Peel v. State

Decision Date22 June 2007
Docket NumberNo. 54A01-0610-CR-452.,54A01-0610-CR-452.
Citation868 N.E.2d 569
PartiesJames E. PEEL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Stephen Gerald Gray, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Scott Barnhart, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAKER, Chief Judge.

Appellant-defendant James E. Peel brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress marijuana found in his motel room. Specifically, Peel argues that the motion should have been granted because the police officers' search of his motel room was illegal, inasmuch as Peel and his roommate were in custody and were not informed of their right to counsel before police obtained consent to search. Hence, Peel argues that his roommate's consent to the search was invalid and that his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution was violated. Concluding that Peel and his roommate were in custody when the police officers allegedly obtained consent to search the room and that the men had not been advised of their Miranda1 rights before allowing the police to search, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

On December 18, 2005, five Crawfordsville police officers were dispatched to the Ramada Inn in Montgomery County after a motel employee called and complained about an odor of marijuana emanating from one of the rooms. When the officers arrived, they traced the odor to a specific room and confirmed their suspicions after a canine unit "indicated" the presence of marijuana. Tr. p. 5. Officer Jared Colley knocked on the door, and Peel eventually opened it. When Officers Julian Huckstep and Colley entered the room, they noticed another individual, James Capps, sitting on one of the beds. Officer Colley informed Peel about the nature of the complaint and asked him if they had been smoking marijuana in the room. Peel admitted that they had, but he told the officers that "there was nothing left." Id. at 7.

At that point, the officers directed Peel and Capps to the hallway. Peel and Capps were not handcuffed at that point, and the officers had not formally placed them under arrest. However, the officers acknowledged that neither Peel nor Capps were "free to wander off" because the officers intended to check for outstanding arrest warrants. Id. at 51.

Officer Huckstep spoke with Peel, and Officer Colley questioned Capps. Officer Colley and Capps walked "a couple of doors to the south," while Peel and Officer Huckstep were "just outside the room." Id. at 20-22. At some point, Officer Huckstep asked for—and received—permission from Peel to search two duffle bags that were in the room. Nothing was discovered in the bags. In response to questioning, Capps admitted to Officer Colley that he and Peel had been smoking marijuana in the room. After additional questioning, Capps told Officer Colley that he had hidden a bag of marijuana in the sheets of each bed as the officers knocked on the door. Capps also told Officer Colley that the marijuana was "both of theirs." Id. at 40-41. Officer Colley then asked Capps if the police could search the room, and Capps responded that they could. As a result of the search, the marijuana was discovered in the beds. In response to additional questioning, Capps told the officers that there was a "joint" near the nightstand, which was subsequently seized. Id. at 43. The police officers also found some rolling papers in the room.

Peel was charged with possession of marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and an allegation that he was a habitual substance offender. Thereafter, on April 11, 2006, Peel filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming that the deputies had "seized the defendant ... and searched defendant's room, questioned the defendant, all in violation of the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution." Appellant's App. p. 25. In part, Peel maintained that

the separation of Capps and Peel provided Officer Colley with an opportunity to question Capps privately and obtain Capps' consent without Peel's knowledge or objection. Thus, Peel was prevented from objecting to a search of his bed or the common nightstand because Peel was never informed of Capps' consent or what the officers were planning to do. Here, ironically, Capps' consent was hidden from Peel. Therefore, it was not reasonable to believe that Capps had actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the common nightstand.

Appellant's App. p. 40-41.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied Peel's motion to suppress on August 8, 2006. In relevant part, the trial court's order provided as follows:

Peel concedes that Capps had actual authority to consent to the search of Room 125, but contends that Capps had no authority to consent to the search of Peel's bed. Peel argues that Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957 (Ind.2001), applies to these facts. His argument is based on the premise that a bed is analogous to a container, i.e., "[a] bed is a closed container that normally holds at least one highly personal item ..." Defendant's Brief, p. 9. Assuming that Peel did have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in his own bed, and assuming that by separating the co-defendants the police deprived Peel of any opportunity to object to any search authorized by Capps, and assuming that Peel was in fact in custody after admitting he had smoked marijuana, the evidence in this case nonetheless fails to support Peel's constitutional claims. Before opening the door to the police Capps hid bags of marijuana that belonged to both defendants in both of their beds. To the extent that Peel contends constitutional exclusivity in his bed, his claim is vitiated by Capps's free access to that bed to hide the incriminating evidence. These circumstances distinguish this case from Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d [668] 688 (Ind.2005), and Krise v. State, supra.

Id. at 19-20. Thereafter, on August 22, 2006, Peel filed a subsequent motion to suppress. In relevant part, Peel alleged that

2. The issues raised by Peel in his first motion were limited narrowly to Peel's expectation of privacy and the ability of a third party to consent to a search of areas Peel considered private.

3. An issue specifically not raised by Peel at that time was any challenge to the voluntariness of the third party consent. Peel's counsel asserted that Peel did not have standing to challenge that consent of the search of his co-occupant's bed because Peel lacked an expectation of privacy in someone else's bed. Peel does not contend otherwise now.

4. The issue not addressed in Peel's first motion is his standing to challenge the voluntariness of a third party consent in areas in which he has a clear expectation of privacy. Peel contends that he does indeed have standing and raises this specific issue herein.

5. Defendant does not seek any further evidentiary hearing as the initial suppression hearing sufficiently addresses any necessary facts for the court to consider this issue.

Id. at 27 (emphases in original). The trial court subsequently denied this motion and certified both rulings for interlocutory appeal. We accepted jurisdiction of the appeal on December 4, 2006.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review

We initially observe that the standard of review on the admissibility of the evidence is essentially the same for a motion to suppress or an objection to the admission of evidence at trial. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. We will not reweigh the evidence, and we consider the conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. However, we will also consider any uncontested evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Id. We will affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value. Id.

II. Peel's Claims

Peel contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police officers illegally searched his bed and nightstand "with the tainted consent of a third party." Appellant's Br. p. 1. Peel also maintains that the evidence should have been suppressed because Capps's consent to search the motel room was not voluntary.

We initially observe that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally prohibits warrantless searches. Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). The purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the privacy and possessory interests of individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Barfield v. State, 776 N.E.2d 404, 406 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). If a warrantless search is conducted, the burden is on the State to prove that, at the time of the search, an exception to the warrant requirement existed. Id. That is searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to a few well-delineated exceptions. Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 432 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).

We note that hotel guests enjoy the same constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure as do occupants of private residences. Norwood v. State, 670 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). An occupant of a motel room has standing to challenge a search even when he or she has not paid for the room. Ceroni v. State, 559 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990). In Tate v. State, 835 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied, this court recognized that the defendant, "as a registered guest of the motel, undoubtedly had proper authority to consent to a search of his room."

Pursuant to the Indiana Constitution, the focus is on whether the police acted reasonably under the circumstances. Thus, "the purpose of Article [I], section 11 is to protect from...

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