Pegg v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 88-4267-C.,88-4267-C.
• Citation: 785 F. Supp. 901
• Parties: Carol L. PEGG, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

785 F. Supp. 901

Carol L. PEGG, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 88-4267-C.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

February 10, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kevin M. Fowler, Frieden, Haynes & Forbes, Topeka, Kan., for plaintiff.

Stephen A. Murphy, Paul Scott Kelly, Jr., Gage & Tucker, Overland Park, Kan., John

J. Yates, Gage & Tucker, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CROW, District Judge.

The case comes before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, Carol Pegg ("Pegg"), was employed by the defendant, General Motors Corporation ("GMC"), until her termination in December of 1986. The plaintiff alleges she was denied certain benefits and was terminated in breach of an implied contract and, alternatively, an express contract, and in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623 and 626(c), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and 2000e-5(f)(1). The defendant contends summary judgment should be entered on each of the plaintiff's claims.

A motion for summary judgment gives the judge an initial opportunity to assess the need for a trial. Without weighing the evidence or determining credibility, the court grants summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is significantly probative or more than merely colorable such that a jury could reasonably return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. An issue of fact is "material" if proof of it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit. 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Factual inferences are drawn to favor the existence of triable issues, and where reasonable minds could ultimately reach different conclusions, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Riley v. Brown & Root, Inc., 896 F.2d 474, 476-77 (10th Cir.1990).

The movant's initial burden under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 is to show the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 345 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987). The movant must specify those portions of "`the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits if any,'" which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Windon, 805 F.2d at 345 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). It may be sufficient for the movant to establish that the alleged factual issues are without legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

The opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts supported by the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The evidence is deemed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor. Windon, 805 F.2d at 346. More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure "designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Fed. R.Civ.P. 1." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Though a court should be cautious to grant summary judgment in a discrimination case when intent is at issue, such motions are useful to weed out those claims and cases obviously lacking merit. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 709 (10th Cir.1988); Schwenke v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 858 F.2d 627, 628 (10th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must come forth with specific facts to show a genuine issue of material fact; mere assertions or conjecture as to intent or pretext is not enough to survive summary judgment. Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 771-72 (10th Cir.1988).

For purposes of this motion, the court will accept the following facts as uncontroverted:

1. The plaintiff was first hired by GMC on January 16, 1969, to work as a third-level position clerk in the Chevrolet Motor Division in Omaha, Nebraska. As of October 1, 1977, she had received four promotions and was serving in the position of district manager in the Denver Zone. After several transfers, she was relocated to Salina, Kansas, to serve as a district manager within the Kansas City Zone.

2. Whenever the plaintiff received a salary increase from GMC, she received a written compensation statement which she signed and which referred four different times to an "Employment Agreement" between her and GMC. One such reference reads: "When signed and accepted, this statement, for the effective period hereof, becomes a part of my basic `Employment Agreement,' in accordance with the terms thereof, as heretofore executed and presently in effect." The plaintiff never executed a written employment contract with GMC.

3. Salaried employees were given a handbook entitled "Working with General Motors." Outlined at page four of the 1985 version of the handbook is the different types of employment status available at GMC. The category for regular employee reads in pertinent part: "As a regular employe your employment is on a calendar month-to-month basis." At the end of the 1985 booklet, the following appears:

While the policies and procedures in the booklet do not constitute a legal contract, and do not modify the month-to-month employment relationship (which in fact may not be altered, amended or extended by any employe, representative or agent of GM) described on page 4, GM does believe they represent a good basis for a productive relationship between you and GM.

The plaintiff recalls that the handbooks were distributed to the employees and were reviewed by the management with them.¹ The plaintiff denies that GMC ever informed her that employment was on a month-to-month basis.

4. In the early 1980's, GMC announced that due to increased competition nation-wide and GMC's recent loss in profits it would reduce its salaried workforce and develop a reorganizational effort that would accomplish, in part, a streamlined administrative organization.

5. Prior to May of 1984, the Chevrolet Motor Division, as part of its policy on salaried employees' transfers, had the management inquire of employees regarding their willingness to travel and relocate. In December of 1982, the plaintiff wrote a memo to her zone manager stating: "I do not feel that I am in a position to leave myself open for a relocation...." Later in the same memo, she said: "The above does not mean I would not relocate should the District Sales Manager position be eliminated...."

6. The Chevrolet Motor Division announced in May 1984 a new relocation policy. Since the past policy had "created bottlenecks" which interfered with management's ability to place according to business needs, the new policy was less concerned with an employee's choice:

Accordingly, you will no longer be asked to indicate in advance your willingness to travel and relocate. While management will continue to be aware of employe concerns about relocation, after August 31, 1984, business considerations as determined by management, will be given first priority. All Sales, Marketing, and Service employes will be expected to relocate when required by management.

Failure or refusal to accept an assignment, for reasons unacceptable to management, will result in a Special Separation.

In exceptional cases, exemption from transfer and/or relocation may be requested on a "deferral" arrangement and may be granted if, in management's judgement, the circumstances justify deferral.

The plaintiff was asked to sign a form acknowledging her receipt of these changes in the relocation policy. The plaintiff first signed with a notation at the bottom that her earlier stated position on transfers had not changed. The plaintiff was then told that she would be terminated if she did not sign the acknowledgement without comment. The plaintiff then executed another acknowledgement of receipt.

7. A memorandum dated August 25, 1986, from the Office of the General Manager was sent to all Chevrolet salaried employees telling them that GMC had announced two corporate-wide voluntary programs —Special Retirement Program for "selected employes aged 53 through 59" and Special Separation Incentive Program ("SSIP") for "selected employes under 53"—to assist Chevrolet in reducing its salaried work force. The memorandum further provided:

Both of these programs would involve employes whose departure is mutually agreed upon between the individual and the employing unit.

....

Salaried employes selected for separation under these programs will be contacted on an individual basis, and details of these programs will be made available at that time.

The plaintiff received and reviewed this letter.

8. On September 30, 1986, the plaintiff received and reviewed a two-page memorandum entitled "Separation Program for Regular Salaried Employes." Towards the front of the memorandum appears: "Both of these programs would involve employes whose departure is mutually agreed upon between the individual and the employing unit." Among the "General Provisions" appears: "The program will be administered on a mutually agreeable basis to both management and the employe. An employe may volunteer for the separation offer or the separation can be initiated by management."

9. Also on September 30, 1986, the plaintiff attended a satellite broadcast on GMC's reorganization plans and programs. After the broadcast, Eldon Kibler, the Kansas...