, 81 P. 707, Hartney...
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