Pegues v. Hooks
| Decision Date | 07 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:19CV610 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER EUGENE PEGUES, Petitioner, v. ERIC A. HOOKS, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Public Safety, Respondent. |
Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "Petition"). (Docket Entry 1.) Respondent has moved for summary judgment. (Docket Entries 4, 5.) For the reasons that follow, the Court should grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On August 9 and 10, 2016, a jury in the Superior Court of Guilford County found Petitioner guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in case 15 CRS 76505, and of attaining habitual felon status in case 15 CRS 23221, respectively. (See Docket Entry 1, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4-6; see also Docket Entry 5-3 at 46, 74; Docket Entry 5-7 at 287-89, 391-94.)1 The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 80 to 108 months in prison. (See Docket Entry 1, ¶ 3; see also Docket Entry 5-3 at 77-78; Docket Entry 5-7 at 395-401).
Petitioner appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, (see Docket Entry 1, ¶¶ 8, 9; see also Docket Entry 5-3 at 81-83; Docket Entry 5-7 at 403), which found no error, State v. Pegues, No. COA17-70, 812 S.E.2d 912 (table), 2018 WL 2016281 (N.C. App. May 1, 2018) (unpublished). Petitioner did not thereafter file a petition for discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme Court. (See Docket Entry 1, ¶ 9(g).)
Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se MAR with the trial court (Docket Entry 1 at 40-56; Docket Entry 5-6), which that court summarily denied (Docket Entry 1 at 36-39). Petitioner then filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the North Carolina Court of Appeals seeking review of his MAR's denial (id. at 23-56), which that court denied (id. at 22).
Petitioner next instituted this action via his Petition. (Docket Entry 1.) Thereafter, Respondent filed the instant Motion and Supporting Brief (Docket Entries 4, 5), and Petitioner responded in opposition (Docket Entry 7).
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals summarized the trial evidence as follows:
On [May 28,] 2015, while [Petitioner] was on probation, law enforcement officers went to search [Petitioner]'s home. When officers arrived, [Petitioner] asked if he could secure his dogs before they entered; the officers agreed and [Petitioner] closed the door to his home. The officers then heard a window opening and a "clink, metal-on-metal" sound. When [Petitioner] returned to the door, he had forgotten to secure his dogs. Thereafter[,] officers found two guns on the ground outside [Petitioner]'s residence by his bedroom window; one gun was on [Petitioner]'s property and the other was just beyond a fence on the neighbor's property but still "justoutside" [Petitioner]'s bedroom window. [Petitioner] was the only person in the area, and his neighbor's house appeared to be entirely vacant.
The Petition raises nine grounds for habeas relief:
1) Petitioner's "[c]onviction was obtained in violation of Due Process of Law" (Docket Entry 1, ¶ 12 (Ground One)), because "[the trial court] threatened [Petitioner], . . . made unfair and improper remarks about [Petitioner], . . . denied substitute counsel, . . . [and] did not make sufficient inquiry into [Petitioner's] suicide attempt" (id., ¶ 12(Ground One)(a));
2) Petitioner possesses "[n]ew evidence" (id., ¶ 12 (Ground Two)) consisting of "[a]ffidavits from two witnesses stating that [Petitioner] did not live at [the] residence [where officers found the guns], the guns were not [Petitioner's], and that [the] guns may have belonged to someone next door," as well as a "[n]ewspaper article reporting on the houses in the neighborhood" (id., ¶ 12(Ground Two)(a));
3) Petitioner's "[c]onviction [was] obtained by use of [a] coerced or illegally obtained confession" (id., ¶ 12(Ground Three)) because, "[a]t trial[, Petitioner's trial counsel] opened the door to suppressed alleged statements [by Petitioner] which led to the prosecutor addressing [the] statements over objection" (id., ¶ 12(Ground Three)(a));
4) "[u]nconstitutional search and seizure" (id., ¶ 12(Ground Four)), in that "[p]robation officers and High Point Policesearched the residence [where they found the guns] without a warrant[ and Petitioner] did not live at the residence" (id., ¶ 12(Ground Four)(a));
5) Petitioner's "[c]onviction [was] obtained by the use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest," because "[o]fficers placed [Petitioner] in handcuffs without any provocation from [him]" (id. at 12);
6) Petitioner's "[c]onviction [was] obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination," because "[o]fficers claim[ed] that [Petitioner] admitted to guilt prior to being given Miranda warnings[ and the a]lleged statements were introduced at trial despite a motion to suppress [the] statements" (id. at 13);
7) Petitioner's "[c]onviction [was] obtained by action of the trial jury . . . which was unconstitutionally selected, impaneled, and constituted," because "[a j]uror . . . admitted to being friends with the Assistant Chief of Police and that she m[ight have been] subconsciously bias[ed]" (id. at 14);
8) Petitioner's "[c]onviction [was] obtained by denial of [his] right to present evidence in his own defense" because, "[o]n March 3[], 2016[,] and again on August 8[], 2016[, he] made it clear to the [trial] court that [his trial counsel] did not know the details of [Petitioner's] case, but the [trial] court forced [Petitioner] to proceed without evidence or witnesses" (id. at 15); and
9) Petitioner's "[c]onviction [was] obtained due to the ineffectiveness of [his] trial [] counsel," in that trial "counseldid not present [an] arresting officer's contradictory statements, did not present evidence, misstated facts, did not present witnesses, opened the door to suppressed statements, did not dispute ownership of [the home where officers found the guns], did not address probation's right to search, used profanity towards [Petitioner], expelled [Petitioner] from trial counsel's office, violated lawyer/client confidentiality, did not investigate, did not present mitigating factors, did not question [the] credibility of [the] state's witnesses, was unable to answer simple questions, did not object to proceeding after [Petitioner's] suicide attempt, did not give advice whether or not to testify, [and] did not strike [a] bias[ed] juror" (id. at 16).
The Court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Further, O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) ().2
Alternatively, this Court must apply a highly deferential standard of review in connection with habeas claims "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). More specifically, the Court may not grant relief unless a state court decision on the merits "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. To qualify as "contrary to" United States Supreme Court precedent, a state court decision either must arrive at "a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law" or "confront[] facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant [United States] Supreme Court precedent and arrive[] at a result opposite" to the United States Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). A state court decision "involves an unreasonable application" of United States Supreme Court case law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. at 407; see also id. at 409-11 ().
In Ground One, Petitioner contends that his "[c]onviction was obtained in violation of Due Process of Law" (Docket Entry 1, ¶ 12 (Ground One)), because "[the trial court] threatened [Petitioner], . . . made unfair and improper remarks about [Petitioner], . . . denied substitute counsel, . . . [and] did not make sufficient inquiry into [Petitioner's] suicide attempt" (id., ¶ 12(Ground One)(a)); see also Docket Entry 7 at 2-6). Those contentions fall short.
Petitioner first asserts "that[,] at [his] pre-trial hearing on [March 3,] 2016[,] regarding [his] rejection of a plea bargain[, the trial court] made strong, descriptive comments to [Petitioner] in order to impress upon [him] the seriousness of [his] situation." (Docket Entry 7 at 2.) According to Petitioner, "[b]y [the trial court] making threatening and unfair remarks towards [Petitioner], [it] reaffirmed [Petitioner's] fears and distrust of the [c]ourts and prison" and, "had [the...
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