Pell v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.02-21 KAJ.,CIV.A.02-21 KAJ. |
| Citation | 348 F.Supp.2d 306 |
| Parties | Melvin PELL and Ellen Pell, Plaintiffs, v. E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Robert Jacobs, Esq., Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for Plaintiffs.
Mary E. Cooper, Esq., Kathleen Furey McDonough, Esq., and Erica L. Niezgoda, Esq., Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Defendants.
Before me is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Item ["D.I."] 116; the "Motion") filed by defendants E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. Inc., a Delaware corporation, and the Board of Benefits and Pensions of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. Inc. ("the Board") (collectively "DuPont"). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Melvin Pell, a retired employee of DuPont, and Ellen Pell, his wife, alleges that DuPont breached its duties, obligations, and fiduciary responsibilities under Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, by calculating Mr. Pell's benefits under the DuPont pension plan based on a later date than the commencement of his employment with Consolidated Coal Company ("Consol"), a DuPont subsidiary,1 even though DuPont represented on several occasions over the course of his employment that it would use the earlier employment-commencement date in calculating his pension. (D.I. 1 at ¶¶ 10-14.) Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, to estop DuPont from using the later date in calculating the benefit rights due under the pension plan, and they seek damages, interest, and costs stemming from what they claim is the unfairly low calculation of Mr. Pell's retirement benefits. (See D.I. 1 at ¶ 30.)
DuPont denies breaching any duty to the Plaintiffs and argues that (1) Plaintiffs' state law causes of action are preempted, (2) Plaintiffs are receiving all the benefits due to them under the terms of the DuPont Pension and Retirement Plan (the "DuPont Plan") and certain administrative guidelines in force at the time of Mr. Pell's transfer to DuPont (the "Transfer Policy"), and (3) that Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel theory fails as a matter of law. (D.I. 117 at 12-27.)
For the reasons set forth herein, DuPont's Motion will be granted.
Mr. Pell was employed by Consol on February 10, 1971. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 6; D.I. 13 at 3.) He provided engineering services to DuPont and worked at their facilities in Delaware while he was on "loan" to DuPont as a Consol employee between 1982 and January 1984. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 7.) Mr. Pell claims that, in 1983, he was asked to consider transferring employment from Consol to DuPont. (Id. at ¶ 8.) According to Mr. Pell, one of the key factors he considered in making his decision was whether his retirement benefits under the DuPont Plan would be calculated based on his total combined service at Consol and DuPont. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.)
Mr. Pell alleges that he transferred his employment to DuPont on January 1, 1984, after receiving assurances that his total combined service would be counted for vesting purposes.3 (Id.) In explaining what effect his transfer of employment would have on his pension, Mr. Pell was told in a letter dated January 13, 1984, from the Director of Employee Compensation and Benefits at Consol, that the "[p]ension ... will be calculated under the DuPont Plan based on ... total combined service."4
Subsequent to the 1984 letter, Mr. Pell received several calculations of his pension benefits from DuPont. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Pell received these calculations on at least four occasions: 1991, 1992, 1998 and 1999. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 12.) In Plaintiffs' Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Opposition"), however, Plaintiffs assert that the four calculations actually occurred in 1991, 1992, 1998 and 2000, "when ... [Mr. Pell] finally requested his actual pension...."5 (D.I. 125 at 8-9.) Each of these calculations, except the one in 2000, used February 10, 1971 to calculate his pension benefits under the DuPont Plan.6 (D.I. 125 at 8-9; D.I. 1 at ¶ 12; D.I. 1 at Exs. B, C, D.) Mr. Pell alleges that in reliance upon representations that his pension was based on his total combined service starting February 10, 1971, he decided to retire in December 2000. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 13.) Eleven days prior to the date of his retirement, Mr. Pell was, he says, informed by DuPont that his pension was going to be calculated beginning on November 1, 1975 and therefore he would be given credit for 25.1667 years of service rather than the 29.9 years of service he had expected and been assured of by DuPont. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.)
DuPont does not deny that it made numerous representations to Mr. Pell about basing his pension on February 10, 1971 as the date that his service began, but characterizes the representations as estimates that were "subject to final confirmation at the time a formal application for benefits was made." (D.I. 8 at 4.) To support that characterization, DuPont points to the disclaimer language that appears on the representations, such as "data used in this estimate ... are subject to review and confirmation." (Id.)
DuPont claims that its actuaries, in their final calculation of Mr. Pell's pension benefits, used November 1, 1975 rather than February 10, 1971 because of the Transfer Policy that governed the treatment of pension benefits for employees who transferred between Consol and DuPont. (Id.; see also D.I. 5 at Ex. B.) The Transfer Policy states that:
pension benefits for any employee transferring from Consol to DuPont are to be calculated
(D.I. 5, Ex. B at 6, 14.) Mr. Pell denies that he was ever given a copy of the Transfer Policy. (D.I. 13 at 5.)
Mr. Pell deferred retirement until May 31, 2001 while he appealed to the Board the issue of the service date used to calculate his pension benefits. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 19.) On May 24, 2001, the Board denied his appeal. (D.I. 5 at Ex. D.) It explained that since Mr. Pell's service under the DuPont Plan and Transfer Policy "start[ed] on November 1, 1975, a service adjustment of 4.72500 [years was] ... applied to [Mr. Pell's] February 10, 1971 ASD." (D.I. 5, Ex. D at 2.)
The reduction in credited service of approximately four-and-a-half years under the DuPont Plan resulted in a smaller benefit than Plaintiffs had anticipated. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 14.) According to Plaintiffs, the difference between the pension payments is approximately $725 per month and, if Plaintiffs live their normal life expectancies, the loss will exceed $100,000 in benefits.7 (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 24.) DuPont's response to Mr. Pell was simply that it:
sincerely regrets that [he] received several incorrect letters and statements over the years, and that [he was] informed of the correct treatment for [his] pension benefit only shortly prior to [his] intended retirement date. Unfortunately, due to the uniqueness of [his] situation (the timing and direction of [his] transfer), significant research was required to determine [his] proper treatment. That research began only upon receipt of [his] notice of intention to retire, and required significant time and resources from Consol, Conoco, and DuPont.
Prior to bringing suit on January 9, 2002, Mr. Pell exhausted all of his appeals. (D.I. 1 at ¶¶ 19, 16.) Plaintiffs now allege that DuPont breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA by misrepresenting the basis of the pension plan. Based on their reliance on the misrepresentations, Plaintiffs argue that DuPont should be estopped from changing the service date of February 10, 1971 as the basis for Mr. Pell's pension. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs also seek back pay for pension benefits, plus interest and future benefits calculated with the February 10, 1971 service date. (Id. at ¶ 30.)
On October 29, 2003, I denied DuPont's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.I.7) and gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to develop in discovery evidence to support their claims. (See D.I. 10.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a party is entitled to summary judgment if a court determines from its examination of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether there is a triable issue of material fact, a court must review the evidence and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976). However, a court should not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal citation omitted). The non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Inds. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, a mere...
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