Peede v. State

• Decision Date: 19 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 90,002.,90,002.
• Parties: Robert Ira PEEDE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

748 So.2d 253

Robert Ira PEEDE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 90,002.

Supreme Court of Florida.

August 19, 1999.

John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region, Christopher DeBock, Assistant CCRC-Middle Region, Syed S. Ahmed and Abigail O. Dressel, Staff Attorneys-Middle Region, Tampa, Florida; and Robert Ira Peede, pro se, Raiford, Florida, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Katherine V. Blanco and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Robert Ira Peede appeals the summary denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on Peede's Brady¹ claim, most of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, his mental competence claims, and his public records request.

PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

In 1984, Peede was convicted for the first-degree murder of his estranged wife, Darla Peede. The facts in this case are set forth in greater detail in Peede v. State, 474 So.2d 808 (Fla.1985). The evidence at trial established that Peede returned to Miami to convince Darla to go to North Carolina and serve as a decoy in an alleged scheme Peede had to kill his ex-wife and her boyfriend. Peede telephoned Darla and she agreed to pick him up at the airport. However, instead of returning to Darla's home as intended, they mistakenly got on the Florida Turnpike heading for Orlando. As they left the Miami area, Peede pulled a lock-blade knife and inflicted a superficial cut in Darla's side. Subsequently, outside of Orlando, Peede stopped the car, jumped into the back seat, and stabbed Darla in the throat. As a result of this injury, Darla bled to death. Peede was arrested in North Carolina before carrying out his scheme to murder his ex-wife, and he confessed to Darla's murder.

After his trial and conviction, a jury recommended the death penalty. The trial judge followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Peede to death, finding three aggravating factors² and one mitigating circumstance. The trial court found in mitigation that Peede was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but attributed little weight to this finding. On appeal, this Court affirmed Peede's conviction and, although we found that the murder was not cold, calculated and premeditated (CCP), we nevertheless upheld the death penalty. See Peede v. State, 474 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1985)

. On June 23, 1986, the United States Supreme Court denied Peede's petition for writ of certiorari.³

On May 6, 1988, the governor signed a death warrant and on June 6, 1988, Peede filed an emergency 3.850 motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence, raising fifteen issues. The fifteen claims were: (1) that Peede was not competent to stand trial; (2) that he received an inadequate psychiatric evaluation; (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) that counsel was ineffective in failing to present an insanity defense; (5) that there was a Brady violation; (6) that the instructions diminished the responsibility of the jury; (7) that the jury instruction on jurisdiction was improper; (8) that there was an improper instruction to the jury shifting the burden of proof to Peede during the penalty phase; (9) that the jury instructions created an automatic aggravating circumstance; (10) that the instructions in the guilt phase were unconstitutional for failing to explain the unanimity requirement; (11) that there was an improper instruction to the jury that a majority vote was needed for a life recommendation; (12) that a jury instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof of mitigation to the defendant; (13) that the trial court failed to consider all nonstatutory mitigation; (14) that the death sentence was imposed based on an unconstitutionally obtained prior conviction; and (15) that there were due process violations where the State presented the factual basis for the prior guilty pleas at the sentencing phase. The State's response conceded that an evidentiary hearing was proper on the claims relating to Peede's competency to stand trial, the adequacy of his psychiatric evaluation, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the alleged Brady violation. The trial court granted Peede's application for stay on June 24, 1988, and stayed his execution indefinitely. On October 7, 1988, the trial judge scheduled a four-day evidentiary hearing which apparently never took place.

Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, Peede filed an amended 3.850 motion, expanding upon his prior fifteen issues and raising six additional issues. The six new issues were: (1) whether the death penalty is constitutional; (2) whether this Court failed to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis concerning the CCP finding; (3) whether the sentencing court failed to properly and timely impose a written sentence of death; (4) whether improper hearsay testimony was admitted; (5) whether the prohibition against interviewing jurors after trial is constitutional; and (6) whether state agencies improperly withheld files and records in violation of chapter 119, Florida Statutes (1993). The State opposed this amended motion on the ground that it was untimely filed.

On June 21, 1996, the trial court summarily denied all of Peede's claims even though the State had conceded the need for an evidentiary hearing on certain claims and the trial court had scheduled a four-day evidentiary hearing. It was not clear from the order whether the judge had considered the claims raised in the amended motion. However, in a subsequent order dated January 28, 1997, the judge stated that he had considered and addressed the claims raised in Peede's amended motion when he denied all relief. Because the new claims raised in the amended motion were not addressed specifically in his order, we assume that the trial judge found these issues procedurally barred or improperly pled when he wrote in his initial order that "the remaining claims are either procedurally barred or improperly pled." This appeal follows.⁴

APPEAL⁵

On appeal, Peede essentially alleges that the trial court erred in summarily denying the claims raised in his 3.850 motion.⁶ We affirm the trial court's summary denial of claims (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15) of Peede's original rule 3.850 motion. We also affirm the trial court's denial of claims (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the newly added claims in the amended motion for postconviction relief. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims.⁷

Preliminarily, however, we address Peede's first claim on appeal that because both the State and the trial court had conceded the need for an evidentiary hearing, his due process rights were violated when the trial court reversed its earlier ruling and denied the evidentiary hearing. Although the State's concession can be a relevant factor in the trial court's decision to grant an evidentiary hearing, such concession is not dispositive as to the actual need for one; this determination is ultimately made by the trial court, subject to appellate review. See Swafford v. State, 636 So.2d 1309, 1310 n. 4 (Fla.1994)

. We find no merit to Peede's claim on this issue. For the remainder of Peede's claims, we apply the following standard of review.

Standard of Review

To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a 3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the record. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(d). Further, where no evidentiary hearing is held below, we must accept the defendant's factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record. See Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So.2d 1364, 1365 (Fla.1989)

.

Public Records Request

Peede alleges that he has not received any records pursuant to his request under chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes. The trial court failed to address this issue in its order and, so far as we can tell, the issue was not addressed at any hearings conducted below. Because we are unable to determine the merits of this claim on the present record and we are remanding for an evidentiary hearing, we remand without prejudice for Peede to again present this claim to the trial court, recognizing that Peede retains the burden of sufficiently alleging and establishing his entitlement to public records or other discovery in accord with the rules applicable to postconviction proceedings.

Brady Claims

Peede alleges that the State committed a Brady violation by withholding independent evidence of Darla's loving relationship with him. Specifically, he claims the State withheld a part of Darla's diary written four months before her murder that expressed her love for Peede and her desire to reunite with him in Miami. He claims that he could have used these statements to contradict the State's kidnaping theory and to negate the inferences drawn from Darla's daughter's testimony that her mother was scared of Peede and would not have agreed to accompany him to Orlando or North Carolina. At trial, the State presented and argued a theory of felony murder based on an underlying kidnaping. In part through the testimony of witnesses who testified that Darla was terrified of Peede and would never have accompanied him voluntarily on an extended trip, the State sought to prove that Peede forced the victim to accompany him. In particular, Darla's daughter testified that Darla had told her that if she did not return promptly from the airport, she should notify the police. Since it was conceded that Darla had initially joined Peede voluntarily, the State used this testimony to attempt to prove the lack of consent element of the crime of kidnaping, and as a result, in the penalty phase, the trial court actually found that the murder...