Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R.Co., Civil No. 99-112-P-C.

• Decision Date: 26 July 1999
• Docket Number: Civil No. 99-112-P-C.
• Citation: 59 F.Supp.2d 109
• Parties: PEJEPSCOT INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC. d/b/a Grimmel Industries, Plaintiff, v. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO., Springfield Terminal Railway Co., and Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

59 F.Supp.2d 109

PEJEPSCOT INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC. d/b/a Grimmel Industries, Plaintiff, v. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO., Springfield Terminal Railway Co., and Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc., Defendants.

Civil No. 99-112-P-C.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

July 26, 1999.

James T. Kilbreth, Rita H. Logan, Verrill & Dana, Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.

Glen L. Porter, Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veague, Bangor, ME, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

GENE CARTER, District Judge.

Plaintiff Pejepscot Industrial Park, Inc. d/b/a Grimmel Industries filed a six-count First Amended Complaint seeking: a declaration of ownership rights of a railroad spur (Count 1); an injunction preventing destruction of the spur and interference with Grimmel's right to repair, maintain, and use the spur (Count II); unlawful refusal to provide rail service, in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11101 (Count III); breach of duty to Grimmel as third-party beneficiary of the freight easement agreement between MEC and the State of Maine (Count IV); breach of contract (Count V); and tortious interference with business advantage and expectancies (Count VI). Defendants Maine Central Railroad Company, Springfield Terminal Railway Company, and Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc. move pursuant to 12(b)(1) to dismiss this action with prejudice because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, Defendants move to dismiss the action without prejudice under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction for all of the issues within the special expertise of the Surface Transportation Board. The Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

I. FACTS

Defendant Maine Central Railroad ("MEC") is a common carrier providing railroad freight services. First Amended Complaint ¶ 2. Defendant Springfield Terminal Railway ("ST") operates MEC's railroad. Defendant Guilford Transportation ("Guilford") owns MEC, ST, and various other entities providing transportation services. First Amended Complaint ¶ 4. At the heart of this controversy is a 3000-foot railroad spur located in Topsham, Maine, northeast of the Androscoggin River and southwest of the main line of the "Lewiston Lower Road" Branch. First Amended Complaint Ex. 1 at Ex. A at 2. The spur was constructed in the late 19th century to provide freight service to a paper mill owned by the Pejepscot Paper Company. First Amended Complaint ¶ 8. In January 1992, Grimmel purchased the abandoned Pejepscot Paper mill and incorporated as Pejepscot Industrial Park engaged in the business of salvaging, selling, and shipping scrap metal. First Amended Complaint ¶ 7. Eastbrook Timber Company owns the land adjacent to Grimmel's facility. First Amended Complaint ¶ 8. A spur railroad track (the "spur") runs across Grimmel's land and Eastbrook's land to a main railroad track. First Amended Complaint ¶ 8. Eastbrook has no operations at its site. First Amended Complaint ¶ 9. Thus, at this time the spur serves only Grimmel. First Amended Complaint ¶ 9.

The main railroad track to which the spur connects traverses from Brunswick/Topsham to Lewiston, and is commonly known as the "Lewiston Industrial Track." First Amended Complaint ¶ 10. MEC's predecessors acquired the track in 1937. First Amended Complaint ¶ 10. In February 1991, MEC executed a deed (the "Deed") granting to the State of Maine portions of the Lewiston Industrial Track. First Amended Complaint Ex. 1, Ex. A. Among the parcels granted was the Lewiston Lower Road Branch, which lies within Brunswick, Topsham, and Lisbon, Maine and is the portion of the line the spur connects. First Amended Complaint ¶ 11; First Amended Complaint Ex. 1, Deed Ex. A. In conveying the Lewiston Lower Road Branch of the rail line to the State, MEC expressly reserved "a certain parcel of land in Topsham known as the `Pejepscot Spur Line.'" First Amended Complaint ¶ 12; First Amended Complaint Ex. 1, Ex. A at 2. The Pejepscot Spur Line is the spur serving Grimmel's facility. MEC does not own the "parcel of land" reserved in the Deed. First Amended Complaint ¶ 12.

As part of the sale of the Lewiston Industrial Track, MEC, along with ST, entered into a "Freight Easement Agreement" (the "Agreement") with the State. First Amended Complaint Ex. 2. Pursuant to the Freight Easement Agreement, Defendants reserved "from the Lines conveyed to the State ... a rail freight easement for the purpose of providing common carrier rail freight service to all shippers and shippers' facilities on the Lines." First Amended Complaint ¶ 14; First Amended Complaint Ex. 2, part 1.1. Further, the Agreement provided that "[t]he conveyance of the Lines by MEC to the State excludes any and all rights and obligations of the MEC under federal law to provide, directly or through ST, common carrier freight service and the MEC retains all such rights and obligations to provide said service to all shippers and shippers' facilities located on the Lines." First Amended Complaint ¶ 14; First Amended Complaint Ex. 2, part 1.2.

By 1994, Grimmel's operations were fully in swing and Grimmel was prepared to ship scrap metal out of Maine. First Amended Complaint ¶ 15. The most efficient and least expensive method of such shipment is by rail. First Amended Complaint ¶ 15. Thus, Grimmel requested that Defendants provide common carrier freight service at Grimmel's Pejepscot Industrial Park. First Amended Complaint ¶ 15. Defendants refused to provide service, asserting no appropriate rail cars were available. First Amended Complaint ¶ 16. After shipping the product out of Portland for a time, by other means, Grimmel again requested rail service at the Pejepscot industrial facility. First Amended Complaint ¶ 22. Defendants provided Plaintiff with rail service rates which Grimmel accepted. First Amended Complaint ¶ 23. Apparently before any product was shipped by rail, Defendants again refused to provide service to Grimmel. First Amended Complaint ¶ 24. Thereafter, Grimmel began negotiations with the State over repairs to the Lewiston Lower Road Branch track and the provision of rail service to Grimmel upon MEC's formal abandonment of rail service on the Lewiston Industrial Track line. First Amended Complaint ¶ 25.

In June 1998, MEC filed with the Surface Transportation Board a Notice of Exemption for abandonment and discontinuance of service over the Lewiston Industrial Track line. First Amended Complaint ¶ 26; First Amended Complaint Ex. 5. In its Notice of Exemption, MEC represented to the Board that the Lewiston Lower Road Branch portion of the line was already owned by the State. First Amended Complaint ¶ 27; First Amended Complaint Ex. 5 at 3. It further represented that "the State of Maine, or a third party acting in conjunction therewith, will acquire the remainder of the Line and/or operating rights over the same post-abandonment." First Amended Complaint ¶ 27; First Amended Complaint Ex. 5 at 3. MEC maintained that "no salvage operations will be undertaken" after abandonment. First Amended Complaint ¶ 27; First Amended Complaint Ex.5, Ex. D at 4. MEC also represented that "[t]he proposed abandonment will not affect carrier operations in the area." First Amended Complaint ¶ 27; First Amended Complaint Ex.5, Ex. D at 5.

The Surface Transportation Board permitted abandonment of the line. First Amended Complaint ¶ 28. Thereafter, Defendants informed Grimmel that they intend to rip up the spur and sell it for scrap. First Amended Complaint ¶ 28. Destruction of the spur will entirely cut off Grimmel's ability to obtain rail service from whichever rail carrier operates the main rail line after MEC abandons it. First Amended Complaint ¶ 29. The State of Maine has agreed to upgrade the Lewiston Lower Road Branch so that Grimmel may be provided rail service, so long as Grimmel upgrades the spur. First Amended Complaint ¶ 30. In June 1999, however, Grimmel requested MEC's consent to repair and upgrade the spur at Grimmel's own expense, so that Grimmel could have access to rail service on the Lewiston Lower Road Branch. First Amended Complaint ¶ 31. MEC refused to allow Grimmel to repair the spur at Grimmel's own expense. First Amended Complaint ¶ 32. Thus, Grimmel will be unable to obtain rail service when the main rail line is restored. First Amended Complaint ¶ 32.

II. DISCUSSION

Federal jurisdiction may never be presumed. Instead, the proponent — here, the Plaintiff — has the burden of demonstrating the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1996); Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995). On a motion to dismiss, this Court is required to construe the complaint liberally, treating all factual averments as true and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. See Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Grimmel asserts two bases of subject matter jurisdiction for its claims — federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). First Amended Complaint ¶ 5. The only federal question expressly raised is whether Defendants violated federal law by refusing to provide rail service to Grimmel or by otherwise interfering with the provision of rail service, in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11101(a). Complaint ¶¶ 43-48.

Late in 1995, in line with the general trend regarding deregulation, Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, which dissolved the Interstate Commerce Commission. Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 ("ICCTA"), Pub.L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995)(codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.A., including 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-16106 (1997)). See also 49 U.S.C.A. § 101 note (1997) (detailing the Act's codification). The passage of the ICCTA, however, did not signal the complete end of regulation. In its place, Con...