Pellow v. Pellow

Decision Date22 October 1985
Docket NumberNo. 61677,61135,61677
Citation1985 OK 88,714 P.2d 593
PartiesVernon E. PELLOW, Jr., Appellee, v. Nancy A. PELLOW, Appellant.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Marti Hirst, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Gary W. Davis, Marie Weston Evans, Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

SUMMERS, Justice.

This case began on October 8, 1982 when Vernon E. Pellow, Jr. (Appellee) filed his petition for divorce in the District Court of Oklahoma County. In excess of forty pleadings were filed in the case before a decree of divorce was entered on August 31, 1983, granting a divorce to each of the parties on the grounds of incompatibility. A hand-written Property Settlement Agreement was signed by the parties and their counsels. The parties were sworn by the court and the court inquired of the parties whether or not they "understood what they had agreed upon and that everybody was satisfied". (Tr. 6, January 26, 1984: R. 341). Unfortunately, due to the lateness of the hour, no court reporter was available. No objections were raised by either party to the entering of a decree of divorce.

Appellant filed her petition in error appealing from the Property Settlement Agreement on September 30, 1983. Appellant did not request reversal of the granting of the divorce. On October 7, 1983, the trial court heard appellee's Motion to Settle Journal Entry. The court ordered that the hand-written Property Settlement Agreement signed by the parties and their counsel on August 31, 1983 be attached to the decree of divorce and incorporated therein.

On October 25, 1983, appellant's amended petition in error expanded the issues to be appealed regarding the Property Settlement Agreement. No appeal was taken from the granting of the divorce itself.

Appellee filed his response in motions to dismiss on November 14, 1983 and amended response on December 2, 1983. On January 25, 1984, five months after the entry of the decree of divorce appellant filed her second amended petition in error seeking for the first time to reverse granting of the divorce and further expanding the issues on appeal. Also on this date appellant filed her Motion for Temporary Relief Pending Appeal and for Stay of Execution in Appeal No. 61135. Concurrently, appellant filed a separate appeal of the trial court's denial of her Motion for Temporary Relief and Stay of Execution under Appeal No. 61677.

On or about January 31, 1984, appellee died in a plane crash in Mexico.

February 21, 1984, and on February 23, 1984, appellant filed objection to this court's jurisdiction and moved to dismiss her appeals. The appeals were dismissed by Order of this court on February 27, 1984. On application of appellant, the appeals were reinstated consolidating under surviving number 61,677. Appellants objections to jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary of reversal was denied by Order of this court dated March 31, 1984.

Richard B. Pellow, brother of decedent appellee, having been appointed Personal Representative in the probate court, was substituted for appellee by Order of this court dated April 11, 1984. On April 30, 1984, this court by its Order denied stay of the trial court's adjudication directing appellant to deliver possession of real property. The court declined the appellant's motion to reconsider on May 29, 1984.

Appellant filed her third amended petition in error on June 11, 1984 with her brief in chief. Appellees responded on July 2, 1984.

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANT A DIVORCE TO BOTH PARTIES?

Appellant first asserts that the trial court was without authority to enter any judgment "based upon a nonconsentual (sic) agreement, and the entire proceeding wherein the Court attempted to render judgment, should be set aside, vacated and held for naught". (p. 17, brief in chief)

In Oklahoma, judgment is rendered when pronounced. The entry of the written memorial upon the court's journal is not essential to the validity of the judgment, and failure to properly file a journal entry of judgment does not render judgment void. 1 On August 31, 1983 the trial court entered a minute which stated "divorce granted to both parties all as per journal entry". (R. 444)

The following comments of the trial court judge in a hearing subsequent to the divorce support the consensual nature of the divorce and the Property Settlement Agreement:

"1. ... It was my considered opinion when I asked her (Appellant) and I felt that she was competent at the time, she appeared to be competent, and she was capable of signing that agreement, she was not physically infirm or anything else that I noted, and that was the time to have spoke (sic) up then because we were in chambers, the divorce was granted in chambers, but all the witnesses were sworn and she was asked those questions by me.... And, if she felt that she was being coerced, she should have spoke (sic) up at that time because this Court would not have permitted or granted the divorce if anybody's (sic) given any inkling of thought to me that there was any coercion. ... But, I cannot see the appellate court overturning something that everybody agreed to and that the Court approved and that they all knew or advised the Court they knew what they were doing." (Tr. 10; Hearing of October 7, 1983; R. 313)

"2. Ms. Hirst, the Court was present when the parties came in front of it and they advised me and I asked each one of them individually if this was agreed-upon divorce, they had been working all day on it, apparently the terms were satisfactory to both ties, I made sure of that before I approved it and before I granted the divorce." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 48; Hearing of January 3, 1984; R. 445)

"3. I'm not addressing myself to the agreed-upon Journal Entry which, in my opinion, was agreed upon and at the time she came forward she was represented by counsel as well as Mr. Pellow. We did not have a court reporter, unfortunately, due to the lateness of the hour, but I made a very strong point of making sure that everybody understood what they had agreed upon and that everybody was satisfied ... They were both sworn. It was not just I divorce you or any of that kind of stuff ... because I knew that there was a lot involved because the parties had been outside the courtroom all day. I'd observed them, their negotiations, they had the jury room to themselves. I don't know what went on in there, but when they all emerged, came into my chambers, everybody sat down and I went over it with them." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 6; Hearing of January 26, 1984; R. 341)

The testimony of appellant's own counsel also evidences the consensual nature of the divorce and property settlement. Robert J. Unruh testified as he participated in the agreement negotiations (Tr. 88) as counsel for the appellant: the parties went over a list of property in detail (Tr. 84-85); the court saw the memorandum and the parties were before it, with the list which had been worked on during the settlement negotiations (Tr. 89); he read aloud the Property Settlement Agreement and appellant looked at it again afterwards (Tr. 92). And in answer to the question: "And did Mrs. Pellow at that time agree to what had been written, he answered "yes". (Tr. 92) Appellee's formalized property settlement agreement "very thoroughly and detailed set out the explanation of the list (referring to appellee's typed-written agreement) (Tr. 92); appellant rejected the agreement of the parties "after the settlement". (Tr. 94) Appellant's own testimony at the same hearing indicates that she was fully advised what she was agreeing to and that there was in fact an agreement. (Tr. 99)

Furthermore, Rule 1.17 "Amendment of Petition in Error" 2 states in pertinent part:

(a) Time and extent of amendment

The petition in error may be amended at any time before brief in chief is filed, or thereafter by leave of court, to include any error or any issue presented to and resolved by the trial court which is supported by the record, but if a party has filed a motion for new trial, errors either not alleged in that motion or not fairly comprised within the grounds alleged therein may not be asserted on appeal by such party. 12 O.S Supp.1969 § 991(b). (emphasis added)

Appellant, the defendant in the trial court, filed an answer to petition and cross-petition. In the cross-petition, appellant alleges, inter alia,:

"3. Said cross-petitioner states that the parties have become irreconcilably incompatible, because of the wrongful conduct and fault of Plaintiff. That as a result of the irreconcilable incompatibility existing between the parties. Cross-Petitioner should be granted a divorce from Plaintiff."

The Decree of Divorce entered on August 31, 1983 states, "... both parties hereto are granted a divorce each of the other...."

Appellant prayed for and was granted a divorce. At no time before the decree was entered, at the time the decree was entered, or in a post-decree motion did appellant object of record that the court should not grant the divorce. It was not until appellant's second-amended petition in error filed January 25, 1984, some five months after the decree was entered, that appellant raised the issue of reversing the granting of the divorce.

Rule 1.17(a) allows the petition in error to be amended to include an issue but only an "issue presented to and resolved by the trial court which is supported by the record". The issue of "granting of the divorce" is not an issue that was "presented to the trial court" and cannot be presented for review by this court for the first time in the second-amended petition in error some five months after the decree was entered.

In addition, appellant's post-decree conduct is inconsistent with 12 O.S. §§ 1282 3 and 1280 conduct. If a timely appeal is taken from the granting of the divorce itself, the other party is on notice not to marry until thirty (30) days from the date on...

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