Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1950
• Docket Number: No. 14048.,14048.
• Citation: 181 F.2d 136
• Parties: PENDERGRASS et al. v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

181 F.2d 136 (1950)

PENDERGRASS et al. v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. et al.

No. 14048.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

April 3, 1950.

Clinton R. Barry and John E. Harris, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellants.

Robert L. Jones, Jr., Fort Smith, Ark. (G. C. Hardin, J. Clib Barton and Bruce H. Shaw, Fort Smith, Ark., were with him on the brief), for appellee Ann Pendergrass and Ann Pendergrass, Executrix of the estate of Willard Pendergrass, deceased.

Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.

This is a controversy between the appellants and the appellee Ann Pendergrass over the proceeds of a $6,000 policy of insurance upon the life of Willard Pendergrass. The insured was the father of the appellants by a divorced wife, and the husband of Ann Pendergrass, by whom he was shot and killed November 6, 1948. She was the designated beneficiary in the policy at the time of his death.

The appellants brought an action in the District Court against the New York Life Insurance Company, the insurer, upon the claim that the beneficiary had feloniously and unlawfully killed the insured, thereby disqualifying herself from receiving the proceeds of the policy, and that they (the appellants), as the insured's sole surviving heirs, were entitled to the benefits of the policy.

The insurer converted the action into one in interpleader, and, by order of the court, Ann Pendergrass, as an individual and as executrix of the insured's estate, was made a cross-defendant. In her answer she denied that she had unlawfully killed the insured or disqualified herself as beneficiary, and asserted that she was entitled to the proceeds of the policy.

The sole issue, under the pleadings, was whether the killing of the insured (for which his wife was not prosecuted) was justifiable homicide under Arkansas law. That issue was tried to the court, which found that Ann Pendergrass had justifiably killed the insured in self-defense, and had not disqualified herself from receiving the proceeds of the policy. A judgment was entered in her favor, from which this appeal has been taken.

The appellants contend, in effect, that, under the evidence and the law of Arkansas, they were entitled to judgment. In their brief they say:

"This case was tried to the court, without a jury upon equitable principles and is here, upon appeal, for trial de novo.

"It is, therefore, both proper and legal for this Honorable Court to try this case upon the testimony taken in the lower court, and decide it as though it had not heretofore been decided."

The appellants have misconceived the functions of this Court, the jurisdiction of which is appellate. In the case of Cleo Syrup Corporation v. Coca-Cola Co., 8 Cir., 139 F.2d 416, 417-418, 150 A.L.R. 1056, we said: "* * * This Court, upon review, will not retry issues of fact or substitute its judgment with respect to such issues for that of the trial court. Storley v. Armour & Co., 8 Cir., 107 F.2d 499, 513; Gasifier Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corporation, 8 Cir., 138 F.2d 197, 199; Travelers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rector, 8 Cir., 138 F.2d 396, 398. The power of a trial court to decide doubtful issues of fact is not limited to deciding them correctly. Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 8 Cir., 89 F.2d 652, 655; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 8 Cir., 113 F.2d 698, 701 (affirmed 313 U.S. 146, 61 S.Ct. 908, 85 L.Ed. 1251); Travelers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rector, supra. In a nonjury case, this Court may not set aside a finding of fact of a trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or unless it was induced by an erroneous view of the law. Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 8 Cir., 116 F.2d 1, 4, 5; Gasifier Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corporation, 8 Cir., 138 F.2d 197, 199; Travelers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rector, supra."

It is true that in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, at page 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746, the Supreme Court said: "A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." The opinion in that case shows that the Supreme Court regarded the findings which it held to be erroneous as contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. The statement above quoted, when read in connection with what was later said by the Supreme Court on the same subject in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275-276, 69 S.Ct. 535, furnishes no warrant for the belief that we can retry doubtful issues of fact upon a cold record, and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court with respect to such issues, or that a district court, in nonjury cases, is to act as a sort of special master for this Court, to report testimony, to make advisory findings, and to enter an advisory judgment.

There is no logical reason for placing the findings of fact of a trial judge upon a substantially lower level of conclusiveness than the fact findings of a jury of laymen, or those of an administrative agency, which may be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. The findings of fact of a trial court should be accepted by this Court as being correct unless it can be clearly demonstrated that they are without adequate evidentiary support or were induced by an erroneous view of the law. The entire responsibility for deciding doubtful fact questions in a nonjury case should be, and we think it is, that of the district court. The existence of any doubt as to whether the trial court or this Court is the ultimate trier of fact issues in nonjury cases is, we think, detrimental to the orderly administration of justice, impairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of the district courts, and multiplies the number of appeals in such cases.

The sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court's findings and judgment is, of course, a proper question on review. Whether a reviewing court thinks that it would or might have made different findings of fact or have entered a different judgment, had it been the trier of the facts, is a matter of no consequence. On review, this Court should refrain from exercising any of the trial functions conferred by law upon the district courts.

We shall not attempt to set forth in this opinion a detailed statement of the evidence. Much of it deals with the character of the insured, his way of life, and the treatment accorded by him to his wife from the time of their marriage until his death. In considering the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to give to Ann Pendergrass, as the prevailing party, the benefit of all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her.

The record shows that the insured and Ann Pendergrass were married in 1940. He was then, apparently, about sixty-three years of age and she was about forty. Each had been married before and each had two children by a former marriage. The children did not live with them. The insured was an attorney, who lived and had an office in Paris, Arkansas. He had no means. She had inherited properties of considerable value from a deceased husband. After the marriage, the insured dominated his wife, and had her place all of the properties she owned in their names as joint tenants by the entirety. As her properties were sold, the proceeds were deposited in a joint bank account and were used for living expenses and the construction of a home upon a 600-acre farm on top of Doug Mountain, about two and one-half miles south of Paris, Arkansas. The farm had been purchased by the insured and his wife as tenants by the entirety. They lived there after August 15, 1946.

The insured prevented his wife from visiting her children or having them visit her, and denied her the privilege of attending church or of seeing friends. He was addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor and when under its influence was profane and abusive. He had killed two men, and in the community where he lived had the reputation of being a violent and dangerous person. He sometimes boasted of having shot seven men, four of whom recovered. He not infrequently threatened to take his wife with him when he thought he might die. She was afraid of him. He would, on occasion, threaten to kill his own children. He kept two pistols within reach most of the time, one at the office in his desk, and another that he carried around with him in his car and brought into the house.

What occurred on the day of the shooting is stated with substantial accuracy in the following findings of ...