Peets v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 September 1958
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 337-57-TC.
• Citation: 165 F. Supp. 177
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Eleanor S. PEETS et al., Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

165 F. Supp. 177

Eleanor S. PEETS et al., Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Civ. No. 337-57-TC.

United States District Court S. D. California.

September 18, 1958.

Daniel Cathcart, Magana & Olney, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Jack Wilson, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Fulton Haight, Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

HOLTZOFF, District Judge (Sitting by designation).

This is an action by a husband and wife against the United States to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the wife, the suit being brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. The plaintiffs were visiting their son at Fort Ord, California, the son being stationed there while in the military service. The plaintiffs had dinner at the Post Exchange Cafeteria, and while leaving the building the female plaintiff stepped off a ramp leading from the exit door to the sidewalk, fell and was injured.

The evidence discloses the following facts. As stated, the plaintiffs' son was in the military service and was stationed at Fort Ord. On certain days the military authorities encouraged servicemen on duty at that Army post to invite members of their families and friends to visit them. On March 16, 1956, in accordance with such an invitation, the plaintiffs visited their son. They were accompanied by their daughter and another young lady who was a friend of the son. After arriving at Fort Ord in the early evening and registering at a guest house, as was the usual practice, they went to have dinner at the Post Exchange Cafeteria, which was open to civilians. At that time it was already dark.

After finishing dinner this family group proceeded to leave. They saw a sign, "Exit", pointing to a door leading outside, and went out through that door. The door opened onto a ramp that was hardly wider than the doorway. The doorway itself was 36 inches wide, while the ramp was 48 inches wide. In other words the ramp was only six inches wider than the doorway on each side. The ramp was 13 feet long and led down to a sidewalk. It started at a height of 26 inches above the ground at the doorway, and tapered down to a height of 7½ inches at the point where it reached the sidewalk. There were no handrails on either side of the ramp.

As this family group went out of the door and stepped on the ramp, the two young ladies led the way. The female plaintiff followed and her husband brought up the rear. After the female plaintiff took a couple of steps on the ramp, she encountered three other persons walking up the ramp in the opposite direction. She started to step aside to let them pass, and as she did so, her right foot dangled off the ramp and she fell to the ground, sustaining certain injuries, to which reference will be made hereafter.

It is claimed that the defendant was guilty of negligence in that the ramp as constructed, and being without handrails, was a hazardous and dangerous structure. The court so finds as a fact.

There was no evidence introduced by either side as to whether this ramp was of a usual or an exceptional type of construction. The Government offered no evidence tending to explain why a ramp was used instead of constructing a few steps leading down to a level walk. Neither did the Government tender any explanation for the absence of handrails or any other safety devices.

It is true that perhaps on military posts certain installations might not be deemed dangerous or hazardous for military personnel that might be considered such for ordinary members of the public. This building, however, is obviously of a different character than structures intended solely for the use of soldiers. It was a Post Exchange Cafeteria that was open to civilians. Moreover, relatives and friends of military personnel stationed at the fort were invited to visit the Post, and among other things to utilize the facilities of the cafeteria. Therefore, the obligation of the defendant to maintain a safe structure should be weighed from the standpoint of the general public, rather than from the viewpoint solely of military personnel.

The court finds as a fact that this structure was hazardous and dangerous because of lack of handrails. In addition, it appears that inside the building in the cafeteria, there was a sign, "Exit", pointing toward this door. Apparently persons in the cafeteria were invited and expected to use this door for the purpose of egress. Since the exit led to a narrow ramp without handrails, it was obviously dangerous to permit persons to walk on the ramp in both directions. It would have been a reasonable precaution to place a sign outdoors to the effect that this opening in the building was to be used solely as an exit and was not to be employed also as an entrance. If this had been done, the plaintiff would not have encountered persons walking up the ramp, because there would have been no reason for anyone to do so if the door could not be used as a means of entrance. For both of these reasons the court finds that the defendant was guilty of negligence.

There is still another important fact that has a significant bearing upon the issues of this case. Immediately outside of the door and above the ramp there was an electric light fixture. Both plaintiffs, their daughter, and the other young lady accompanying them, testified that the lamp in that light fixture was not burning at the time of the accident. These witnesses also stated that when they first arrived at the cafeteria they passed by this door in order to reach the main entrance, and did not see any light burning. To be sure, this evidence comes from interested witnesses. Moreover, it is negative testimony. Nevertheless, it is in no wise contradicted.

The acting manager of the cafeteria was called as a witness by the Government and testified that she had been inside the cafeteria and was notified that an accident had taken place. She later went out and found out that the light was burning. However, the accident, according to the pretrial order, took place at 7:40 P.M., and this witness testified that she saw a light some time between 9:00 and 9:30 P.M. In other words, an hour and a half elapsed between the moment of the accident and the time when the acting manager of the cafeteria saw this outside light burning. Any number of things might have happened during the interim.

There was also testimony to the effect that the bus boys working in the cafeteria were charged with the duty of turning on all lights at the proper time. It appeared, however, that there were three bus boys and not one of them was specially charged with this obligation, and there was no evidence as to whether any one of them had performed this function on the evening of the accident. There is, of course, a possible inference that the light might have been originally turned on, that it might have burned out, and that later another lamp had been inserted in the fixture, and that this was the reason why the light was not operating at the time of the accident and yet was in full operation an hour and a half later.

It is the function of the court, as the trier of...