Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Indus. Comm'n

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DUNN
• Citation: Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 285 Ill. 31, 120 N.E. 530 (Ill. 1918)
• Decision Date: 21 October 1918
• Docket Number: No. 12163.,12163.
• Parties: PEKIN COOPERAGE CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

285 Ill. 31

120 N.E. 530

PEKIN COOPERAGE CO.

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 12163.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 21, 1918.

Error to Circuit Court, Peoria County; Clyde E. Stone, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Henry Rasor, employé, for compensation for injuries sustained by him while at work for the Pekin Cooperage Company. Award by an arbitrator in favor of claimant was confirmed by the Industrial Commission, writ of certiorari sued out of the circuit court was quashed, and, the judge of that court having certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, the employer brings error. Judgment affirmed.Fyffe, Ryner & Dale, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Kirk & Shurtleff, of Peoria, for defendant in error.

DUNN, J.

Henry Rasor received an injury while at work for the Pekin Cooperage Company, for which an award was made in his favor by an arbitrator under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1913, p. 335), which was confirmed by the Industrial Commission. A writ of certiorari sued out of the circuit court of Peoria county was quashed on motion of the respondents, and, the judge of that court having certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, a writ of error was sued out for that purpose.

[2] The question is whether Rasor's injury, which was received in the course of his employment, arose out of his employment, and it has been argued as if we were to determine it from the weight of the evidence. Our consideration of the evidence is limited to the inquiry whether the record contains competent evidence to sustain the award. If the evidence in favor of the applicant sustains the award, the weight of the evidence to the contrary will not be considered by the reviewing court. The determination of the facts upon contradictory evidence by the Industrial Commission is final.

On December 26, 1916, the Pekin Cooperage Company was engaged in the cooperage business in Peoria. Rasor was engaged in picking out or culling barrel staves for another employé, who was known as a ‘barrel raiser,’ whose duty it was to make the barrels. George A. Miller was culling staves a few feet from Rasor for another barrel raiser. It was the duty of each culler to cull staves for his barrel raiser, and in case his rack ran out of staves it was customary for the cullr to take staves from another culler's rack. Miller had been taken from the half-barrel department and put to culling staves in the afternoon, and had been working about half an hour when the injury happened. He had taken a half-pint bottle of whisky with him to the plant in the morning, from which he had taken two or three drinks, and he had about half the whisky left. Shortly after the injury the superintendent sent Miller home because he was drinking on the job. Miller had gone to another part of the building a few minutes, and when he returned he took some staves from Rasor's rack and put them in his own. Rasor objected to this in language which was offensive, and a fight ensued, the details of which are clouded in the obscurity which usually attends such occurrences. There is evidence tending to show, and which would justify the conclusion,that Miller was the aggressor throughout, and that Rasor did no more than defend himself. Rasor's claim is for injuries received in this encounter.

Rasor clearly suffered an accidental injury in the course of his employment. It was a sudden and unexpected mishap, occurring outside of the usual course of events, without any design on his part, while he was engaged at his work. The compensation to be provided and paid by the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not, however, for all accidental injuries which may be sustained by his employés in the course of their employment, but only for such as also arise out of the employment. There must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury. It is not necessary that the injury be one which ought to have been foreseen or expected, but it must be one which after the event may be seen to have had its origin in the nature of the employment. The courts administering compensation laws similar to ours do not disagree upon the interpretation of the law, but in the great variety of circumstances which they are called upon the review it is frequently difficult to make the application to the facts. In Armitage v. London and Western Railway Co., 86 L. T. 883 (a case under the English Workmen's Compensation Act), two boys, fellow workmen of the claimant, were ‘larking,’ and one pushed the other into a pit. The latter in anger threw a piece of iron at the former, but missed him and injured the claimant, who was engaged at his work. It was held that the act had no relation to the employment, but was an intentional wrongful act, and was not a risk of the employment. In Baird v. Burley, 45 Scot. L. R. 416, the claimant, who was working in a coal mine, was pursuing a fellow workman to prevent him from carrying off a hutch. The latter threw some rubbish, and the former, in seeking to avoid it, struck his head against the side of the passage. It was held the accident was caused by the act of a fellow workman outside the scope of his employment, and that the claimant was therefore not entitled to compensation. In Murphy v. Berwick, 43 Ir. L. T. 126, a customer came out of the bar of a hotel into the kitchen, which adjoined it, and made a rush at the cook, who in trying to avoid him threw her hand through a glass door and was injured, and it was held that the accident did not arise out...