Pendleton v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 February 1910
• Docket Number: No. 53,53
• Parties: C. M. PENDLETON, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

216 U.S. 305

30 S.Ct. 315

54 L.Ed. 491

C. M. PENDLETON, Plff. in Err.,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 53.

Argued January 21, 1910.

Decided February 21, 1910.

Messrs. James H. Blount and Henry E. Davis for plaintiff in error.

Assistant Attorney General Russell for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of murder in the court of first instance of the province of Cebu, Philippine Islands, and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, which was reduced to seventeen years by the supreme court.

The assignments of error are as follows:

'1. The accused has been compelled to be a witness against himself, in violation of article 5 of the law of Congress of July 1, 1902. [32 Stat. at L. 692, chap. 1369.]

'2. The fact that the accused did not offer himself as a witness in his own favor has been used to his prejudice, in violation of his right to remain silent until his guilt be established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

'3. The evidence does not show the guilt of accused of the crime imputed to him beyond a reasonable doubt.'

The argument to support the first assignment of error is not very tangible. It is based upon an affidavit of defendant that he was subpoenaed as a witness, and obeyed by going to the fiscal's, where he answered questions put to him without knowing that he had a right to refuse, or being notified that he had such right, and not knowing that 'the object of securing his statement was in order to search for proof against him.' The affidavit also states that he was not represented by counsel, and did not know that he had a right to consult a lawyer. Motion was made, presumably based on the affidavit, for an order to the fiscal to return to the defendant the statement, together with all copies of the same, and that the fiscal be prohibited from using the statement in any manner whatever. Nothing seems to have been done with that motion, and subsequently it was repeated and denied on the ground 'that it was not a proper time to make such motion, as the court could not then decide on the admissibility of proofs which had not yet been offered in the cause.' An exception was entered.

It is not contended that the statement was afterwards used in any way, but the action of the court is urged nevertheless as an error 'so grave and so material,' to use counsel's words, 'as to call for a new trial.'

The argument to support it is based on suppositions of what might have been done, and the potency of the statement in the hands of the prosecuting officer. 'It left the defendant open, it is said, to the fire of a masked battery.' But the law has no measure to apply to such a situation. Defendant was certainly not disabled from telling the truth in other statements if he wished to make them, and to be able not to tell the truth can hardly be urged as a legal and constitutional right. The assignment of error, therefore, is not well taken.

The second assignment of error is that the fact that the defendant did not offer himself as a witness was used against him. To support this contention, certain remarks of the judge of the trial court in delivering sentence upon the defendant are quoted. The court said:

'The prosecution has presented an abundance of proof which, in case the court should give it full credence, would establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the defense has presented very little direct proof; the accused did not use his right to testify in his own favor, and no eyewitness has testified favorably to him. The defense has practically limited itself to insisting on: (1) Alleged contradictions between the various witnesses of the prosecution relating to the details of identical facts or happenings related by them. (2) Mistakes which they claim to be essential, in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution with respect to distances and relative positions of persons and objects connected with the case. (3) The expert testimony of two physicians that the deceased could not have died as the result of a wound received in the manner stated by the witnesses for the prosecution.'

An analysis of this language is made by counsel, and its relation to the general character of the evidence is discussed, and the conclusion deduced that the trial court urged three arguments to sustain its judgment: 'First, paucity of proof in behalf of the defendant. Second, his failure to testify in his own favor. Third, his failure to get any eyewitness to the shooting, to rebut evidence of the Filipinos who claim to have been eyewitnesses.' And to this summary, which, it is urged, demonstrates that the trial court considered in determining the guilt of defendant, that he failed to take the stand in his own behalf, there is added the comment of the supreme court of the Islands in its review of the case, or rather, in denying a motion for a new trial, after its decision of the case. Upon the first consideration of the case in the supreme court, no assignment of error based on the point was made. It was raised for the first time in what is styled, 'Exception to the Judgment, and ...