Peninsula Corporation v. United States, 24102.

Decision Date31 January 1945
Docket NumberNo. 24102.,24102.
Citation60 F. Supp. 174
PartiesPENINSULA CORPORATION OF SEAFORD, DEL., v. UNITED STATES et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. E. Hummer, C. V. Guthrie, and E. B. Ussery, all of Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

E. M. Reidy, Asst. Chief Counsel, of Washington, D. C., for Interstate Commerce Commission.

Robert L. Pierce, Department of Justice, Wendell Berge, Department of Justice, and Edward M. Curran, U. S. Dist. Atty., all of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

John R. Norris and James J. Doherty, both of Baltimore, Md., and Eugene X. Murphy, of Washington, D. C., for intervenor Interstate Common Carrier Council of Maryland, Inc.

Before EDGERTON, Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and LETTS and McGUIRE, Associate Justices.

McGUIRE, Associate Justice.

This is a suit under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41 (28), 43-47a, to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission entered November 11, 1943.

The report and order of Division 5 of the Commission (Exhibit B to the complaint) dismissed plaintiff's application under the "grandfather" clause of Section 206 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act.1 This application, as amended,2 sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity to continue operations as a common carrier by motor vehicle in interstate commerce of commodities to and from certain designated points over irregular routes.3

In view of the character of the attack made by plaintiff on the conduct of the proceedings before the Commission, a rather lengthy résumé of the proceedings both before and after the order in question as gleaned from the record before this court is set forth and in some detail.

On February 4, 1936, one John R. Mitchell (plaintiff's predecessor) filed an application with the Commission under the "grandfather clause" of the Interstate Commerce Actsupra,1 requesting authority to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle of commodities generally throughout Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York. The application was filed on the short emergency form, which specified that the applicant must, on or before a date to be designated by the Commission, furnish evidence to support all allegations.

On March 8, 1937, Mitchell filed a statement of facts in support of his application in which he said that the main volume of his traffic was obtained in Florida, North Carolina, and Del-Mar-Va Peninsula, and was transported to Northern and Eastern markets. Seventy-five percent of the revenue was claimed to be derived from hauling farm products, the remainder from general commodities. At the same time Mitchell filed statements by two shippers to the effect that he had carried shipments for them to and from Florida, and he also filed a certificate of registration under the N.R. A. which recited that he operated in North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York. In this statement Mitchell indicated that, in addition to the seven states just named, he operated in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, the District of Columbia, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts.

On April 5, 1937, the application was transferred to Mitchell's successor, Mitchell and Furniss, d/b/a Sussex Motor Line, a partnership.

On December 8, 1937, at the direction of the Commission, Mitchell appeared before a District Supervisor to submit proof of his operations. He submitted an affidavit in which he enumerated seventeen classes of commodities which he handled and specified the points of origin and destination. It is alleged by the plaintiff that Mitchell exhibited to the Supervisor certain documents, books and papers, in support of his operations, and this allegation is apparently admitted by the Commission; there is, however, no reference to this evidence in the papers forwarded by the Supervisor to the Commission. Mitchell also submitted affidavits of ten shippers to the effect that he had hauled commodities for them; only one of those is specific as to dates, commodities transported, origin and destination. The District Supervisor forwarded to the Commission these eleven affidavits together with a short questionnaire, but it nowhere appears in the record what, if any, recommendation the Supervisor made.

On February 12, 1938, the Commission entered an order authorizing the applicant to transport the seventeen classes of commodities enumerated in Mitchell's affidavit and designating practically the same points of origin and destination as had been specified in Mitchell's affidavit.

On March 15, 1938, the rail carriers in the Official Classification Territory filed a petition with the Commission to stay issuance of the certificate upon the ground that there was not adequate proof to support the order as issued; it was requested further that the applicant be required to furnish documentary proof or specific affidavits indicating the nature of his operations. This petition was denied by Division 5 of the Commission on May 12, 1938.

On October 28, 1938, the rail carriers filed another petition asking reconsideration and reopening of the applicant's case on the ground that proper proof had not been submitted to support such a broad authorization. It was further alleged that the original application, which mentioned only the seven states from North Carolina to New York, had never been amended. On May 19, 1939, the rail carriers were notified that the Commission deemed their objections sufficient to refer the case back to the field for further investigation.

Accordingly the case was referred back to the District Supervisor with instructions to hold a conference with the rail carriers. After holding this conference the Supervisor notified the applicant that in the opinion of the protestants the evidence submitted was not sufficient to substantiate the scope of operations granted in the original order.

The Supervisor requested that the applicant appear in his office on June 8, 1939, for an informal conference with the protesting rail carriers, bringing with him such additional proof as he had and specific affidavits of shippers. The applicant refused to appear and requested a formal hearing. On July 24, 1939, the Commission vacated the original order.

On August 22, 1939, the application of Mitchell and Furniss was transferred to the Peninsula Corporation.

On September 13, 1939, the Commission set the case for a formal hearing to be held before Examiner Kephart at Salisbury, Maryland, on October 11, 1939. On September 30, 1939, the rail carriers filed a formal protest against allowance of the application.

At the hearing the rail carriers appeared by counsel. The Peninsula Corporation appeared by its President, Harry I. Truitt, and Mitchell and Truitt testified in its behalf. From the evidence it appeared that the corporation had been formed by Truitt and several small independent carriers for the purpose of avoiding regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act; (Tr. 30), the carriers retained title to their own trucks (Tr.31) and, when hauling exempt commodities, did so as individuals; when nonexempt commodities were to be hauled the trucks were leased to the corporation which then provided the required services (Tr. 31-32-33). The intent plainly was to avoid the provision of the act by which a carrier who hauls both exempt and non-exempt commodities is regulated in all respects. Mitchell testified as to his operations prior to June 1935 (Tr. 13). He was operating as a common carrier over irregular routes (Tr.13). His chief loads were agricultural products and he made a practice of following the produce season (Tr.13-14). He hauled produce from Florida to points along the Atlantic Seaboard as far up as Massachusetts and also to Western Pennsylvania and New York (Tr.13-15-19). On return trips he hauled canned goods and frozen fruit from the Del-Mar-Va Peninsula and from the Western shore of Maryland to Florida and other Southern states. He hauled produce from Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia and the Del-Mar-Va Peninsula to the same Northern markets and also hauled from Western New York to the coast. In addition to produce he hauled fertilizer, building materials and wholesale groceries (Tr.21-25). Mitchell, however, could offer no documentary proof. He claimed that the papers which he submitted to the District Supervisor on December 8, 1937, had been destroyed when his house burned down in 1938 (Tr.25). He relied entirely upon his own testimony and the affidavits of shippers which he submitted on December 8, 1937he had not asked any of these shippers to testify at this hearing (Tr.27). The rail carriers objected to the admission of any of these affidavits unless the shippers were brought to the hearing for cross-examination (Tr.48) and the examiner rejected them.4 Truitt complained that it was practically impossible to get shippers to appear at a hearing, but proceedings were adjourned for a week to enable him to try to get more evidence (Tr.57). Before the hearing concluded Truitt amended the application as above indicated.4a

On October 17, 1939, Truitt appeared at the hearing with only one witness whose knowledge of Mitchell's operations did not prove very substantial. He said he had been so busy that he could not get any of the shipping documents. (Tr.60-69).

Before he could act on the case Examiner Kephart went into the army and the proceedings were turned over to Examiner Sullivan.

On December 11, 1940, the Examiner filed a report and a proposed order. His recommendations as to farm produce covered practically the same territory as had been allowed the applicant in the original order. He was also allowed practically what he had asked for in hauling fertilizer, lubricating oil, livestock feed, coal and lime. He was allowed to transport canned goods from Baltimore and Aberdeen on...

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8 cases
  • Warren v. Marion County
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 2 Junio 1960
    ...by the administrative action. 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 2.10, 2.15, 7.20. See also Peninsula Corporation of Seaford, Del. v. United States, D.C.1945, 60 F.Supp. 174; Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 1946, 187 Md. 296, 49 A.2d In testing the statute for the adequa......
  • Wiener v. Fernandez
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    ...L.Ed. 164. Substantial, as distinguished from incidental, sporadic, or infrequent, service is required." In Peninsula Corporation v. United States, D.C., 60 F.Supp. 174, at page 180, the court said: "The `grandfather' clause, so-called, requires that the Commission in specifying in a certif......
  • REA Exp., Inc. v. U.S.
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    • 16 Septiembre 1977
    ...their judgment for that of an administrative agency. E. g., FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 272 (1949); Peninsula Corp. of Seaford, Delaware v. United States, 60 F.Supp. 174 (D.D.C.1945) (three-judge court). Having said this, we recognize the exceptional situation where two mutually exclusive, bo......
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