Pelumi v. City of Woonsocket

• Decision Date: 12 January 2015
• Docket Number: C. A. PC 10-3875
• Parties: HAKEEM PELUMI v. CITY OF WOONSOCKET, alias John Doe; THOMAS BRUCE, alias John Doe in his official capacity as Treasurer for the City of Woonsocket; THOMAS S. CAREY, alias John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as the Chief of Police for the City of Woonsocket; RICHARD FINNEGAN, alias John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as the Bail Commissioner for the State of Rhode Island; EDWARD DOURA, alias John Doe, individually and in his capacity as Patrol and Arraigning Officer for the City of Woonsocket; JOHN DOE (1), alias John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as a Patrol Officer for the City of Woonsocket
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

HAKEEM PELUMI v. CITY OF WOONSOCKET, alias John Doe; THOMAS BRUCE, alias John Doe in his official capacity as Treasurer for the City of Woonsocket; THOMAS S. CAREY, alias John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as the Chief of Police for the City of Woonsocket; RICHARD FINNEGAN, alias John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as the Bail Commissioner for the State of Rhode Island; EDWARD DOURA, alias John Doe, individually and in his capacity as Patrol and Arraigning Officer for the City of Woonsocket; JOHN DOE (1), alias John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as a Patrol Officer for the City of Woonsocket

C. A. No. PC 10-3875

Superior Court of Rhode Island

January 12, 2015

Providence County Superior Court

For Plaintiff: Hakeem Pelumi, pro se

For Defendant: Arthur M. Read, II, Esq., Krista J. Schmitz, Esq.

DECISIONz

VAN COUYGHEN, J.

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants City of Woonsocket, ^[1] Thomas Bruce (Mr. Bruce), in his official capacity as Treasurer of the City of Woonsocket Thomas S. Carey (Mr. Carey), individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Woonsocket; and Edward Doura (Mr. Doura), individually and in his capacity as Patrol and Arraigning Officer for the City of Woonsocket (collectively, Defendants).^[2] Also before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and a separate Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Richard Finnegan (Mr. Finnegan) individually and in his capacity as Bail Commissioner for the State of Rhode Island.^[3] Mr. Finnegan additionally seeks attorneys' fees and costs. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Super. R. Civ. P. 56, and G.L 1956 § 8-2-14.

I Facts and Travel

The genesis of this litigation is the July 3, 2007 arrest of Plaintiff Hakeem Pelumi, pro se, for disorderly conduct in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-45-1. See Defs.' Ex. C. On July 4, 2007, Plaintiff appeared before Mr. Finnegan for a bail hearing at the Woonsocket Police Station. See id; Aff. of Richard Finnegan at 2. On July 23, 2007, Plaintiff's plea of nolo contendere to the underlying charge was entered. See Crim. Compl. As a result, he received a six-month suspended sentence with probation and was ordered to pay court costs. Id.

On March 21, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, C.A. No 08-105ML, pro se, in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the State of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island District Court Administrator for Rhode Island District Court, Sixth Division. See Defs.' Ex. E. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserted that Mr. Finnegan, who was not named as a party, willfully and intentionally took money from him on July 4, 2007, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 18 U.S.C. § 242; and article 1, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution. See Defs.' Ex. E. at 1.

In addition to C.A. No. 08-105ML, Plaintiff, pro se, had seven separate complaints pending in the federal court. Therefore, on Apri1 4, 2008, United States District Court Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond issued a Consolidated Report and Recommendation for Summary Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) of all seven cases.^[4] See Defs.' Ex. F. With respect to C.A. No. 08-105ML, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal for failure to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[5] See Defs.' Ex. F. at 9. He then recommended that "[i]n view of the absence of any viable federal claims, [Plaintiff's] state constitutional claim is not viable in federal court due to the absence of diversity jurisdiction." Id.

On April 17, 2008, before the District Court acted upon the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, Plaintiff amended his Complaint in C.A. No. 08-105ML. See Defs.' Ex. G. In doing so, he omitted his federal criminal allegations and substituted the Rhode Island District Court Administrator with the Rhode Island District Court, Sixth Division. See Defs.' Ex. G. The Plaintiff also added Mr. Finnegan, individually and in his official capacity as Bail Commissioner for the City of Woonsocket, the City of Woonsocket, and the Woonsocket Police Department as party defendants. Id.

On May 30, 2008, Magistrate Judge Almond issued a Second Consolidated Report and Recommendation for Summary Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Defs.' Ex. H.^[6]The Magistrate Judge again recommended dismissal of the federal claims in C.A. No. 08-105ML for failure to state a viable claim, observing that Plaintiff "had adequate remedies under state law[, ]" because he could have tried "to pursue a criminal action . . . [or] a common law tort claim for conversion." Id. at 9. On June 30, 2008, United States District Court Chief Judge Lisi adopted the Reports and Recommendations previously issued by the Magistrate Judge in full and dismissed the Amended Complaint in that action. See Defs.' Ex. I. On the same day, the federal court entered a Judgment reflecting the dismissal of the Amended Complaint. See id. Plaintiff appealed the ruling and, on March 4, 2009, the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. See Defs.' Ex. J.

On June 1, 2009, Plaintiff, pro se, filed C.A. No. 09-257ML in federal court against the State of Rhode Island; the City of Woonsocket; Michael Houle, in his capacity as Chief of the Woonsocket Police Department; and Richard Finnegan, individually and in his official capacity as Bail Commissioner. See Defs.' Ex. K. The Plaintiff again accused Mr. Finnegan of stealing his money during the July 4, 2007 bail hearing and, again, he alleged that defendants had committed various state and federal civil rights violations. See id. Magistrate Judge Almond consolidated C.A. No. 09-257ML with four unconnected complaints filed by Plaintiff, pro se, and issued a Consolidated Report and Recommendation for Summary Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) on June 16, 2009. See Defs.' Ex. L.

In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the "newly filed Complaints" (including C.A. No. 09-257ML) were barred under the doctrine of res judicata and he recommended that they "be DISMISSED with prejudice." See Defs.' Ex. L. at 5 and 7. On August 6, 2009, Chief Judge Lisi "adopt[ed] the Report and Recommendation in its entirety" and dismissed all of the Complaints. (Defs.' Ex. M at 2.) Plaintiff appealed and, on October 13, 2009, the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff's appeal "[s]ubstantially for the reasons given in the thorough Second Consolidated Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Almond . . . ." See Defs.' Ex. N.

On July 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant action, pro se. The Amended Complaint contains six counts. Count I asserts a claim of negligence against the Defendants.^[7] Count II, entitled "Negligence, " alleges an intentional tort committed by Defendants. Count III, entitled "Deprivation, " appears to allege that Defendants committed theft. Counts IV, V, and VI assert 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendant Thomas Carey, Woonsocket Police Officers, and the City of Woonsocket, respectively. Additional facts will be supplied in the analysis portion of this Decision as needed.

II Analysis

A

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, a Motion that has been adopted and joined by Defendant Finnegan, the Defendants assert that Plaintiff's action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island previously dismissed two actions that raised substantially similar allegations to those raised in the present case. They further contend that Plaintiff has failed to set forth a valid cause of action.

Standard of Review

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial justice must keep in mind that it '"is a drastic remedy and should be cautiously applied.'" Steinberg v State, 427 A.2d 338, 339– 40 (1981) (quoting Ardente v. Horan, 117 R.I. 254, 256-57, 366 A.2d 162, 164 (1976)). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the preliminary question before the court is whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact which must be resolved. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Boiteau, 119 R.I. 64, 376 A.2d 323 (1977); O'Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.I. 627, 359 A.2d 350 (1976).

The moving party is the one who "bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of questions of material fact." Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003). To satisfy that burden, the moving party may "submit[] evidentiary materials, such as interrogatory answers, deposition testimony, admissions, or other specific documents, and/or point[] to the absence of such items in the evidence adduced by the parties." Id. It is only when "the moving party satisfies this initial burden[] [that] the nonmoving party then must identify any evidentiary materials already before the court or present its own evidence demonstrating that factual questions remain." Id. If an examination of the parties' pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other similar matters, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact, the suit is ripe for summary judgment. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 119 R.I at 66, 376 A.2d at 324; Harold W. Merrill Post. No. 16 Am. Legion v. Heirs-at-Law, Next-of-Kin and Devisees of Smith, 116 R.I. 646, 360 A.2d 110 (1976).

The party who opposes a summary judgment motion "carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions." Accent Store Design, Inc. v Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. ...