Pena v. Honeywell Int'l Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 January 2018
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 15-179 WES
• Parties: MAYRA F. PENA, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

MAYRA F. PENA, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC., Defendant.

C.A. No. 15-179 WES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

January 29, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.

Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond filed a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (ECF No. 42) recommending that Defendant Honeywell International Inc.'s ("Honeywell") Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) be granted with respect to all counts in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff Mayra F. Pena timely filed an Objection to the R&R ("Objection") (ECF No. 45). For the reasons set forth below, the Court accepts the R&R.

With respect to Counts I through VIII, Magistrate Judge Almond recommended that summary judgment is appropriate because, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), no reasonable juror could reconcile Plaintiff's position in this litigation with her prior declaration in the context of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI"). (R. & R. 14-15.) Additionally, Magistrate Judge Almond endorsed summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's remaining retaliation claims (Counts IX through XII) because Plaintiff failed to set forth evidence upon which a reasonable juror could glean a sufficient causal relationship between Plaintiff's termination and her alleged protected activity, a complaint to her supervisor about her break schedule. (Id. at 17-19.)

In her Objection, Plaintiff avers that she has sufficiently explained away any inconsistencies between her SSDI application and this litigation.¹ (Mem. in Opp'n to R. & R. 11, ECF No. 45-1.) Plaintiff suggests that Magistrate Judge Almond overlooked the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines that discuss the impact of statements made in the context of SSDI applications on claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). (Id. at 12-14.) In Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant'sResponse to Plaintiff's Objection² ("Reply") (ECF No. 49), Plaintiff attempts to further reconcile her conflicting statements by identifying an affidavit in which she attested, "The SSDI application did not ask if I needed any accommodations of a disability in order to work and no one at any of the hearings asked. Had I been asked, I would have responded, 'Yes.'" (Reply 1-2; Pena Aff. ¶ 24, ECF No. 45-3.) Plaintiff also argues that her deposition testimony elucidates that she did not understand the line of questioning and was tricked by Honeywell's counsel into "admitting that she is lying and trying to manipulate the system." (Id. at 6-7.) Finally, with respect to the retaliation claims, Plaintiff, in a conclusory manner, suggests "a jury could find that Pena's February 21, 2013 complaint set off a chain of events that ultimately led to her termination on June 17, 2013." (Mem. in Opp'n to R. & R. 15.)

This Court's de novo³ review leads it to the same conclusion as Magistrate Judge Almond: summary judgment is appropriate on all counts. As an initial matter, with respect to Counts I throughVIII, it is clear that Plaintiff misconstrues and misapplies the governing standard. Throughout her filings with this Court, Plaintiff purports to rationalize or spell out why she provided inconsistent statements in her SSDI application and in this litigation.⁴ However, this is not what Cleveland requires. Rather, "to defeat [a defendant's] motion for summary judgment, [a plaintiff] must explain why the representations of total disability [s]he has made in the past are consistent with [her] current claim that [s]he could perform the essential functions of [her position] with reasonable accommodation." Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798 (emphasis added)). Plaintiff simply has not satisfied this standard.

In other words, Plaintiff has not sufficiently explained why her representation for purposes of SSDI that she became unable to work because of her disabling condition on March 8, 2013 and remained disabled after that point, is consistent with her position for purposes of this litigation that on March 8, 2013 (her final day of work), she was "completely capable of working in othersettings" with the exception of the Molding Department. Moreover, a closer look at Plaintiff's deposition testimony crystallizes the inconsistency when viewed against Plaintiff's SSDI application.⁵ While at times confusing, Plaintiff's deposition clearly states that she was wholly unable to work.

Plaintiff's post hoc affidavit, which conflicts with her SSDIapplication and her deposition testimony, does not alter this landscape; indeed, "a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity." Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806-07 (citations omitted). Further, in light of the Supreme Court's Cleveland decision handed down two years after the EEOC's guidance, Plaintiff's citation to and reliance on factors set forth by the EEOC is of no moment.

Finally, summary judgment is appropriate with respect to Plaintiff's retaliation claims (Counts IX through XII). Plaintiff's conclusory declarations in her Objection do nothing to alter the fact that she still has not identified evidence upon which a reasonable juror could causally link her February 21, 2013 complaint to her supervisor with her June 17, 2013 termination. When Plaintiff's statements, bereft of evidentiary support, are dispensed with, all that remains is her reliance on temporal proximity, which in this instance cannot carry the day. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Three and four month periods have been held insufficient to establish a causal connection based on temporal proximity."(citations omitted)); see also Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) ("The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be 'very close.'" (citations omitted)). The Court has considered Plaintiff's remaining arguments and deems them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the Court fully ACCEPTS the R&R (ECF No. 42) and adopts its reasoning. Defendant Honeywell's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) on all counts of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED in its entirety. Judgment will enter for Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/_________

William E. Smith

Chief Judge

Date: January 29, 2018

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MAYRA PENA

v.

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.

C.A. No. 15-179WES

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Lincoln D. Almond, United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before me for a report and recommendation (28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)) is Defendant Honeywell International, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF Doc. No. 27). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (ECF Doc. No. 33). A hearing was held on June 19, 2017.

Background

Plaintiff commenced this employment discrimination action in state court on or about April 16, 2015. Defendant removed the case to this Court on May 5, 2015. The operative pleading is Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 9) which was filed on August 28, 2015 and contains twelve federal and state statutory claims.⁶

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Honeywell violated various anti-discrimination statutes by failing to reasonably accommodate her disabilities (Counts I through IV). She also claims her discharge was unlawfully motivated by her disabilities (Counts V through VIII). Finally, she claims that she was unlawfully subject to retaliation for reports of unlawful discriminatory conduct she made to the Human Resources Department at Honeywell (Counts IX through XII).

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1^st Cir. 1997).

Summary judgment involves shifting burdens between the moving and nonmoving parties. Initially, the burden requires the moving party to aver "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1^st Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden falls upon the nonmoving party, who must oppose the motion by presenting facts that show a genuine "trialworthy issue remains." Cadle, 116 F.3d at 960 (citing Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1^st Cir. 1995); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1^st Cir. 1994)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if it "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. (citing Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581).

To oppose the motion successfully, the nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to rebut the motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-257 (1986). "Even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, [or] unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1^st Cir. 1990). Moreover, the "evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot...