Pellitteri v. Prine

• Decision Date: 21 August 2013
• Citation: Pellitteri v. Prine (M.D. Ga. Aug 21, 2013)
• Parties: FELICIA PELLITTERI, Plaintiff, v. CHRIS PRINE, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lowndes County, Ga., LOWNDES COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, and LOWNDES COUNTY, GA., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

FELICIA PELLITTERI, Plaintiff, v. CHRIS PRINE, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff ofLowndes County, Ga., LOWNDES COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,and LOWNDES COUNTY, GA., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:13-CV-28 (HL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA VALDOSTA DIVISION

SO ORDERED: August 21, 2013

ORDER

This case is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss of Lowndes County Sheriff's Office and Lowndes County, Georgia and Motion for Partial Dismissal by Sheriff Chris Prine, in His Official Capacity (Doc. 11).For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I.MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain specific factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868(2009)(citingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007)).A claim is plausible where the plaintiff alleges factual content that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that thedefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."Id.The plausibility standard "calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of the defendant's liability.Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

On a motion to dismiss, "all-well pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n. 1(11th Cir.1999).However, the same does not apply to legal conclusions contained in the complaint.Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260(11th Cir.2009)(citation omitted)."Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.In addition, the court does not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

II.FACTS/BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff was employed as a deputy sheriff within the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office on or about June 7, 2009.(Compl. ¶ 11;Doc. 1).She was terminated from employment in May of 2012.(Id.at ¶ 12).Prior to her termination, Plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury to her knee.(Id.at ¶ 13).Plaintiff became disabled as a result of the injury, and Defendants knew of Plaintiff's disability.(Id.at ¶¶ 13-15).In light of her disability, Plaintiff requested that she be put on temporary light duty.(Id.at ¶ 16).Rather than accommodating her disability, Defendant Prine terminated her employment.(Id.at ¶ 17).Plaintiff was replaced by a male deputy sheriff.(Id. at 20).Defendant Prine allowed male deputy sheriffs who suffered on-the-job injuries to work light duty jobs.(Id.at ¶ 18).Further, at the time of Plaintiff's termination, Defendants retained equally or lesser qualified similarly situated male deputy sheriffs.(Id.at ¶ 19).

On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against Chris Prine, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lowndes County, Georgia, the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office, and Lowndes County, Georgia.In Count One, asserted against all Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that her termination violated her right to be free from gender discrimination under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.In Count Two, asserted against Defendant Prine in his official capacity only, the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office, and Lowndes County, Plaintiff alleges that her gender-based termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.Finally, in Count Three, asserted against Defendant Prine in his official capacity only, the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office, and Lowndes County, Plaintiff alleges that her termination based on her disability or perceived disability constitutes a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, in part, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).Specifically, Defendants move to dismiss the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office and Lowndes County as parties.They also move to dismissCounts One and Three against Defendant Prine in his official capacity.Defendants do not seek the dismissal of the claims asserted in Count One against Defendant Prine in his individual capacity and in Count Two against Defendant Prine in his official capacity, and those will move forward notwithstanding the rulings made here by the Court.

III.ANALYSIS

A.Claims against the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office

Defendants move to dismiss all claims against the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office because it is not an entity capable of being sued.The Court agrees.The issue of whether a government entity is capable of being sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is located.Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(3).Thus, in this case, Georgia law controls.The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that "[i]n every suit there must be a legal entity as the real plaintiff and the real defendant.This state recognizes only three classes as legal entities, namely (1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue."Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 258 Ga. 317, 318, 368 S.E.2d 500, 502(1988)(quotation omitted).A sheriff's office does not fall into any of these categories, and therefore is not capable of being sued.Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214(11th Cir.1992)("Sheriff's departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit.");Presnell v. Paulding County, 454 F.App'x 763, 768(11th Cir.2011).Accordingly, all claims against the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office are dismissed.

B.Claims against Lowndes County

Defendants move for dismissal of all claims against Lowndes County because it was not Plaintiff's employer and does not exercise control over the personnel matters or decisions of the Sheriff.The Court agrees that Lowndes County should be dismissed from the case.

Plaintiff alleges Title VII and ADA claims against Lowndes County.Both Title VII and the ADA authorize a cause of action against an employer.42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a);42 U.S.C. § 12111;42 U.S.C. § 12112;Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007(11th Cir.1996).It is well established that in Georgia, the Sheriff, and not the county, employs his deputies.See generallyManders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1311(11th Cir.2003);Teasley v. Freeman, 305 Ga. App. 1, 3, 699 S.E.2d 39(2010)("Furthermore, as pointed out by the trial court, our statutory and case law consistently treat sheriffs as the employer of their deputies.")As explained by the Eleventh Circuit in Manders, under Georgia law, counties are separate entities independent of the sheriff's office, the sheriff is not a sub-unit or division of county government, and "[s]heriffs alone hire and fire their deputies."338 F.3d at 1310-11.Because Defendant Prine, not LowndesCounty, was Plaintiff's employer, the Title VII(Count Two) and ADA (Count Three) claims against Lowndes County must be dismissed.

In addition to her Title VII and ADA claims, Plaintiff asserts a claim under § 1983 that her allegedly gender-based termination violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause.Generally, the Eleventh Circuit has "rejected the notion that a Georgia county can be liable under § 1983 for the actions of members of a sheriff's office, finding that, pursuant to the Georgia Constitution, a sheriff's office is independent from the county in which it operates."Townsend v. Coffee County, Ga., 854 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1350(S.D. Ga.2011)(citingGrech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1332, 1335(11th Cir.2003)).In light of the strict limitations on municipal liability under § 1983, a county will be held responsible only when the county's "official policy" causes a constitutional violation.Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611(1978).Thus, a plaintiff must "'identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused [his] injury.'"Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329(quotingGold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350(11th Cir.1998)).

A plaintiff"has two methods by which to establish a county's policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county."Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329."Because a county rarely will have an officially-adopted policy of permitting a particular constitutional violation, most plaintiffs . . . must show that the county has a custom or practice of permitting it and that the county's custom or practiceis 'the moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.'"Id. at 1330(quotingCity of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412(1989)).

To establish "§ 1983 liability against a municipality based on custom, a plaintiff must establish a widespread practice that, 'although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.'"Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481(11th Cir.1991)(quotingCity of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107(1988)).In addition, a plaintiff"(1) must show that the local governmental entity, here the county, has authority and responsibility over the governmental function in issue and (2) must identify those officials who speak with final policymaking authority for that local governmental entity concerning the act alleged to have caused the particular constitutional violation in issue."Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330(citations omitted).

In her complaint, Plain...