Pedigo v. Johnson

• Citation: 130 Ill.App.3d 392,85 Ill.Dec. 702,474 N.E.2d 430
• Decision Date: 30 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 4-84-0154,4-84-0154
• Parties: , 85 Ill.Dec. 702 Danny J. PEDIGO, d/b/a Pedigo Sod Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tom JOHNSON, Director, Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 430

474 N.E.2d 430

130 Ill.App.3d 392, 85 Ill.Dec. 702

Danny J. PEDIGO, d/b/a Pedigo Sod Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tom JOHNSON, Director, Department of Revenue of the State of

Illinois, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-84-0154.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Jan. 30, 1985.

Danny J. Pedigo, pro se.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Eugene P. Schmittgens, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Springfield, for defendant-appellee.

TRAPP, Justice:

Danny J. Pedigo, a pro se plaintiff, filed suit to determine whether the decision of defendant Illinois Department of Revenue was void. The circuit court of Sangamon County dismissed the complaint on res judicata grounds, and plaintiff appeals.

After a hearing on August 21, 1979, the Department determined plaintiff was liable for arrears of taxes of approximately $15,600. Plaintiff filed suit for judicial review, but the trial court affirmed the Department's assessment. We, in turn, affirmed the trial court's judgment in Pedigo v. Department of Revenue (1982), 105 Ill.App.3d 759, 61 Ill.Dec. 505, 434 N.E.2d 860 [hereinafter referred to as Pedigo I ]. The supreme court later denied leave to appeal. Pedigo v. Department of Revenue (1982), 91 Ill.2d 572.

Not satisfied with the results obtained in Illinois courts, plaintiff filed suit in Federal court pursuant to the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1982). The Federal District Court dismissed the suit, holding that our decision in Pedigo I had already addressed the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

On November 10, 1983, plaintiff again filed suit in the circuit court of Sangamon County. He alleged the Department's prior determination was void. The trial court dismissed the action on res judicata grounds.

Plaintiff contends the Department failed to comply with section 10 of The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 127, par. 1010.) Section 10 outlines the requirement for notice of a hearing in a contested case under the Act. Plaintiff made this same argument on appeal in Pedigo I. We refused to consider the issue, stating:

"Despite this omission in the notice, we note that plaintiff failed to object at any point to the notice issued by the Department below. As such, any claim by plaintiff that the notice did not comply with section 10 will not be considered inasmuch as this matter has been waived by plaintiff's failure to object to the omission of the aforementioned items." (105 Ill.App.3d 759, 762, 61 Ill.Dec. 505, 508, 434 N.E.2d 860, 863.)

The Department maintains a doctrine of res judicata precludes plaintiff from raising the notice issue now.

Res judicata prohibits repetitive litigation in an effort to obtain judicial economy and to protect litigants from the burden of retrying an identical cause of action with the same party or a privy. Under the doctrine, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits bars absolutely a subsequent action involving the same cause of action or issue between the same parties or their privies. Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 423, 432, 69 Ill.Dec. 399, 403, 447 N.E.2d 834, 838.

The res judicata effect affixes to administrative decisions that are judicial in nature. (Godare v. Sterling Steel Casting Co. (1981), 103 Ill.App.3d 46, 58 Ill.Dec. 588, 430 N.E.2d 620.) After a review of such a decision, the reviewing court's judgment is res judicata to all issues raised before it, and all issues, which could have been raised on the record but were not, are deemed waived. People v. Mitchell (1981), 95 Ill.App.3d 779, 791, 51 Ill.Dec. 1, 420 N.E.2d 415, 424.

A former adjudication can be relied on as an absolute bar when the parties and the cause of action are the same in both proceedings, the former adjudication was a final judgment on the merits, and the court had jurisdiction to render it. (People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 408-09, 75 N.E.2d 851, 854.) Those criteria are met by the decision in Pedigo I. We held that plaintiff could have and should have raised the matter of notice earlier in that proceeding, and thus, the doctrine of res judicata should preclude him from raising it now.

Plaintiff, however, notes that res judicata is not applied to a void judgment. A void judgment is one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect. (In re Marriage of Allcock (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 150, 153, 62 Ill.Dec. 865, 437 N.E.2d 392, 394.) Plaintiff cites section 14 of The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 127, par. 1014), which states, in part:

"A decision by any agency in a contested case under this Act shall be void unless the proceedings are conducted in compliance with the provisions of this Act relating to contested cases except to the extent such provisions are waived pursuant to Section 18 of this Act and except to the extent the agency has adopted its own rules for contested cases as authorized in Section 2 of this Act."

Plaintiff argues the Department's prior order must be void for failure to comply with the notice provision in contested cases. Generally, an agency's order that is void may be attacked at any time and in any court either directly or collaterally. (City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1976), 65 Ill.2d 108, 112, 2 Ill.Dec. 711, 357 N.E.2d 1154, 1155.) Plaintiff concludes the order in Pedigo I is still subject to collateral attack.

Plaintiff, however, has already directly attacked the Department's decision in Pedigo I. While plaintiff had the right to attack the agency's decision either directly or collaterally if it was void, he has no right to both a direct and a collateral attack. The trial court and we ourselves had jurisdiction to review the validity of the Department's order in Pedigo I. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, pars. 3-104, 3-112.) One reason for reviewing an administrative action is to ensure that the agency has acted within the judicial bounds defined by law, and to guard those statutory and constitutional rights guaranteed to one subject to agency action. (Piotrowski v. State Police Merit Board (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 369, 374, 40 Ill.Dec. 660, 663, 406 N.E.2d 863, 866.) Hence, the validity of the Department's decision was at issue in Pedigo I.

In essence, our decision in Pedigo I held that the Department's assessment was not void. Plaintiff maintains we erred, but the doctrine of res judicata precludes him from relitigating the issue. Res judicata is premised on the notion that the law affords every man his day in court along with the opportunity to present his case on the issues involved. It also requires him to bring forth all grounds of recovery or defense that he has. (Pratt v. Baker (1967), 79 Ill.App.2d 479, 485, 223 N.E.2d 865, 868.) "It is of first importance both in the observance of private rights and the public good that a question once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be considered as finally settled and conclusive upon the parties, subject only to proceedings in a court of review." [Winkelman v. Winkelman (1923), 310 Ill. 568, 573, 142 N.E. 173, 174.) Once a litigation is prosecuted to an appellate court and questions of law are decided, all questions relating to the same subject matter which were open for consideration and could have been presented are res judicata. Finley v. Crossley (1953), 414 Ill. 105, 106, 110 N.E.2d 255, 256.

Moreover, we believe plaintiff misinterprets the effect of section 14. Plaintiff argues that by failing to comply with the notice requirement, the Department's hearing and determination became an absolute nullity. He could not, therefore, waive an objection to it as we held in Pedigo I.

In construing a statute, a court should ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. (People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill.2d 469, 60 Ill.Dec. 632, 433 N.E.2d 674.) The words of a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning unless to do so would defeat the legislative purpose. (Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 414, 419, 67 Ill.Dec. 172, 175, 444 N.E.2d 211, 214.) The proper interpretation of the statute, however, cannot simply be based on its language; it must be grounded on the nature, object, and consequences that would result from construing it one way or another. Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill.2d 13, 21, 15 Ill.Dec. 648, 651, 373 N.E.2d...