Peete v. Blackwell

• Citation: 504 So.2d 222
• Parties: Robert W. PEETE, M.D. v. Beverly S. BLACKWELL. 85-491.
• Decision Date: 19 December 1986
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 222

504 So.2d 222

Robert W. PEETE, M.D. v. Beverly S. BLACKWELL.

85-491.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 19, 1986.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 1987.

Dan C. Totten of Malone, Totten & Anderson, Athens, for appellant.

Thomas E. Dutton and Timothy C. Davis of Emond & Vines, Birmingham, for appellee.

TORBERT, Chief Justice.

This is an assault and battery case. The defendant, Dr. Robert W. Peete, appeals from a judgment based on a jury verdict assessing punitive damages against him. Peete contends that punitive damages were improperly awarded in this case. For the reasons set forth below, we reject Dr. Peete's arguments and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In late December 1983, the defendant, Dr. Robert W. Peete, hospitalized one of his patients for a severe nosebleed. As part of this patient's treatment, Dr. Peete applied anterior and posterior nasal packs to control the bleeding. On December 26, Dr. Peete was recalled to the hospital, because this patient was again experiencing difficulties. When he arrived there, he found that the string securing the posterior pack had been cut and that his patient was bleeding profusely. Because his patient was in danger of suffocation, Dr. Peete immediately sought to retrieve the pack and to control the bleeding. In order to retrieve the posterior pack, Peete required the use of a suction machine to remove the blood from his patient's throat. Unless this blood was removed, he could not see well enough to remove the pack.

He was assisted in these efforts by the plaintiff, Beverly S. Blackwell, the nurse in charge of the floor on which the patient had been hospitalized. Blackwell testified that at one point Peete struck her on the forearm and demanded that she "turn on the [goddamn] suction." ¹ She also testified that no physical injury of any kind resulted from this striking. It is from this incident that this case arose.

In a trial before a jury, Blackwell alleged that Peete had committed an assault and battery against her. She demanded $1.00 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict against Peete in the amount of $10,001, indicating that the jury found for the plaintiff on her assault and battery claim and that they assessed $10,000 in punitive damages against Peete. The trial court entered judgment on this verdict and did not rule within 90 days on Peete's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, his motion for new trial, or his motion to alter or amend the judgment. These motions were thus denied pursuant to A.R.Civ.P. 59.1.

Although Peete testified at trial that he did not strike the plaintiff, he does not challenge the finding that he committed an assault and battery. Rather, he argues on this appeal that the punitive damages awarded in this case were excessive or that they were improperly awarded in light of the evidence presented, and he asserts that the trial court therefore erred in denying his various post-trial motions.

Our rules regarding the award of punitive damages for assault and battery are relatively clear and well-established. While one of our recent cases stated that punitive damages are available for assault and battery where the "acts complained of were committed with malice, willfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of others," Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So.2d 1097, 1105 (Ala.1986), our previous cases have typically held that assault and battery will support an award of punitive damages "whenever there is averment and proof tending to show that the act charged was wrongful and attended with an insult or other circumstances of aggravation." John R. Thompson & Co. v. Vildibill, 211 Ala. 199, 202, 100 So. 139, 141 (1924). See, e.g., Shelley v. Clark, 267 Ala. 621, 103 So.2d 743 (1958); ² Harrison v. Mitchell, 391 So.2d 1038 (Ala.Civ.App.1980). In short, the longstanding rule of this jurisdiction requires that particularized circumstances of aggravation or insult appear in cases of assault and battery if punitive damages are to be properly awarded.

Although Peete's specific challenges to the award of punitive damages are somewhat unclear, we discern two basic grounds for his objections. First, he asserts error on wholly evidentiary grounds. He argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to show the requisite "insult or other aggravating circumstances" required for an award of punitive damages, and he therefore asserts error in the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Alternatively, he contends that, even if sufficient evidence of aggravating circumstances was presented, the actual assessment of punitive damages was against the weight and preponderance of that evidence, and he therefore asserts error in the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for new trial. Second, in his brief he challenges the award on the grounds of excessiveness. He argues that, even if the evidence supports some award of punitive damages, the amount awarded in this case was clearly excessive. He therefore contends that "excessiveness" is an alternative ground for finding error in the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial. We will discuss each of these challenges in turn.

In Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), we summarized the standards of appellate review applicable to Peete's evidentiary challenges as follows:

"A motion for directed verdict or JNOV is tested against the scintilla rule, which requires that a question go to the jury 'if the evidence or any reasonable inference arising therefrom, furnishes a mere gleam, glimmer, spark, the least particle, the smallest trace, or a scintilla in support of the theory of the complaint.' Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 293 Ala. 484, 306 So.2d 236 (1975). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on these motions, the appellate court, guided by the standard of the scintilla rule, determines whether there was sufficient evidence below to produce a conflict warranting jury consideration. Baker v. Chastain, 389 So. 2d 932 (Ala.1980). Like the trial court, the appellate court must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ritch v. Waldrop, 428 So.2d 1 (Ala.1982).

"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a new trial motion, based on the weight and preponderance of the evidence, the standard of review guiding the appellate court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in disposing of the motion. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Colonial Sugars, a Division of Borden, Inc., 423 So.2d 190 (Ala.1982). The trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal unless the evidence 'plainly and palpably' shows that the trial court erred in ruling on the motion for new trial. Herrington v. Central Soya Co., 420 So.2d 1 (Ala.1982). The appellate court must view the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the non-moving party and must indulge such inferences as the jury was free to draw. Cooper v. Peturis, 384 So.2d 1087 (Ala.1980)."

Id. at 1376. The evidence in this case meets these standards.

Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, we find that the jury could have found that the doctor had insulted the hospital staff prior to the time the incident took place. In addition, the jury could have found that Dr. Peete cursed frequently throughout the events leading up to the incident, that he had been "yelling and hollering" earlier in the morning, and that he threw or slammed a patient's chart across a desk some time prior to the striking. Finally, the evidence is uncontradicted that Dr. Peete cursed at nurse Blackwell at the time the alleged striking occurred. While telling Blackwell to "turn on the goddamn suction" is arguably not an "insult" to Blackwell, this statement does present at least a scintilla of evidence that "aggravating circumstances" in the form of angry or intimidating behavior accompanied the assault and battery, especially when considered in light of the evidence reflecting on Peete's earlier actions. Given this evidentiary showing, the trial court properly denied Peete's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Likewise, we do not believe that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial on the basis of the weight and preponderance of the evidence. Admittedly, both plaintiff and defendant testified that this incident arose in the midst of a medical emergency in which a human life was threatened. In view of this fact, which tends to indicate that this was not an "aggravated" assault and battery, reasonable minds might well differ on the question of whether a strong case was actually made for an...