Peek v. Ciccone

Citation288 F. Supp. 329
Decision Date01 August 1968
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 16140-3.
PartiesHarold L. PEEK, Jr., Petitioner, v. Dr. P. J. CICCONE, Director, United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

Carl E. Yates, Springfield, Mo., for petitioner.

Calvin K. Hamilton, U. S. Atty., by Bruce C. Houdek, Kansas City, Mo., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

BECKER, Chief judge.

Petitioner, a federal convict confined in the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, filed in this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus "for production of witnesses and documents to substantuate (sic) denial of due process of law and cruel and inhumane treatment with leave to proceed forma pauperis."

In the petition the petitioner states that he is a convict serving a "long sentence"; that his transfer to the federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas, from McNeil Island and then to the Medical Center was "cruel and in humane treatment because it resulted in brutality and mental and physical suffering"; that he has been forced to take drugs which "muddle a man's mind preventing him from writing clearly to courts, politicians or relatives"; that various reports of his "stability" or "instability" which allegedly have been forwarded to the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy are prejudicial reports made by "prison officials"; that he is not allowed to see these reports and this is a denial of "legal representation"; that his work assignment at the Medical Center is "`forced slave labor' under the guise of `rehabilitation'"; and that he has been brutally treated, confined in the "hole", a building where no "heat or too much heat is applied, small rations of water and a starvation diet, plus deprivation of hygiene facilities."

After considering petitioner's complaints, this Court determined that the nature of the petition was habeas corpus. The respondent was ordered to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus awarding injunctive relief should not be granted.

Respondent's response to the order to show cause states that on January 31, 1962, petitioner received a total sentence of twenty-five years for violating Sections 2112 and 2114, Title 18, U.S.C.1; that his initial commitment was in the United States Penitentiary, McNeil Island, Washington, on February 2, 1962; that he was transferred to the United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, on December 5, 1965; that on March 24, 1966, petitioner was transferred to the Medical Center; that upon entering the Medical Center, "petitioner was housed in Ward 10A 2, which provides close individual custody for psychiatric patients"; that upon his entry to the Medical Center, he refused to accept a work assignment and on April 1, 1966, he "was placed in Ward 21E in a strip cell for discipline and maximum security"; that on April 2, 1966, he "refused to accept food and water and demanded that he be personally waited upon by custodial personnel"; that on April 9, 1966, because of petitioner's changed attitude, he was scheduled to be moved to Ward 10B where he would be allowed more freedom and comfort but that he refused oral medication which had been ordered for him and the custodial personnel were required to administer the medication intramuscularly and with force; and that petitioner was not injured, but one custodial officer was injured and, therefore, petitioner's scheduled transfer to Ward 10B was cancelled.

Respondent's response further stated the following:

"On April 12, 1966, petitioner was transferred to Ward 10B which is maximum control for acutely ill and chronic psychotics. Residents of this ward are kept in their rooms at all times except that exercise in the yard is provided on a regular basis with personal escort. On April 13, 1966, petitioner reported that he had passed out, fallen to the floor and cut his eye. This injury required one stitch to close. The injury to petitioner's eye which he complains of occurred in this manner, not at the time when medication was administered forcibly. On April 20, 1966, petitioner was moved to Ward 10D which again is a maximum control ward where the residents are housed in individual rooms. During the day the doors to these rooms are left open and the residents are allowed to go and come in the ward with some degree of freedom. Television is available. On May 11, 1966, petitioner was transferred to Ward 10F which is a ward for younger aggressive prisoners. This ward again provides individual rooms which are locked only at night and the residents are permitted to exercise in the yard, watch television, attend movies and have gymnasium privileges. At this time prisoner was assigned to work in the food service at the main kitchen. On May 19, 1966, petitioner refused to continue to work in food service and was reprimanded and warned but reassigned as an orderly in the craft shop, where he is currently assigned. On July 22, 1966, petitioner was removed from 10F and transferred to the regular prison population.
"The medication received by petitioner is as follows: April 6, 1966, 5 mg. Permitil, twice daily. This is a tranquilizing drug. As petitioner had refused this medication, Thorazine was administered in its place intramuscularly. April 23, 1966, the dosage was reduced to 4 mg.; April 29, 1966, reduced to 3 mg. and May 5, 1966, reduced to 2 mg. This medication was of a tranquilizing nature and was ordered by the medical staff of the institution for petitioner's benefit. It was reduced in strength in a continuing pattern and has been of substantial benefit to petitioner in that his psychiatric condition has improved to the degree where he has been recommended for transfer to a regular prison institution.
* * * * * *
"Petitioner next complains that he has been forced to slave labor by prison officials and that he has been punished for these refusals. The work program at the United States Medical Center is a necessary part of the discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation and reformation provided by Section 4001, Title 18, United States Code. As petitioner is a convicted prisoner, he is not entitled to complain that he is required to do certain work.
* * * * * *
"Petitioner's complaint regarding brute force apparently refers to forcible administration of medication on April 9. 1966. The drugs involved were ordered by his assigned doctor and determined necessary for treatment of his condition. Petitioner was not injured and undue force was not used. One of the medical center personnel was, however, injured in this incident. Petitioner's eye injury apparently resulted from a fall and was not occasioned by acts of medical center personnel. Force is sometimes required to obtain compliance with Medical Center rules and regulations and to assure as much as possible the safety of other inmates, personnel and the public at large. All of the acts of the personnel at the United States Medical Center has been done in petitioner's best interests which is evidenced by his improved condition. The care provided is in line with the present day medical knowledge and penal administration. Undue force has not been used nor has the petitioner been mistreated in any way. It is respectfully submitted that all of the matters referred to by petitioner are within the sound administrative discretion of the Bureau of Prisons."

Petitioner's traverse of the response to the order to show cause entitled "Rebuttal Brief to the Opposition" stated that the administration of drugs by members of the Medical Center staff who were not "certified doctors" or "registered medical assistants" was unlawful and improper; that petitioner had not received a psychiatric hearing as provided by Section 4241, Title 18, U.S. C.; that his transfer to the Medical Center was unlawful because "prison officials" had misrepresented his "psychiatric record of illness"; that his confinement at the Medical Center prevented him from obtaining legal relief from custody; and that petitioner desired to have an injunction issue "to prevent coercive use of force * * * for the purpose of forcing slavery in a prison job. * * *"

After the filing of petitioner's traverse, this Court received a letter from petitioner on May 31, 1967, in which he complained of religious practices in the Medical Center, especially in connection with alleged refusals of his requests to change religious preferences. Petitioner requested that the Court "entertain this letter as a motion for an order, or injunction, to prevent further interference by Jackson Reed Protestant Chaplain at the Medical Center in my, or other inmates' freedom to choose a religion without all the stalling preventatives." This letter was treated as a supplement to the petition for habeas corpus filed herein.

After receipt of this letter, this Court considered the issues raised by the petition for habeas corpus, the response to the order to show cause, the traverse thereof, and the letter from petitioner stating interference with his religious freedom at the Medical Center. Thereafter this Court entered the following order: "Order Appointing Counsel, Granting Time For Respondent to File Response, And Granting An Evidentiary Hearing." This order further requested that counsel meet and prepare a stipulation and statement of the issues in accordance with the procedures in the Cortez case. See 32 F.R.D. 391.

Respondent's supplemental response to the order to show cause was directed toward petitioner's complaints about interference with his religious freedom at the Medical Center. This response stated that religious practices at the Medical Center are governed by the "Policy Statement: Institutional Religious Program" issued by the Director of the Medical Center; that this policy "is reasonable under the circumstances and necessary to the orderly administration of that institution"; that an inmate of the Medical...

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  • Williams v. WARDEN, FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INST., Civ. No. B-78-328.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • 11 May 1979
    ...v. Hartness, 485 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1973), upheld a prisoner's right to send out a Christmas mailing. Similarly, in Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F.Supp. 329, 333-34 (W.D.Mo. 1968), a prisoner who believed he was the reincarnation of Jesus Christ was permitted to communicate this belief to the Pope,......
  • Sconiers v. Jarvis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • 25 July 1978
    ...73CV94-SW-R and 73CV312-S-EBH-R, unpublished (W.D.Mo. 1973); Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1965); Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F.Supp. 329 (W.D.Mo.W.D.1968). Nor does the inmate's disagreement with the nature or type of medical care provided present a constitutional claim. Bowring v. God......
  • Williams v. Anderson, 90-2487
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 9 April 1992
    ...an on-going psychotherapeutic program, it violated the residents' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 455. In Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F.Supp. 329 (W.D.Mo.1968), a district court upheld the one-time forced administration of an antipsychotic drug to an inmate who had a medical history......
  • Rhem v. McGrath
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 17 March 1971
    ...United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. (1970); Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1969); Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F.Supp. 329 (W.D.Mo.1968); Faught v. Ciccone, 283 F.Supp. 76 (W.D.Mo.1966); and lack of access to legal materials (provided that the inmate is not prev......
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