Pedro T., In re, S032514

Citation884 P.2d 1022,36 Cal.Rptr.2d 74,8 Cal.4th 1041
Decision Date12 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. S032514,S032514
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties, 884 P.2d 1022 In re PEDRO T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PEDRO T., Defendant and Appellant.

Howard C. Cohen, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary W. Schons, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nancy Palmieri, Janelle B. Davis and Esteban Hernandez, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent.

WERDEGAR, Justice.

In 1989 the Legislature amended Vehicle Code section 10851, effective January 1, 1990, to increase the maximum punishment for vehicle theft from three years to four. (Stats.1989, ch. 930, § 11, p. 3259.) The 1989 legislation provided that the lesser, pre-1990 punishment would be reinstated as of January 1, 1993, unless the Legislature, before the latter date, otherwise directed. (Stats.1989, ch. 930, § 12.5, p. 3266.) The Legislature did not so direct. Accordingly, the lesser punishment was reinstated as provided in the 1989 statute.

This case presents the question whether one who committed vehicle theft during the effective period of the provision for increased punishment, but whose conviction for that offense was not yet final as of the "sunset" date of that provision, can be sentenced thereunder. We answer this question in the affirmative, and conclude that In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948, cited as authority for a contrary position, does not govern this case. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

On several occasions before April 23, 1991, Pedro T. (the minor) had been found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. On that date, the District Attorney of Riverside County filed a petition subsequent alleging that on April 13, 1991, the minor had escaped from Twin Pines Ranch. On June 20, 1991, the district attorney filed a second petition subsequent alleging, among other things, that the minor had violated Vehicle Code section 10851 by taking and driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner and with the intent to deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle. The minor admitted the truth of the April 23, 1991, petition. Following a trial on the June 20, 1991, petition, the court found the minor came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court committed him to the California Youth Authority, but suspended execution of the commitment. The minor was placed on probation with various conditions, including placement at Twin Pines Ranch.

On August 22, 1991, the minor again escaped from Twin Pines Ranch. Five days later the district attorney filed a petition subsequent alleging misdemeanor escape (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 871). Following his rearrest some months later, the minor admitted the truth of the escape allegation. The court ordered him committed to the California Youth Authority for a term of six years and six months, using as the base term the four-year maximum term for vehicle taking under former Vehicle Code section 10851. The Court of Appeal affirmed. We granted review to decide whether the minor is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment provided in the current version of Vehicle Code section 10851.

Discussion

The minor contends that once the sunset provision of the 1989 statute took effect, and the version of Vehicle Code section 10851 operative when the offense was committed expired pursuant to its terms, the ameliorative effect of the reinstated lesser punishment inured to the benefit of all persons, such as himself, whose convictions under the 1989 statute were not yet final. In support of his contention, he cites our decision in In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 (Estrada ), certain legislative history, and Government Code section 9611.

Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948, involved a prosecution for escape in violation of Penal Code section 4530. When the petitioner in Estrada committed the crime of escape, section 4530 provided that an escape or an attempted escape was punishable by at least a one-year period of imprisonment, to commence from the time the prisoner would otherwise be discharged from prison. (63 Cal.2d at p. 743, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) At that time, Penal Code section 3044 provided that no person convicted of an escape could be paroled until he had served at least two calendar years after his return to prison after the conviction. (63 Cal.2d at p. 743, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) After the petitioner's escape, but before his conviction and sentence, Penal Code sections 3044 and 4530 were amended to reduce the penalties formerly imposed for escapes committed without force or violence. The petitioner in Estrada contended he was entitled to the benefit of the ameliorative amendments.

We agreed. "The problem, of course," we observed, "is one of trying to ascertain the legislative intent--did the Legislature intend the old or new statute to apply? Had the Legislature expressly stated which statute should apply, its determination, either way, would have been legal and constitutional. It has not done so." (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) We looked to other considerations. "Paramount" among them was an appreciation that "[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act." (Id. at pp. 744-745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) We found "inevitable" the inference the Legislature must have intended that the new statute, imposing the new, lighter penalty the Legislature thenceforth deemed sufficient, apply in every case to which it constitutionally could apply. (Id. at p. 745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) 1 Thus, the amendatory act, we concluded, should apply to crimes committed before its effective date, provided the judgment of conviction is not yet final. (Ibid.)

By extension, the minor argues that whenever the Legislature amends a statute to increase, for a specified period, the penalty for an offense, the court, absent a saving clause, cannot apply the increased penalty in a case, such as his, that arises out of an offense committed during the specified period, but is not final until after the amendment expires or "sunsets." (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 ["The fact that the offender can be punished under the old law when the new law increases the punishment where there is an express or implied saving clause, certainly is not conclusive on the legislative intent where the new statute mitigates the punishment. If there is no saving clause he can and should be punished under the new law."].) We are unpersuaded by the minor's argument.

The basis of our decision in Estrada was our quest for legislative intent. Ordinarily when an amendment lessens the punishment for a crime, one may reasonably infer the Legislature has determined imposition of a lesser punishment on offenders thereafter will sufficiently serve the public interest. In the case of a "sunset" provision attached to a temporary enhancement of penalty, the same inference cannot so readily be drawn.

Here, in temporarily increasing the penalties for vehicle-taking, the Legislature determined the public safety required a three-year test of stricter punishments. In a preface to the statute, we find the following statement of purpose: "The Legislature finds and declares that the rapid increase in motor vehicle theft has reached crisis proportions.... [T]he escalating problem of vehicle theft is nurtured by the lack of any serious deterrent to this crime.... [p] ... [T]he Legislature believes that it is in the best interest for public safety to enhance the penalties for the crimes of vehicle theft and receiving stolen vehicles." (Stats.1989, ch. 930, § 1, pp. 3246-3247.) Far from determining that a lesser punishment for vehicle theft would serve the public interest, the Legislature expressly declared that increased penalties were necessary. Estrada is not implicated on these facts.

Nor does the general rule that penal statutes are to be construed as favorably to defendants as their language and circumstances permit (see, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617) demand a different result. The general rule applies only when some doubt exists as to the legislative purpose in enacting the law. We find no such doubt here, given the Legislature's express declaration of its aim of increasing deterrence of vehicle theft through enhancement of the applicable penalty.

Our conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the practical effect of a contrary rule. The utility of a three-year legislative experiment in enhanced penalties might be seriously undermined if those penalties, instead of applying to all offenders during the three years, could be imposed only on those whose convictions became final before the sunset date. The Legislature could reasonably assume that for a deterrent to work it must operate long enough and consistently enough to convey to the public an understanding that the heavier penalty will apply during the stated effective period of the legislation. Yet under the construction the minor urges, the three-year period would in effect be reduced to something indeterminate and much less, i.e., that period of time following the effective date of the amendment in which any particular conviction that occurred could become final before expiration of the three years. (See In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 594, 136 Cal.Rptr. 718 ...

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