Pelton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
Decision Date | 26 January 1932 |
Citation | 7 P.2d 263,139 Or. 198 |
Parties | PELTON v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION. [*] |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; Jacob Kanzler, Judge.
Action by M. H. Pelton against the General Motors Acceptance Corporation and others. From a judgment for plaintiff against defendant named, defendant named appeals.
Affirmed.
Nicholas Jaureguy, of Portland (Jaureguy & Tooze, of Portland, on the brief), for appellant.
Henry S. Westbrook, of Portland, for respondent.
Plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment against the General Motors Acceptance Corporation for $255 compensatory damages and $5,000 punitive damages, by reason of an alleged conversion of an automobile. A nonsuit was granted as to the defendant George H. Hoffmiller. No service was had on any of the other defendants. The defendant finance corporation appeals, assigning as error the denial of its motion for nonsuit and directed verdict; the submission to the jury of the question of punitive damages; and the admission of certain evidence.
In view of the assignments of error, the statement of facts will be in the light most favorable to plaintiff. In December, 1930 the plaintiff, under the name of John W. Clarkson, purchased the automobile in controversy from the Howard Automobile Company. When the latter company quit business, the conditional sales contract under which the car was purchased was assigned, on the 18th day of July, 1930, to the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. In July and August, 1930 plaintiff defaulted in each of his monthly payments of $67. Thereupon the defendant, pursuant to the terms of its contract with the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company notified the latter on August 20, 1930, as to such default, and directed it to repossess the car. In this notice it was stated that Bert G. Haynes, assistant secretary and credit manager, was authorized in the repossession of the automobile "to take such action in the premises as he may deem necessary." Pursuant to the authorization of the defendant company, the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, through its agent, George H. Hoffmiller, at about 2 o'clock in the morning of September 5, 1930, located and took possession of the automobile parked in front of the Loraine Hotel where the plaintiff lived in the city of Portland. On the afternoon of September 3, 1930, the plaintiff, through his son, had appeared at the office of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation and made the two payments in default. On the day after the company had accepted these payments, its "credit man," L. M. Broadbent, who had supervision of the contract in question, undertook, as he says, to notify Hoffmiller of the payments made, but was unable to do so as the latter had gone to Corvallis.
The plaintiff thus gives his version of the repossession of the automobile by Hoffmiller: '
Hoffmiller did not go with the plaintiff to see the receipts, but took the car to a garage for storage. En route to the garage, Hoffmiller suggested that the plaintiff call some member of the finance corporation on the telephone concerning his claim of payment, as he was willing to surrender the car, if instructed to do so. Upon arrival at the garage at about 2:30 in the morning, Hoffmiller dialed Broadbent and stood by while the plaintiff talked to him. There is a dispute as to certain parts of this conversation. In reference thereto, the plaintiff testified: "I told him I had made the payments and that Mr. Hoffmiller had taken the car, and he said that didn't make any difference, they demanded the full payment of the car before they would give it back to me."
Hoffmiller, in response to the question, "What part of the conversation did you hear; what did you hear Pelton say and what did you hear stated over the phone, if anything?" testified:
Broadbent testified concerning this conversation as follows:
On the morning of the day the car was repossessed, Hoffmiller went to the office of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation to report and to leave the storage check for plaintiff's car, which the finance company refused to accept. Hoffmiller then returned to his office, and forwarded the storage check to the defendant by registered mail whereupon the latter mailed it back to Hoffmiller, who advised the finance company that he held it subject to its order. From the manner in which this "hot" storage check was juggled back and forth, it is apparent that neither the finance corporation nor the insurance company wanted this automobile which was surreptitiously taken in the wee hours of the morning while the owner was asleep. Broadbent testified that, upon checking the records in his office the morning of the 5th, it was found that $134, the entire sum in default, had been paid on September 3d. However, he...
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...Or. 379, 123 P.2d 179; Harlow v. Chenoweth, 158 Or. 343, 75 P.2d 937; Pelton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 139 Or. 198, 9 P.2d 128, 7 P.2d 263. We deem it unnecessary to burden this page with additional citations from our reports; the rule just stated is universally applied: * * As fu......
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