Pegues v. Emerson Electric Co.

• Decision Date: 25 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 3:94CV119-S-D.,3:94CV119-S-D.
• Citation: 913 F. Supp. 976
• Parties: Cherry Ann PEGUES, Plaintiff, v. EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. and Greg Mosley, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

913 F. Supp. 976

Cherry Ann PEGUES, Plaintiff, v. EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. and Greg Mosley, Defendants.

No. 3:94CV119-S-D.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Western Division.

January 25, 1996.

Lawrence Hakim, Charlie Baglan & Associates, Batesville, MS, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth Milam, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

OPINION

SENTER, Chief Judge.

In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendants wrongfully terminated her employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state law. Presently before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Cherry Ann Pegues, began working for defendant Emerson Electric Company in 1972, and worked at that company until she was terminated in December, 1993. This was Pegues' first and only job; she has an eighth-grade education and no GED.

In September, 1992, Pegues received a work-related injury, which was subsequently diagnosed as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. At the time, she reported her injury to her supervisor and to defendant Greg Mosley, who was the personnel manager of Emerson's Oxford, Mississippi, manufacturing facility. A week later, Emerson sent Pegues to see a doctor who released her for light duty work. Because her recovery was progressing slowly, Pegues decided to seek treatment from another doctor who relieved her from any kind of work from November, 1992, until January, 1993. In early January, Pegues' doctor allowed her to resume working, and she returned to her previous job of scoping rotors. Within a few weeks, however, she returned to the doctor complaining of continuing pain in her hands, and, once again, he relieved her of her job duties. Her doctor continued to monitor her condition, keeping Emerson informed, and in June and September, 1993, he performed surgery on Pegues' hands.

In November, 1993, Pegues received a letter from a nurse who worked for Emerson's workers' compensation administrator. It indicated that Pegues' doctor had released her to return to work, which Pegues did the following day. At that time, she met with Mosley, who advised her that her old job of scoping rotors was not available and that she was therefore being placed in the diecast loader/unloader position, a job which Pegues' doctor believed she was able to do "without any necessary restrictions or limitations." For two and one-half days, Pegues attempted to perform her assigned duties but began to experience pain in her hands and shoulder. She reported the problems to her supervisor who advised her to talk to Mosley, who was unavailable. Following the Thanksgiving holidays, Pegues returned to her doctor after notifying Emerson of her appointment. The doctor once again relieved Pegues of her work duties, advising her that he would notify Emerson of his actions. Pegues had no further contact with Emerson until approximately two weeks later when she received a certified letter from Mosley stating that she had been terminated a week earlier for failing to report her absence. In this situation, the employee, according to Emerson, was presumed to have voluntarily quit her employment. Pegues then called Mosley. He denied having received any notification from the doctor but stated he would investigate the matter. A week later Pegues received another certified letter from Emerson advising that its decision to terminate her employment remained unchanged, as it was the duty of the employee, not the doctor, to contact the company about medical leave.

Subsequently, Pegues brought this action for violations of the ADA and the Mississippi Constitution and for wrongful discharge and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In separate proceedings, she also sought disability benefits from the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission and the Social Security Administration. At Pegues' hearing before the workers' compensation administrative judge, she testified that although she has been released to return to work, she remains in pain, is unable to do any housework, and continues under her doctor's care. Her rehabilitation consultant, C. Lamar Crocker, opined that, given her injury and the restrictions placed upon her by her doctor, Pegues is not employable and probably never will be; he therefore assigned her an occupational disability of one hundred percent. In reaching his conclusions, Crocker discounted Pegues' limited education as follows:

It doesn't matter whether you're educated or not. If you're a skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled person, in whatever job you're using, if you can't use your hands, even in the simplest thing of just grasping something and holding onto it and moving with it — that is the simplest of the three. If you can't do that, it's major.... When her doctor told me that she could not grasp simply, that she was not capable of pushing or pulling, nor could she do what we call fine manipulation, in other words, of manipulating the fingers for assembly work, piecework — when you put all three of those factors together, you're basically finding out the doctor is saying she can't use her hands period.¹

Emerson presented no evidence to rebut any of Pegues' evidence. Therefore, based upon the testimony of Pegues and Crocker and that of Pegues' doctors, the administrative judge found that since September, 1992, Pegues has been permanently and totally disabled with a total loss of wage-earning capacity.

Pegues also received a favorable decision on her claim for social security disability benefits after a hearing before the administrative law judge. The ALJ concluded that Pegues' "impairments preclude her ability to perform significant numbers of jobs existing in the national economy." More specifically, he found that she (1) "is unable to perform a full range of work, even at the sedentary exertional level," (2) "is unable to perform her past relevant work as a small part assembler or inspector," (3) "does not have any acquired skills which are transferable to the skilled or semiskilled activities of other work," and (4) "cannot be expected to make a vocational adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the economy." In sum, Pegues "has been under a `disability,' as defined in the Social Security Act, since January 22, 1993...."

This cause is presently before the court on the motion of Emerson and Mosley for summary judgment. In it, they argue that because Pegues cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she is a qualified individual under the ADA, she therefore cannot state a prima facie case of discrimination. They also argue that even if she makes that showing, summary judgment is appropriate because they have articulated a legitimate reason for the termination. As to the state law claims, Emerson and Mosley maintain that Pegues was an at-will employee and could be discharged at any time and that her emotional distress claims fail as a matter of law. Mosley further contends that he cannot be held individually liable under the ADA because he was not an "employer" as defined in the statute or under state law as he was not a party to the employment relationship between Pegues and Emerson and because in advising Pegues of her termination, he was simply discharging his employment duties with Emerson. Each of these grounds and Pegues' responses will be considered in turn.²

DISCUSSION

I.

The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against qualified employees with a disability "because of the disability...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To state a prima facie case under the ADA, plaintiff must prove that (1) she suffers from a "disability"; (2) she is a "qualified individual"; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than nondisabled employees. Daigle v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir.1995); Aikens v. Banana Republic, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 1031, 1036 (S.D.Tex.1995); Stradley v. Lafourche Communications, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 442, 443 (E.D.La.1994). On summary judgment, plaintiff need only show that there is a genuine issue of material fact on each of these elements. Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1991).³

A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). In pertinent part, a "reasonable accommodation" may include "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices ... and other similar accommodations...." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). However, it does not include anything that would pose an undue hardship, i.e., significant difficulty or expense, on the operation of the business, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A) and 1211(10)(A), and does not require the business to fundamentally alter its program or to find or create a new job for the individual. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir.1995).

Defendants do not dispute that Pegues has proved the first element of her prima facie case, i.e., that she suffers from a qualifying disability. But see McKay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., 878 F.Supp. 1012, 1016 (E.D.Ky.1995) (individuals with carpal tunnel syndrome are not necessarily disabled as matter of law under ADA). Instead, defendants focus on whether Pegues is a qualified individual under the ADA. In that regard, their argument is twofold. First, defendants maintain that, based on the representations and testimony of Pegues and her vocational expert before the Worker's Compensation Commission and the Social Security Administration that she is unable to work and that there is no job in the economy that she can do and the subsequent findings by both entities to that effect, Pegues is now estopped from arguing that she is...