Peek v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp.
Citation | 342 Conn. 103,269 A.3d 24 |
Decision Date | 02 February 2022 |
Docket Number | SC 20414 |
Parties | Delores PEEK v. MANCHESTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al. |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Sean R. Caruthers, Branford, with whom, on the brief, was Michael D. Neubert, New Haven, for the appellants (defendants).
Neil Johnson, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.**
The defendants, Manchester Memorial Hospital and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the action of the plaintiff, Delores Peek, was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-584.1 We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the plaintiff initiated her action within two years from the date of her injury, as that term is understood in the context of § 52-584. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
" (Footnote added; footnotes omitted.) Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , 193 Conn. App. 337, 339–41, 219 A.3d 421 (2019).
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff asserted Id. at 345, 219 A.3d 421.
The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 348, 219 A.3d 421. In doing so, the Appellate Court construed the term "injury" for purposes of § 52-584 consistent with this court's decision in Lagassey v. State , 268 Conn. 723, 747–49, 846 A.2d 831 (2004). The Appellate Court noted that, in Lagassey , this court explained that, as used in § 52-584, Id. at 748, 846 A.2d 831 ; see Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , supra, 193 Conn. App. at 345, 219 A.3d 421 (quoting Lagassey ). This court also explained that "actionable harm does not occur until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the harm complained of was caused by the negligence of the defendant ." (Emphasis in original.) Lagassey v. State , supra, at 747, 846 A.2d 831 ; accord Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , supra, at 346, 219 A.3d 421 (quoting Lagassey ).
Applying this court's interpretation of § 52-584 from Lagassey , the Appellate Court concluded that "the evidence before the trial court demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered her injury as contemplated by § 52-584 ...." Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , supra, 193 Conn. App. at 339, 219 A.3d 421. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court should not have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and it reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 348, 219 A.3d 421.
Thereafter, the defendants sought certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's action was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in ... § 52-584?" Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , 334 Conn. 906, 220 A.3d 801 (2019).
On appeal to this court, the defendants assert that the Appellate Court misapplied this court's precedent under § 52-584 to the facts of the present case and relied on the immaterial fact of when the plaintiff became aware that the defendants were responsible for her safety. They further argue that this court should construe § 52-584 consistent with the plain meaning rule of General Statutes § 1-2z, and that such a construction would require reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ugrin v. Cheshire , 307 Conn. 364, 389, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). In the present case, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she initiated this action within two years of suffering an "injury," as required by § 52-584. To the extent that determining whether summary judgment was appropriate in this case is based on interpreting § 52-584, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Shoreline Shellfish, LLC v. Branford , 336 Conn. 403, 410, 246 A.3d 470 (2020).
Before addressing the defendants’ specific arguments, we lay out this court's long-standing interpretation of the term "injury" for purposes of § 52-584. We begin with the statutory language. General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-584 provides in relevant part: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a ... hospital ... shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been...
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Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.
...of a statute, if the legislature reasonably may be deemed to have acquiesced in that construction ...." Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital , 342 Conn. 103, 125–26, 269 A.3d 24 (2022). "[T]he legislature is presumed to be aware of the [courts’] interpretation of a statute and ... its subse......
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Byrne v. Avery Ctr. For Obstetrics & Gynecology
...if the legislature reasonably may be deemed to have acquiesced in that construction . . . ." Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 342 Conn. 103, 125-26, 269 A.3d 24 (2022). "[T]he legislature is presumed to be aware of the [courts'] interpretation of a statute and ... its subsequent nonact......