Peelman v. DELAWARE J. VOCATIONAL SD BD. OF ED., No. C2-88-0545.
| Decision Date | 03 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-88-0545. |
| Citation | 763 F. Supp. 268 |
| Parties | Cathy PEELMAN, Plaintiff, v. DELAWARE JOINT VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Mark Alicen Foley, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Robert Dean Jollay, Jr. and Grey Wilbur Jones, Columbus, Ohio, for defendants.
This matter is presently before the Court pursuant to the defendants Frass, Miller, Huffman and Cline's motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and venue is proper in the Southern District of Ohio, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2).
The plaintiff Cathy Peelman is a teacher certified by the state of Ohio in several subject areas. During the four school years preceding the 1988-89 school year, the plaintiff was employed by the Delaware Joint Vocational School Board of Education under a series of limited contracts. During this time, the plaintiff was an active member of the Delaware Joint Vocational School Teachers' Association and the Ohio Education Association, organizations which the plaintiff describes as labor unions. The plaintiff's activity in these organizations caused her on several occasions to voice views and opinions contrary to those of the Delaware Joint Vocational School District's administration.
On April 29, 1988, the Delaware Joint Vocational School Board of Education voted not to renew the plaintiff's contract for the 1988-89 school year. On May 17, 1988, the plaintiff filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 () and § 1985 (). In her complaint, the plaintiff named The Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education as a defendant in its corporate capacity, as well as naming Melvin R. Frass, the Superintendent of the school district, and E.J. Miller, Louis Huffman, and Kenneth Cline, all members of the school board, as defendants in their individual capacities.
The substance of the plaintiff's complaint is that the school board's decision not to renew her contract was motivated by anti-union animus and therefore violated her constitutional right of Free Association as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In considering this motion, the Court is mindful that the standard for summary judgment "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) citing Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-480, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234-235, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943). Thus, the Supreme Court concluded in Anderson that a judge considering a motion for summary judgment must "ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In essence, the inquiry is whether the evidence presented a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.
Such an inquiry necessarily implicates the evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits. As a result, the Court must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. Rule 56(e) therefore requires that the nonmoving party go beyond the pleadings and by their own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
In Banks v. Rockwell International N. Am. Aircraft Operations, 666 F.Supp. 1053 (S.D.Ohio 1987) (J. Graham), this district enunciated the importance of granting summary judgments in appropriate situations by stating that: "Although summary judgment should be cautiously invoked, it is an integral part of the Federal Rules which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." citing, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.
Thus, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of a plaintiff's claim is insufficient — there must be evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Having discussed the Rule 56 standard of review, the Court now turns to the merits.
The defendants, Frass, Miller, Huffman, and Cline rely upon the defense of qualified or "good faith" immunity to support their motion for summary judgment. The defense of qualified immunity as recognized in Ohio shields public officials from liability in their individual capacity for failure to properly perform a duty involving judgment and discretion, where the officer was acting within the scope of his authority, in good faith and without any corrupt motive. Scot Lad Foods, Inc. v. Secy. of State, 66 Ohio St.2d 1, 418 N.E.2d 1368 (1981). Under Ohio law, the defense of qualified immunity will shield school board members and officials, such as the defendants in the case at bar, from liability in their individual capacities when sued pursuant to a state law cause of action. However, where public officials are sued in their individual capacity pursuant to the United States Constitution or federal statute, the effect of the federal law upon the state law defense of qualified immunity must be addressed.
In this case, the defendants are being sued in their individual capacities for alleged violation of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983's effect upon a state law defense of qualified immunity was directly addressed by the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974). In Wood the Court limited the scope of such qualified immunity in the context of a lawsuit brought pursuant to § 1983. The Court stated:
A school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of those affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. ...
Wood, 420 U.S. at 322, 95 S.Ct. at 1001. Subsequently however the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1981), rejected the subjective element of the standard it had adopted in Wood, which permitted a public official performing discretionary functions to escape liability by showing that his actions were not taken with malicious intent.
The wholly objective standard retained by the Court in Harlow will shield a public official performing discretionary functions from liability in his official capacity only if his "conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. However, because Wood v. Strickland involved the application and scope of qualified immunity arising under state law, while Harlow v. Fitzgerald involved the application and scope of the qualified immunity of federal executive officials arising under federal law, some questioned the applicability of the Harlow decision to a defense of qualified immunity arising under state law. In Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) however, the Court eliminated any question as to the scope of the Harlow decision when it applied the wholly objective standard to the state law qualified immunity of state officials sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Therefore, under the current law as clearly set forth in Davis v. Scherer, the defendant state school board officials will only be shielded from liability in their individual capacities for violations of § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Davis, 468 U.S. at 197, 104 S.Ct. at 3020, Ohio Civil Serv. Employee Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1173 (6th Cir.1988). In this case, the § 1983 claim brought against the defendants is based upon allegations that the defendants refused to renew the plaintiff's employment contract because they disapproved of her involvement in several teachers' unions. To begin, it is evident that such action, if true, violated the plaintiff's constitutional right of free association. The constitutional right of free association first recognized in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), has been extended to protect an individual's membership in and involvement with trade unions. Brotherhood of...
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Carney v. Columbus City Sch. Bd. of Educ.
...contain enough specificity against the Board Members to survive Defendants' Motion. See Peelman v. Delaware Joint Voc. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 763 F. Supp. 268, 270-71 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that the individual school board members were not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 ......