Pelton v. Amador Cnty.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-1968-TLN-DMC-P |
| Parties | SEAN MICHAEL PELTON, Plaintiff, v. AMADOR COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss. See ECF No 14. Plaintiff has filed an opposition. See ECF No 15. Defendant has filed a reply. See ECF No. 16.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994).
Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
This action proceeds on Plaintiff's original complaint. Plaintiff names Amador County as the only defendant. Plaintiff is a 50-year-old pre-trial inmate housed in the Amador County Jail. See ECF No. 1. Since his incarceration, Plaintiff has been unable to exercise because the jail has not made any meaningful recreational space available. Id. As a result of being unable to exercise, Plaintiff suffers from an increase in blood pressure, depression, loss of appetite, lethargy, anxiety, and stiffening of the legs and back. Id. Plaintiff alleges the County of Amador and the Amador County Jail staff, through its Covid-19 polices, have shown deliberate indifference to his Eighth and Fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 5.
At the time of his complaint, Plaintiff was 60 pounds overweight. Id. at 6. While incarcerated, Plaintiff lost 20 pounds due to loss of appetite. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff has a previous shoulder injury and increasing stiffness in his back and legs, which prevents Plaintiff from performing strenuous exercises, such as pushups. Id. Because of this, Plaintiff alleges he cannot exercise in his cell. Id.
According to Plaintiff, the Amador County Jail is a small facility with only a single outdoor exercise yard. Id. at 3. For approximately 18 months, the outdoor exercise yard has been closed to all inmates because jail staff placed a Covid-19 tent in the yard. Id. The Covid-19 tent on the outdoor exercise yard is relatively small. Id. at 5. The tent can hold approximately six people and could be set up in a matter of hours. Id. Since the tent was put up, no inmate has been housed or quarantined in it, even after two Covid-19 outbreaks occurred at the Amador County Jail. Id. at 3.
One of the outbreaks occurred on September 23, 2021, when five inmates tested positive for Covid-19. Id. at 3. Instead of housing the infected inmates in the Covid-19 tent, jail staff placed all inmates who were housed in cells in the pod. Id. Three inmates who had cellmates that tested positive for Covid-19 were not quarantined but instead left in their cells. Id.
The jail offers 5.5 hours of dayroom each day. Id. at 4. The dayroom is rectangular in shape and is approximately 16 feet by 20 feet large. Id. Within the dayroom there are 4 tables, two three-tiered bunk beds, two single person shower stalls, and a stairway which occupies one wall. Id. The day room houses seven inmates. Id. at 3. Generally, there are 12 to 20 inmates in the dayroom at any time leaving no room to exercise. Id. at 5. Additionally, there is no clear path along the dayroom's perimeter that would allow inmates to walk laps around the room. Id.
Plaintiff alleges there is no internal option to address his exercise issue within the jail. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges jail staff will not provide administrative remedies for Covid-19 related issues, including his exercise claim. Id. Plaintiff alleges it is not jail policy to accept grievances regarding anything which has to do with Covid-19 issues. Plaintiff alleges the exercise yard falls in this category due to the Covid-19 tent. Id.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff contends that jail staff violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him access to exercise. Id. at 5. Further, Plaintiff contends Amador County is liable for the violation of his rights by jail staff. Id. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the court ordering Amador County to remove the Covid-19 tent, $1,000,000 in actual damages, and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 6.
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues the action should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit; (2) Plaintiff's claim fails because he has not alleged a physical injury; (3) Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against Amador County because he does not allege facts to show an underlying violation of his rights; and (4) Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing jail staff acted pursuant to a policy or custom of the county.
Defendant argues the Court should grant its motion to dismiss because the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires inmates, including pretrial detainees, to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing civil actions in federal court and Plaintiff failed to do so in this case.
Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of the complaint, compliance with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative remedies while the lawsuit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court addressed the exhaustion requirement in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and held: (1) prisoners are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint because lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendants; (2) an individual named as a defendant does not necessarily need to be named in the grievance process for exhaustion to be considered adequate because the applicable procedural rules that a prisoner must follow are defined by the particular grievance process, not by the PLRA; and (3) the PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint if only some, but not all, claims are unexhausted. The defendant bears burden of showing non-exhaustion in the first instance. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). If met, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the grievance process was not available, for example because it was thwarted, prolonged, or inadequate. See id.
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