Pendleton v. Goord, 11–CV–0138 (JFB)(WDW).

• Decision Date: 27 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–CV–0138 (JFB)(WDW).,11–CV–0138 (JFB)(WDW).
• Citation: 849 F.Supp.2d 324
• Parties: Anthony PENDLETON, Plaintiff, v. Glenn S. GOORD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

849 F.Supp.2d 324

Anthony PENDLETON, Plaintiff,

v.Glenn S. GOORD, et al., Defendants.

No. 11–CV–0138 (JFB)(WDW).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

March 27, 2012.

Anthony Pendleton, Medford, NY, pro se.

Lori L. Pack, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Anthony Pendleton (“plaintiff”) brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), seeking money damages¹ against defendants Glenn S. Goord (“Goord”) and Brian Fisher (“Fisher”), as Commissioners of the Department of Correctional Services for the State of New York (“DOCS”), Anthony Annucci (“Annucci”), as the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services for the State of New York, and Ronald Merier (“Merier”), an employee of the Division of Parole, alleging that defendants wrongfully detained plaintiff on two occasions for violations of a term of post-release supervision (“PRS”) that was unlawfully imposed by DOCS, in violation of his constitutional rights.² In particular, plaintiff contends that his PRS term was administratively imposed by DOCS in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested for violations while serving his PRS sentence—once in 2007 and once in 2008—and was incarcerated for approximately one month for the first violation and approximately twenty-six months for the second violation. Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims for these periods of incarceration and contends that he should not have been sentenced to any term of PRS, since the judge did not impose PRS at plaintiff's sentencing in 2001.

Defendants now move to dismiss the § 1983 claims against them on the grounds that the action is barred by the statute of limitations and that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is granted on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any conduct with respect to the plaintiff's September 2007 arrest and incarceration for violation of the terms of his PRS. It was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe, given the murky legal landscape that followed Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2006), that they were not violating plaintiff's rights in September 2007 by continuing to enforce his term of PRS.

With respect to plaintiff's February 2008 arrest for violating the terms of his PRS, the Court concludes that plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated because he had been resentenced by a judge on January 10, 2008, rectifying any potential constitutional violations caused by the formerly administratively-imposed PRS.³

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the complaint (“Compl.”), as well as several exhibits attached to the defendants' moving papers.⁴ These facts are not findings of fact by the Court, but rather are assumed to be true for the purpose of deciding this motion and are construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party.

Plaintiff was sentenced by Judge Anthony R. Corso on January 5, 2001 in County Court, Suffolk County to a determinate prison term of seven years for attempted sodomy in the first degree, pursuant to Penal Law § 130.50. (Compl., Ex. A; Pack Declaration (“Pack Decl.”), Ex. 1). He was received into the custody of DOCS on January 17, 2001. (Pack Decl., Ex. 1). On June 23, 2006, plaintiff was released from custody and began serving his 5–year term of PRS. (Pack Decl., Ex. 2).

Plaintiff claims that defendants enforced a period of PRS against him even though he was not sentenced by a judge to a period of PRS. (Compl. ¶¶ Prelim. Statement, 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Goord and Annucci created and enforced the policy and practice under which DOCS employees imposed the PRS term against plaintiff. ( Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that Merier, who was “[r]esponsible for the [p]reparation of the Plaintiff[']s release ... [a]ssumed the [r]ole [o]f the Judiciary” by typing the PRS provision onto plaintiff's release paper. (Id. ¶ 5.)

Subsequent to his release from DOCS' custody on June 23, 2006, plaintiff was incarcerated on September 19, 2007 for a violation of the terms of his PRS. (Pack Decl., Ex. 2, 3.) On January 10, 2008, while plaintiff was incarcerated, he was resentenced by County Court Judge Barbara Kahn to a seven-year determinate prison term and five years post-release supervision, nunc pro tunc. (Pack Decl., Ex. 4.) Plaintiff was released from the custody of DOCS by January 15, 2008. (Pack Decl., Ex. 1.)

Plaintiff again violated the terms of his parole on February 27, 2008. (Pack Decl., Ex. 5.) He pled guilty on the parole violation at a final parole revocation hearing on March 25, 2008, and was returned to DOCS as a PRS violator to be held to the maximum expiration date of his sentence. (Pack Decl., Exs. 5, 6.) On April 5, 2010, plaintiff was released from DOCS custody. ( See Compl. ¶ 11.) On April 12, 2010, an amended commitment order was issued vacating the PRS part of plaintiff's sentence. (Pack Decl., Ex. 7.)

B. Legal History ⁵

In 1998, the New York legislature enacted Penal Law 70.45, also known as Jenna's Law, which required that with the imposition of a determinate term of incarceration, a period of PRS must also be included.

On June 9, 2006, the Second Circuit held in Earley v. Murray that the administrative imposition of a five-year PRS term by DOCS, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 70.45, was unconstitutional. Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2006), reh'g denied,462 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.2006), writ of habeas corpus granted byNo. 03–CV–3104 (ERK), 2007 WL 1288031, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31942 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007), cert. denied Burhlre v. Earley, 551 U.S. 1159, 127 S.Ct. 3014, 168 L.Ed.2d 752 (2007).

On April 29, 2008, in People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457, 889 N.E.2d 459, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582 (2008), the New York Court of Appeals also held that the administrative imposition of a PRS term was invalid, but on different grounds. In Sparber, the Court of Appeals held that the failure of a sentencing court to orally pronounce a term of PRS rendered that part of the sentence invalid because it did not comport with state law. See id. at 470–71, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459.

In Garner v. N.Y. State Department of Correctional Services, a case issued by the Court of Appeals on the same day as Sparber, the court held that a writ of prohibition barring DOCS from adding a mandatory period of PRS could issue because, pursuant to CPL 380.20 and 380.40, only the sentencing judge is authorized to pronounce the PRS component of a sentence. 10 N.Y.3d 358, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467 (2008). Thus, any such administratively added PRS term was an act by DOCS in excess of its jurisdiction, since the “CPL's express mandate [is] that sentencing is a judicial function[.]” Id., 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d at 470.Garner did not expressly pass on the constitutional arguments before it or on the applicability of the Second Circuit's opinion in Earley v. Murray, instead resting its decision on statutory grounds. See id.

In response to the Garner and Sparber decisions, the New York legislature passed Correction Law § 601–d, which created a procedure by which improperly sentenced defendants could be identified and resentenced. That law became effective June 30, 2008.

C. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action on January 10, 2011. Defendants filed the instant motion on May 11, 2011. Plaintiff submitted his opposition on June 13, 2011. Defendants submitted their reply on June 21, 2011. Plaintiff submitted a sur-reply on August 15, 2011. The Court has fully considered all of the parties' submissions.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006); Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2005). “In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This standard does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The Supreme Court clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court instructed district courts to first “identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Though “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, if a complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.

Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, “[c]ourts are obligated to construe the [plaintiff's] pleadings ... liberally.” McCluskey v. New York State Unified Ct. Sys., No. 10–CV–2144 (JFB)(ETB), 2010 WL 2558624, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010) (citing Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.2008)); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004). A pro se plaintiff's complaint, while liberally interpreted, still must “ ...