Pendleton v. Bob Frensley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 May 2016
• Docket Number: 3:14 C 02325
• Parties: JOHN PENDLETON, Plaintiff, v. BOB FRENSLEY CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, INC., AND THOMAS MOWELL, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

JOHN PENDLETON, Plaintiff,
v.
BOB FRENSLEY CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, INC.,
AND THOMAS MOWELL, Defendants.

3:14 C 02325

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

May 19, 2016

Judge Marvin E. Aspen

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff John Pendleton, an African-American, filed this lawsuit against his employer, Bob Frensley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, Inc. ("Bob Frensley"), and his supervisor, Thomas Mowell ("Mowell"), alleging violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), and the Tennessee Human Rights Act,¹ Tenn. Code. Ann. § 4-21-101, et seq. ("THRA"). Pendleton contends that Defendants subjected him to a hostile work environment and terminated him because of his race in retaliation for objecting to Defendants' alleged unlawful conduct. Presently before us are two motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants,² which we deny for the reasons discussed below.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND³

Plaintiff began working as a car salesman for Defendant Bob Frensley on February 26, 2014. (Resp. SOF ¶ 1.) Plaintiff's last day of work was April 26, 2014. (Id.) During Plaintiff's tenure at Bob Frensley, Defendant Mowell served as Bob Frensley's New Car Manager and was Plaintiff's supervisor. (Mowell Dep. at 2, 27.) Plaintiff testified that throughout his employment at Bob Frensley, Mowell made offensive racially derogatory statements to Plaintiff on a daily basis. (Add. SOF ¶ 5.) According to Plaintiff, Mowell told "nigger jokes," made fun of the way African-Americans spoke, told Plaintiff that "the only thing that niggers could do was wash cars," said that "he had a big dick like a nigger," and informed Plaintiff that he left his previous employer because his supervisor was a "lazy nigger." (Pendleton Dep. at 73, 111-12, 120.) Plaintiff stated that Mowell made racially inappropriate comments every day; that the comments were constant. (Id. at 111.) According to Plaintiff's testimony, he did not find Mowell's jokes funny; instead; "it was sickening just having to work [at Bob Frensley] or [be] around [Mowell]." (Id. at 113.) Mowell denies making any racially derogatory statements. (Mowell Dep. at 41-44.)

Plaintiff testified that he complained of Mowell's inappropriate conduct to both Mowell and Jon Henderson ("Henderson"), another Bob Frensley Manager. (Pendleton Dep. at 107.) Plaintiff testified that he complained to Mowell daily and complained to Henderson several

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times, specifically telling the men that "the nigger jokes have to stop." (Id. at 107-08.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants took no correction action in response to his complaints. (Add. SOF ¶ 17.) Defendants deny that Plaintiff ever complained of racial discrimination or harassment. (Resp. Add. SOF ¶ 15.) According to company policy, employees are required to report discrimination or harassment to "department managers." (Add. SOF ¶ 14.) Under the same policy, department managers are then required to report any complaints to Jennifer Webb ("Webb"), Bob Frensley's owner and general manager. (Id. at 16.) During Plaintiff's time at Bob Frensley, Mowell and Henderson were both department managers. (Id.) Neither Mowell nor Henderson informed Webb of Plaintiff's allegations. (Id.)

On April 26, 2014, Plaintiff was involved in an incident at Bob Frensley with a Caucasian salesman, Derek Ritchie ("Ritchie"). (Id. at 24.) That day, Plaintiff was assisting customers with a sale when Mowell directed Ritchie and another Caucasian salesman, Mr. Whittle ("Whittle") to assist Plaintiff.⁴ (Id.; Ritchie Decl. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff thought Ritchie and Whittle were attempting to take his sale and a verbal argument ensued. (Add. SOF ¶ 24; Ritchie Decl. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff, Ritchie and Whittle exited the showroom towards the back of the dealership. (Add. SOF ¶ 28, Ritchie Decl. ¶ 4.) Ritchie then pushed and punched Plaintiff, knocking him to the ground. (Add. SOF ¶ 29; Ritchie Decl. ¶ 4.) Whittle and Douglas restrained Plaintiff and Ritchie struck Plaintiff again. (Add. SOF ¶ 31.) Ritchie then walked back to the front of the dealership. (Ritchie Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff never struck Ritchie or anyone else. (Add. SOF ¶ 30.) Plaintiff testified that moments later, Mowell approached Plaintiff and said: "Get your black ass out of here. You're fired. . . . If you don't leave the premises . . . we're

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calling the police." (Id. ¶ 35.) Defendant Mowell denies making these statements. (Resp. Add. SOF ¶ 35.) It is undisputed that Mowell did not witness the incident and that Mowell told Plaintiff he needed to leave the premises or Mowell would call the police. (Add. SOF ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiff left the dealership. (Id. ¶ 35.) Ritchie, on the other hand, was not asked to leave and finished his shift. (Ritchie Decl. ¶ 4.) According to Ritchie, immediately following the fight, Mowell told him: "You don't have to worry about [Plaintiff] anymore, I fired him because of the fight."⁵ (Id.) It is undisputed the Ritchie was not terminated or suspended for his involvement in the April 26 incident. (Add. SOF ¶ 37.) Ritchie received an "Employee Warning" for the April 26 incident on Monday, April 28. (Id. ¶ 38.) Defendant Mowell completed that write-up on April 26. (Id.)

Defendants deny that Plaintiff was fired and assert that Plaintiff was administratively discharged when he failed to return to work on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday following the incident.⁶ (Resp. Add. SOF ¶ 36; Webb Dep. at 31.) Additionally, Defendant Mowell testified that he called Plaintiff on his cell phone numerous times on April 26, April 27 and April 28 to check in on Plaintiff and to determine whether Plaintiff intended to return to work. (Add. SOF ¶ 42.) Plaintiff testified that he was never contacted by Defendants following the April 26 incident. (Id. ¶ 44.) According to Mowell's cellphone records, Mowell did not call Plaintiff from his cellphone on April 26, April 27 or April 28. (Id. ¶ 43.) Defendants allege that had Plaintiff returned to work on Monday, April 28, he would have received the same punishment as Ritchie, a write-up. (Id. ¶ 39.) There is no employee write-up for Plaintiff in the

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record. Additionally, Defendants allege that they obtained written statements from employees concerning the April 26 incidents. (Id. ¶ 45.) Defendants did not produce any written statements from April 26. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that a second African-American salesman, Willie Epps ("Epps"), was similarly terminated by Defendant Bob Frensley following a separate incident with a Caucasian employee, Jason Whittle. (Id. ¶ 18; Pendleton Dep. at 84-86.) Epps testified that it was Defendant Mowell who stepped in to break up the confrontation and that Mowell witnessed Whittle instigate the fight.⁷ (Epps Dep. at 28, 71.) Epps was terminated by Jon Henderson the next day. (Id.) Whittle was not terminated. (Add. SOF ¶ 18, Pendleton Dep. at 84-86; Epps Dep. at 71.)

Plaintiff filed his charge with the E.E.O.C. on May 1, 2014. (Add. SOF ¶ 18.) Defendant Bob Frensley did not investigate Plaintiff's E.E.O.C. claims. (Webb Dep. at 59.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue for trial exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); see also DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the issue as "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law") (internal quotation omitted). This standard places the initial burden on the moving party to identify those portions of the record that "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Once the moving party meets this burden of production, the nonmoving party "must go beyond the pleadings" and identify portions of the record demonstrating that a material fact is genuinely disputed. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The nonmovant must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, however, we must accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513; see Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2010).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants: (1) discriminated against him based on his race, (2) retaliated against him based on his complaints of discrimination, and (3) created a hostile work environment. We discuss each claim in turn.

I. Race Discrimination

Plaintiff brings his race discrimination claim under Title VII, § 1981, and the THRA, yet we need only conduct one analysis. Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that § 1981 claims are analyzed "under the same standards as claims of race discrimination brought under Title VII"); Chattman v. Toho Tenax Amer., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 2012) (analyzing THRA claims under the Title VII standard); Mullins v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 291 Fed. Appx. 744, 745 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) ("The THRA is a state law analogous to Title VII and the statues are analyzed identically.").

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer⁸ "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . race." 42 U.S.C. §...