Pena v. State, 03-595.

Decision Date21 October 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-595.,03-595.
Citation100 P.3d 154,323 Mont. 347,2004 MT 293
PartiesMarcellino PEÑA, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent and Respondent.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Kristina Guest, Appellate Defender's Office, Helena, Montana.

For Respondent: Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jennifer Anders, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney; Kevin Peterson, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana.

Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Marcellino Peña (Peña) appeals from the order entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, dismissing his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.

¶ 2 The following issue is presented on appeal:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err in dismissing Peña's petition for postconviction relief which alleged that the District Court lacked statutory authority, and thus, subject matter jurisdiction, to sentence Peña to more than five years to the Department of Corrections (DOC)?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Peña was seventeen years old when, on October 31, 1998, he was arrested and charged with deliberate homicide (felony murder) in violation of § 45-5-102, MCA; robbery in violation of § 45-5-401(1)(b), MCA; and aggravated burglary in violation of § 45-6-204, MCA.1 On Halloween night, Peña and two other males broke into a home in Billings hoping to find drugs and money. The three men wore Halloween masks and had two handguns among them. They knocked on the door, and, when a female resident of the house opened the door to the apparent trick-or-treaters and explained she had no candy, one of them responded, "Wrong answer!" The three men then forced their way into the house.

¶ 5 Inside, the men demanded drugs and money. The woman told them she had money in one of the bedrooms and led the three to that room. Upon arriving, two of the men, including Peña, began to search the room, while the third forced the woman to her knees and demanded oral sex. One of the two men searching the house found a baggie with hallucinogenic mushrooms and a small jar containing other illicit drugs. The woman began to perform oral sex on the third man who was holding a gun to her head.

¶ 6 When a vehicle was heard pulling into the driveway, two of the three males, including Peña, broke out a window and crawled out of the house while the third continued to demand oral sex. However, when the homeowner was heard entering the house, the assailant also crawled out of the broken window. Before running away, he yelled "Die, Motherfucker!" and shot and killed the homeowner.

¶ 7 Responding officers arrested Peña, found the hallucinogenic mushrooms on him, and located Halloween masks, clothing, and one gun in the vicinity of the crime. Witnesses later identified Peña as one of three men running in the area.

¶ 8 On November 4, 1998, the Yellowstone County Attorney's Office obtained leave to file an Information in District Court. On November 5, 1998, the State arraigned Peña in District Court, although Peña was seventeen at the time. Peña objected to the District Court's jurisdiction over his case without a removal hearing from youth court. Two weeks later, on November 20, 1998, Peña pled guilty to deliberate homicide (felony murder) and aggravated burglary. The State later dismissed the robbery charge. Peña admitted that he had participated in a burglary and that, after he had left the residence, one of the other participants shot and killed an individual. Under a plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of sixty years, with no weapons enhancement and no parole restrictions.

¶ 9 On April 2, 1999, the District Court sentenced Peña to the Montana State Prison as an adult offender for a total of forty-five years: thirty years for the deliberate homicide, and fifteen years for the aggravated burglary, to run consecutively. Peña did not appeal his judgment of conviction or sentence.

¶ 10 On April 6, 1999, four days after Peña was sentenced in District Court, this Court decided State v. Butler, 1999 MT 70, 294 Mont. 17, 977 P.2d 1000, in which we held that due process requires a hearing before leave to file an Information in District Court can be granted in cases involving a juvenile. On October 25, 1999, Peña filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief alleging that, pursuant to Butler, his due process rights had been violated because the District Court failed to hold a hearing prior to the transfer of his case from Youth Court to District Court. The Yellowstone County Attorney's Office conceded that Peña was entitled to a removal hearing as a matter of due process, and the District Court set the matter for a hearing on September 5, 2000.

¶ 11 On September 13, 2000, the District Court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order granting leave for the State to file the Information against Peña directly in District Court. However, pursuant to a stipulation between Peña and the State, Peña re-entered his guilty pleas and the same sentence was imposed.

¶ 12 On October 16, 2002, Peña filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in District Court. The District Court appointed the Montana Appellate Defender's Office to represent Peña and ordered the State to respond. On March 5, 2003, through postconviction relief counsel, Peña filed an amended petition for postconviction relief. In his amended petition, Peña argued that his sentence was illegal because, pursuant to § 41-5-206(6), MCA, of the Youth Court Act, youths must be sentenced to the DOC, and, pursuant to § 46-18-201(1)(e), MCA, the maximum sentence to which an individual could be sentenced to the DOC is five years. Peña argued that, pursuant to these two statutes, the District Court lacked the statutory authority to sentence him to more than five years to the DOC. Therefore, Peña requested that the District Court amend his sentence to a five-year commitment to the DOC for each count.

¶ 13 On July 14, 2003, the District Court issued an order denying Peña's amended petition for postconviction relief on grounds that § 41-5-206(6), MCA, and § 46-18-201(1)(e), MCA, did not constitute a limitation to the court's ability to impose Peña's forty-five-year sentence to the Montana State Prison. Peña now appeals the denial of his amended petition. This Court heard oral argument on the matter on March 10, 2004.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 14 This Court reviews a district court's denial of a petition for postconviction relief to determine whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct. State v. Root, 2003 MT 28, ¶ 7, 314 Mont. 186, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 1035, ¶ 7 (citing State v. Wright, 2001 MT 282, ¶ 9, 307 Mont. 349, ¶ 9, 42 P.3d 753, ¶ 9).

DISCUSSION

¶ 15 Did the District Court err in dismissing Peña's petition for postconviction relief which alleged that the District Court lacked statutory authority, and thus, subject matter jurisdiction, to sentence Peña to more than five years to the DOC?

¶ 16 Peña argues that, pursuant to subpart (e) of § 46-18-201, MCA, the sentencing statute, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him to more than five years to the DOC. The State argues that Peña's petition is barred by the one-year filing period for postconviction relief set forth in § 46-21-102, MCA. That statute provides:

XX-XX-XXX. When petition may be filed. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a petition for the relief referred to in XX-XX-XXX may be filed at anytime within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final. A conviction becomes final for purposes of this chapter when:
(a) the time for appeal to the Montana supreme court expires;
(b) if an appeal is taken to the Montana supreme court, the time for petitioning the United States supreme court for review expires; or
(c) if review is sought in the United States supreme court, on the date that that court issues its final order in the case.

The State reasons that, under § 46-21-102, MCA, because Peña did not appeal his judgment of September 13, 2000, the conviction became final sixty days thereafter, on November 12, 2000. Peña then had one year from that date, or until November 12, 2001, to file his petition for postconviction relief. The State contends that since Peña filed his petition on October 16, 2002, over eleven months beyond the deadline, it was time-barred.

¶ 17 Peña responds that, even though he filed his petition beyond the filing deadline established by § 46-21-102, MCA, his claim is not time-barred because he is challenging the sentencing court's subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time. Peña's jurisdiction argument begins by reference to §§ 41-5-206 and 46-18-201, MCA, which, Peña explains, control his case as a seventeen-year-old youth.

¶ 18 Section 41-5-206(6), MCA, of the Youth Court Act, provides:

41-5-206. Filing in district court prior to formal proceedings in youth court. (1) The county attorney may, in the county attorney's discretion, file with the district court a motion for leave to file an information in the district court if:
(a) the youth charged was 12 years of age or older at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful and the unlawful act would if it had been committed by an adult constitute:
...
(ii) deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102;
...
(v) burglary or aggravated burglary as defined in 45-6-204;
...
(6) If a youth is found guilty in district court of any of the offenses enumerated in subsection (1) and is sentenced to the state prison, the commitment must be to the department of corrections....

The offenses listed in subsection (1) of § 41-5-206, MCA, include deliberate homicide and aggravated burglary, the two felonies with which Peña, as a minor, was charged. Section 46-18-201(1)(e), MCA, provides:

XX-XX-XXX. Sentences that may be
...

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