Peek v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp.

Citation342 Conn. 103,269 A.3d 24
Decision Date02 February 2022
Docket NumberSC 20414
Parties Delores PEEK v. MANCHESTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut

Sean R. Caruthers, Branford, with whom, on the brief, was Michael D. Neubert, New Haven, for the appellants (defendants).

Neil Johnson, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.**

MULLINS, J.

The defendants, Manchester Memorial Hospital and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the action of the plaintiff, Delores Peek, was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-584.1 We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the plaintiff initiated her action within two years from the date of her injury, as that term is understood in the context of § 52-584. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following relevant facts from the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party. "On January 30, 2015, the plaintiff was admitted to Manchester Memorial Hospital with a medical diagnosis of [C. diff] diarrhea. On or about that date, she was assessed at the hospital and found to be at risk for falling. She was placed on ‘fall prevention protocol’ and required assistance to leave her hospital bed. On February 10, 2015, the plaintiff fell while using the restroom and sustained injuries to her shoulder and neck, for which she received medication and treatment. She ‘was unaware,’ on the date of her fall, ‘what was the cause of [her] fall.’ The plaintiff left the hospital on February 12, 2015, and received follow-up care through December 10, 2015, on which date she underwent neck surgery. On or about April 6, 2015, staff at the office of the plaintiff's doctor informed the plaintiff that ‘a nurse or nurse's aide should have been responsible for [her] safety while inpatient at [the hospital].’

"On November 22, 2016, the plaintiff received an automatic ninety day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to General Statutes [Rev. to 2015] § 52-190a (b).2 The plaintiff delivered the action to the state marshal for service of process on May 22, 2017. In her one count complaint, the plaintiff alleges that her fall resulted from the defendants’ negligence in ‘fail[ing] to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence ordinarily exercised by hospitals engaged in the treat[ment] of patients ... on ... fall prevention protocol ....’ On July 26, 2017, the defendants filed an answer and a special defense alleging that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations in § 52-584. On July 31, 2017, the plaintiff filed her reply to the special defense, stating therein: ‘The plaintiff ... denies any and all allegations of the defendants’ special defense in its entirety ....’

"On September 13, 2017, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, maintaining that the plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations in § 52-584. The documents submitted with the defendants’ motion and memorandum of law in support of their motion were the plaintiff's certificate of good faith pursuant to § 52-190a and attached written opinion letter, the plaintiff's request for an extension of the statute of limitations, the state marshal's return of service, the defendants’ answer and special defense, and the plaintiff's reply thereto.

"On December 29, 2017, the plaintiff objected to the motion for summary judgment, arguing ... [inter alia, that] the statute of limitations did not begin [to run] until April 6, 2015, on which date she claimed that she ‘learned that she was on fall risk protocol and that while on fall risk protocol that the hospital was required to provide her assistance whenever she left her bed.’ She argued that she ‘was not aware that the defendants’ conduct or lack thereof was the cause of her injury until she was informed by the defendant provider on or about April 6, 2015.’ The plaintiff attached to her opposition memorandum her affidavit averring that she ‘was unaware,’ on the date of her fall, ‘what was the cause of [her] fall.’ She further averred that staff at her doctor's office informed her on April 6, 2015, that ‘a nurse or nurse's aide should have been responsible for [her] safety while inpatient at [the hospital].’ The defendants did not file a reply memorandum.

"On January 2, 2018, the court granted the defendantsmotion for summary judgment [and rendered judgment for the defendants], stating that ‘the plaintiff did not place the action in the hands of the marshal until May 22, 2017. Because the plaintiff suffered actionable harm—the fall and injuries—on February 10, 2015, she should have brought the action on or before February 10, 2017. Having received a ninety day extension ... the suit should have been initiated on or before May 10, 2017. Having failed to initiate this action within the applicable statute of limitations, the action is time barred.’ " (Footnote added; footnotes omitted.) Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , 193 Conn. App. 337, 339–41, 219 A.3d 421 (2019).

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff asserted "that she submitted evidence in opposition to the defendantsmotion for summary judgment that show[ed] that she did not discover her ‘injury’ for purposes of § 52-584 until April 6, 2015. She argue[d] that actionable harm occurred on April 6 when she learned that the defendants’ negligence had caused her injury." Id. at 345, 219 A.3d 421.

The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 348, 219 A.3d 421. In doing so, the Appellate Court construed the term "injury" for purposes of § 52-584 consistent with this court's decision in Lagassey v. State , 268 Conn. 723, 747–49, 846 A.2d 831 (2004). The Appellate Court noted that, in Lagassey , this court explained that, as used in § 52-584, "the term ‘injury’ is synonymous with ‘legal injury’ or ‘actionable harm.’ ‘Actionable harm’ occurs when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the essential elements of a cause of action." Id. at 748, 846 A.2d 831 ; see Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , supra, 193 Conn. App. at 345, 219 A.3d 421 (quoting Lagassey ). This court also explained that "actionable harm does not occur until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the harm complained of was caused by the negligence of the defendant ." (Emphasis in original.) Lagassey v. State , supra, at 747, 846 A.2d 831 ; accord Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , supra, at 346, 219 A.3d 421 (quoting Lagassey ).

Applying this court's interpretation of § 52-584 from Lagassey , the Appellate Court concluded that "the evidence before the trial court demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered her injury as contemplated by § 52-584 ...." Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , supra, 193 Conn. App. at 339, 219 A.3d 421. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court should not have granted the defendantsmotion for summary judgment, and it reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 348, 219 A.3d 421.

Thereafter, the defendants sought certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's action was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in ... § 52-584?" Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , 334 Conn. 906, 220 A.3d 801 (2019).

On appeal to this court, the defendants assert that the Appellate Court misapplied this court's precedent under § 52-584 to the facts of the present case and relied on the immaterial fact of when the plaintiff became aware that the defendants were responsible for her safety. They further argue that this court should construe § 52-584 consistent with the plain meaning rule of General Statutes § 1-2z, and that such a construction would require reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

"The scope of our appellate review depends [on] the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. ... When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ugrin v. Cheshire , 307 Conn. 364, 389, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). In the present case, the trial court granted the defendantsmotion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she initiated this action within two years of suffering an "injury," as required by § 52-584. To the extent that determining whether summary judgment was appropriate in this case is based on interpreting § 52-584, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Shoreline Shellfish, LLC v. Branford , 336 Conn. 403, 410, 246 A.3d 470 (2020).

Before addressing the defendants’ specific arguments, we lay out this court's long-standing interpretation of the term "injury" for purposes of § 52-584. We begin with the statutory language. General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-584 provides in relevant part: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a ... hospital ... shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been...

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  • State v. Gore
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    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
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  • Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • 10 Mayo 2022
    ...of a statute, if the legislature reasonably may be deemed to have acquiesced in that construction ...." Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , 342 Conn. 103, 125–26, 269 A.3d 24 (2022). "[T]he legislature is presumed to be aware of the [courts’] interpretation of a statute and ... its subse......
  • Byrne v. Avery Ctr. For Obstetrics & Gynecology
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • 10 Mayo 2022
    ...if the legislature reasonably may be deemed to have acquiesced in that construction . . . ." Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 342 Conn. 103, 125-26, 269 A.3d 24 (2022). "[T]he legislature is presumed to be aware of the [courts'] interpretation of a statute and ... its subsequent nonact......

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