Pempek v. Edgar, 83 C 7055.
| Decision Date | 26 December 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83 C 7055.,83 C 7055. |
| Citation | 603 F. Supp. 495 |
| Parties | Raymond PEMPEK, et al., etc., Plaintiffs, v. Jim EDGAR, Secretary of State of Illinois, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
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Roderick F. Mollison, Jerome J. Adams, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Roger P. Flahaven, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for Jim Edgar.
Robert W. Fioretti, James D. Montgomery, Chicago, Ill., for City of Chicago.
Raymond Pempek (Pempek) and Gary Sternberg (Sternberg) brought this section 1983 action against the City of Chicago (the City) and Jim Edgar, the Illinois Secretary of State (Edgar or the Secretary). The complaint alleges that the City violated Pempek's constitutional rights in connection with his arrest for twenty delinquent parking tickets and that Edgar deprived him of his constitutional rights when Edgar suspended his driver's license. Sternberg charges that the suspension of his driver's license deprived him of his constitutional rights. Both the City and Edgar move to dismiss.
On August 26, 1983, Pempek "was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, charging the Plaintiff with twenty (20) outstanding municipal automobile parking violation notices against him." Amended Complaint at ¶ 1. The same day, he paid $400.00 as a bail bond. The clerk issued a bail order demanding Pempek's appearance on October 6, 1983 at 321 North LaSalle Street, Room 103, Chicago, Illinois. On that date, Pempek "appeared before a State Court Judge ... as required by his bail bond conditions, and demanded a trial." Id. at ¶ 4. The City was not ready, and the judge granted a continuance over Pempek's objection.
On October 5, 1983, Pempek received notice that Edgar had suspended his license under Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 95½, § 6-306.1 (section 6-306.1). Edgar also suspended Sternberg's license under this provision.
Section 6-306.1 requires Edgar to suspend anyone's license when Edgar receives notice that the person has an outstanding warrant against him. The suspension occurs without a hearing. Section 6-306.1(a). The Secretary cannot reinstate the license until Edgar receives notice that the licensee has satisfied the warrant. Id. Before the Secretary suspends the license, however, he must also receive notice that the court clerk mailed the licensee notice of the warrant at his last known address sixty days before the suspension. Id. The Secretary must also know the licensee's full name, date of birth, sex, and driver's license number as well as the registration number of the motor vehicle registered to the alleged violator. Id.
Plaintiffs claim that these actions by Edgar and the City deprived them of due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and that the statute and the City's actions are a bill of attainder prohibited by article I of the Constitution. The complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys' fees, costs, and the money "collected by the City of Chicago pursuant to the authority of Illinois." Amended Complaint at 5. Both the City and Edgar move to dismiss on various grounds.
On a motion to dismiss, the court must "take the plaintiffs' allegations to be true, and view them, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir.1981). "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The complaint, however, must "contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery on any legal theory, even though it may not be the theory suggested or intended by the pleader, or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial." Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).
Section 6-306.1 provides in relevant part:
Plaintiffs interpret this section to prohibit the Secretary from ever holding a hearing regarding a suspension. Edgar notes that after a suspension, a driver may apply under Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 95½, ¶¶ 2-118(a) and 2-118(e) for an administrative hearing subject to judicial review.1 Edgar's Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 3.
In Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977), the United States Supreme Court upheld a similar Illinois statute that gave the Secretary power to revoke a driver's license after three convictions for minor traffic offenses. The Secretary needed to hold no pre-suspension hearing. Id. at 107, 97 S.Ct. at 1724. The procedure encompassed written notification as well as a full evidentiary hearing within twenty days and "`as early as practical'" after the licensee requested such a hearing. Id. at 109-10, 97 S.Ct. at 1726 (quoting ¶ 2-118(a)).
"The Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver's license by the State." Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112, 97 S.Ct. at 1727. The Court therefore utilized the three part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to determine when the licensee must receive a hearing.2 To evaluate what process was "due," the Court looked to "`first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'" 431 U.S. at 112-113, 97 S.Ct. at 1727 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903).
The Court concluded that the interest in a driver's license "is not so great as to require the Court ... `to depart from the ordinary principle' ... that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action." 431 U.S. at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 1728 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 907). The risk of an erroneous deprivation was "not great" since it followed three full judicial hearings. Id. The appellee never challenged the sufficiency of these hearings. Id. "Finally, the substantial public interest in administrative efficiency would be impeded by the availability of a predetermination hearing in every case." Id. 431 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 1728. The licensees might use a hearing request to delay proceedings. Id. Therefore, a pre-suspension hearing was unnecessary. Id.
The Court reaffirmed Dixon in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), which held that the Illinois law in Dixon was indistinguishable from the Massachusetts law requiring suspension for refusal to undergo a breathylzer examination for drunk driving. "Both cases involved the constitutionality of a statutory scheme for administrative suspension of a driver's license for statutorily defined cause without a pre-suspension hearing." Id. at 11, 99 S.Ct. at 2617.
This court finds that section 6-306.1 is similarly indistinguishable from the statutes in either Dixon or Mackey. The private interest is the same as in Dixon and Mackey and does not by itself necessitate a pre-suspension hearing. See 431 U.S. at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 1727. Paragraphs 6-306.1 and 2-118(a) provide numerous safeguards against erroneous deprivation both due to unfounded traffic citations and to clerical mistakes. The Secretary suspends the license only after an Illinois court issues a warrant because the licensee has at least ten outstanding parking tickets. The clerk of the issuing court must send notice of the warrant to the licensee at least sixty days before the Secretary receives any information. The forms used to notify the Secretary whose licenses should be suspended must contain detailed information about the licensee.
These safeguards operate in two ways. First, they ensure that the licensee gets many chances to challenge the underlying allegations of parking violations. Ten tickets and a warrant must issue at least sixty days before the Secretary even receives the information leading to suspension. The licensee has procedures to challenge both the tickets and the warrant. Second, before the deprivation, several different state agencies and many individuals review the licensee's file. At least ten tickets issue, a court...
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In re Shannon
...No. 91-6333, 1992 WL 88457 (N.D. Ill. April 27, 1992) ; Grant v. City of Chicago , 594 F.Supp. 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ; Pempek v. Edgar , 603 F.Supp. 495 (N.D. Ill. 1984). One of the cases from this jurisdiction analyzes the dischargeability of a fine "for the benefit of a governmental unit"......
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...if it sets out facts sufficient for court to infer that all required elements of cause of action are present); Pempek v. Edgar, 603 F.Supp. 495, 497-98 (N.D.Ill.1984) (in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, complaint must contain either direct allegations on all material points, or cont......
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In re Hicks
...to control the flow of traffic on its streets. In re Gallagher , 71 B.R. 138, 139 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ; see also Pempek v. Edgar , 603 F.Supp. 495, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Parking laws protect the smooth flow of traffic and allow a city to make maximum use of limited parking spaces."). T......