Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-10172.,03-10172.
• Citation: 361 F.3d 272
• Parties: Ron L. PEGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HONEYWELL, INC., Honeywell International, and Honeywell International, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

361 F.3d 272

Ron L. PEGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HONEYWELL, INC., Honeywell International, and Honeywell International, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-10172.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 5, 2004.

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W.D. Masterson (argued), Dorothy Elizabeth Masterson, Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stephen C. Schoettmer, Bryan Patrick Neal (argued), Thompson & Knight, Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Jennifer Susan Goldstein (argued), EEOC, Washington, DC, for EEOC, Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

In this employment discrimination case, appellant Ron L. Pegram ("Pegram") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer Honeywell, Inc., ("Honeywell") dismissing Pegram's claims of racial and disability discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2003) and the Texas Commission for Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002 et seq. (Vernon 1998). Pegram also challenges the district court's dismissal of his claims to recover employee benefits for violations under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140, as well as the common law theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant background, drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is as follows: Pegram, an African-American sales employee, began working at Honeywell in 1991. In August 2000, Pegram was promoted to the position of Total Plant Account Manager ("TPAM"), in the power industry, otherwise known as the Industrial Automation and Control ("IAC") division. As a TPAM, Pegram sold a wide-range of Honeywell products, with Pegram's yearly sales quota in the amount of $3-4 million.

In September 2000, Honeywell geographically reorganized its IAC division's sales territories and reporting relationships. After the reorganization, Pegram reported to David Spencer, the IAC division's Regional Sales Manager, and Guy Grumbles, the Solutions Sales Director for the eastern sales region. In October of 2000, Pegram learned that Grumbles expressed concerns about Pegram's ability to satisfactorily accomplish his tasks as a TPAM. Thereafter, Spencer and Grumbles attempted to persuade Pegram to accept a position as a Service Account Manager ("SAM"). The SAM position offered Pegram a base salary comparable to a TPAM, but with a lower incentive pay.

On December 14, 2000, Pegram aggravated a pre-existing back condition, during an automobile accident, and Honeywell subsequently transferred him to a SAM position.¹ Spencer and Grumbles then hired a white male to replace Pegram in the TPAM position. On several occasions Pegram expressed disillusionment in serving as a SAM and an unwillingness to continue in that role. Despite Pegram's desire to continue working as a TPAM, Spencer informed him that there were no available TPAM positions in Pegram's region at the time, and advised Pegram to search for a TPAM position elsewhere in the company.

On March 13, 2001, while in pursuit of other TPAM opportunities, Pegram sent an email to Honeywell officials explaining that he had scheduled back surgery on April 16, 2001, and that he would need short-term disability benefits. The next day, Pegram met with Spencer and a representative of Honeywell's Human Resources Department in Houston to discuss his employment situation. During the Houston meeting, Spencer apprised Pegram that no TPAM positions were currently available, and that unless Pegram was able to secure another position at Honeywell, he would be terminated. Pegram was unable to secure such a position, and was terminated. Thereafter, Pegram applied for, and was denied, any short-term disability benefits from Honeywell.

On April 5, 2001, Pegram filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR") alleging employment discrimination based upon race and disability. Upon receipt of this Notice of the Right to Sue from the EEOC, Pegram timely filed a complaint in federal court on May 4, 2001. In his complaint, Pegram alleged that Honeywell discriminated against him because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He also asserted claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel under Texas law based upon his claim for short-term disability benefits. On February 7, 2002, Pegram amended the complaint to add claims under the TCHRA for discrimination based upon race and disability, and under section 510 of ERISA for interference with his rights under the short-term disability plan.

On April 30, 2002, Honeywell moved for summary judgment on all of Pegram's claims. After the parties completed briefing, the district court instructed the parties to submit additional briefing and evidence on whether Pegram's reassignment was an "adverse employment action" under the TCHRA and section 1981. On February 5, 2003, the district court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment. Regarding Pegram's reassignment, the district court held that the transfer did not constitute an adverse employment action. Pegram timely filed a notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir.2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Doubts are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, and any reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party. See Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 619 (5th Cir. 1999).

We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. St. Romain v. Industrial Fabrication & Repair Serv., 203 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness of Federal & State Law Claims

Honeywell asserts on appeal, as it did before the district court, that prior to reaching any substantive issues, this court should find Pegram's federal and state law claims untimely. The district court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment finding that Pegram's claims under section 1981 were only actionable if they accrued post May 4, 1999, and Pegram's state law claims under TCHRA were actionable only if they occurred after October 7, 2000. We affirm.

We begin our analysis by noting that Pegram filed suit alleging discriminatory acts by Honeywell that occurred between 1993 and 1997 and from the period of October 2000 until March 30, 2001. Pegram filed a charge of discrimination with the TCHR on April 5, 2001, and he initiated this action in federal court on May 4, 2001. Federal civil rights actions brought under section 1981, which lack an express statute of limitations, are governed by the most closely analogous limitations period provided under state law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-66, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir.2003). Under Texas law,² one must file a discrimination claim under section 1981 within two years of the adverse employment action. See Byers v. Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir.2000). To state a claim under the TCHRA,³ a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the TCHR within 180 days of the discriminatory act. Tex. Lab.Code. Ann. § 21.202(a); see also Estate of Martineau v. ARCO Chem. Co., 203 F.3d 904, 913-14 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, the district court correctly ruled that Pegram's section 1981 claims arising prior to May 4, 1999 (two years before Pegram filed the federal complaint) were time-barred. Likewise, any state-law claims occurring before October 7, 2000, (180 days before Pegram filed with TCHR) were also time-barred.

Continuing Violations Doctrine

Pegram attempts to avoid this apparent untimeliness by invoking the continuing violations doctrine. Specifically, Pegram contends that the district court erred in dismissing his section 1981 and state law claims because Honeywell's alleged discriminatory acts, relating to Pegram's race and/or disability, constituted a pattern of discriminatory behavior. We cannot agree.

This court has consistently held that the continuing violations doctrine is equitable in nature and extends the limitations period on otherwise time barred claims only when the unlawful employment practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a series of discrete acts. Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 136 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238-39 (5th Cir.1998). Under the continuing violations doctrine, a plaintiff is relieved of establishing that all of the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred within the actionable period, if the plaintiff can show a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period. Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 487 (5th Cir.2002) (citing Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 135 (5th Cir.1997)). The end...