Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Adkins

• Citation: 448 Md. 197,137 A.3d 211
• Decision Date: 26 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 68, Sept. Term, 2015.,68, Sept. Term, 2015.
• Parties: PENINSULA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER v. Tracey L. ADKINS.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

448 Md. 197

137 A.3d 211

PENINSULA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

v.Tracey L. ADKINS.

No. 68, Sept. Term, 2015.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 26, 2016.

Randi Klein Hyatt (J. Garrett Woznial, Kollman & Saucier, P.A., Timonium, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

John B. Stolarz (The Stolarz Law Firm, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA,^* GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, GLENN T. HARRELL, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ADKINS

, J.

Since its enactment in 1965, the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”), Maryland Code (1984, 2014 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article (“SG”) § 20–601 et seq.

, has been an important statutory protection of employee civil rights. FEPA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of an “individual's race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic information, or disability.” SG § 20–606. In this case, we address FEPA's grant of protection to disabled individuals. Specifically, we primarily consider an employer's duty to reasonably accommodate a qualified individual with a disability.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Tracey L. Adkins¹ (“Adkins”) began her career at Peninsula Regional Medical Center (“PRMC”), a hospital located in Salisbury, Maryland, around March 2005. She was first employed as a storekeeper in the Materials Management Department, which is, in part, responsible for inventorying and stocking medical supplies and equipment. In this role, Adkins delivered supplies to various floors of the hospital, organized supplies in the supply room, and checked expiration dates of materials. Six months later, she was transferred to Inventory Control, more commonly known as the “Cath Lab,” as an inventory control assistant. This position was also in the Materials Management Department. Adkins held this position until September 2010, when the position was “cut.” She then transferred back to the storekeeper position, which she held until her termination on February 25, 2012—the event generating the underlying lawsuit.²

In April 2011, Adkins went to PRMC's emergency room after experiencing pain in her groin area and took a few days off from work. When Adkins returned to work, she continued to experience pain but managed to complete her tasks. Adkins was ultimately diagnosed with a tear in the joint of her left hip as well as a deformation in her hip socket. She was scheduled to have surgery in August 2011 and notified her supervisors. She also filled out paperwork to obtain leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).³ The FMLA paperwork indicated that her leave would begin on August 25, 2011 and that she would return to work on or about October 6, 2011. In a letter dated August 11, 2011, PRMC approved Adkins's FMLA leave request. In this letter PRMC explained that her 12–week leave under the FMLA would expire on November 17, 2011 and that so long as she returned by that date, she would be returned to her job or an equivalent one. PRMC also advised Adkins in this letter that she would have to obtain a work evaluation from the Employee Health Office before resuming work. Adkins continued working full-time until she underwent surgery in August 2011. In the months leading up to her surgery, Adkins began applying for other positions at PRMC, including Patient Services Rep—Medical Group.⁴

Following the surgery, Adkins's pain intensified and her doctors advised her that the time for recovery could range from six months to a year. On October 3, 2011, while still out on FMLA leave, Adkins met with James Bunk (“Bunk”), a supervisor who was the supply chain operations manager of the Materials Management Department. She informed him that she was meeting her surgeon on October 10 for a follow-up appointment and that she hoped to learn, at that time, when she could return to work. After the October 10 appointment, Adkins received a letter from her physician advising her that she would be unable to return to work until November 7, 2011. Adkins then delivered this documentation to Bunk and PRMC's Employee Health Office.

On November 7, 2011, Adkins returned to work as scheduled and met with a nurse in the Employee Health Office. She told the nurse that she was still in pain and would be unable to fulfill her job responsibilities on that day. She explained that she experienced increased pain when bending, lifting, and squatting, and that she would not be able to stand for long periods of time. An “Employee Charting Note” for this date states that “[a]ll parties” agreed that Adkins could not return to work. It also reflects that Adkins had “been educated on FMLA and to start looking at job postings,” and that Adkins reported having applied for the “core tech position.”

Adkins returned to her doctor on November 10 and received a medical report indicating she could return to work under “light duty.” That same day, she brought the form to PRMC's Employee Health Office. The form stated that she was restricted to “[s]edentary [w]ork: [l]ifting 10 pounds maximum and occasionally lifting and/or carrying small articles and occasional walking or standing.” The Employee Health Office told Adkins “that her unit can not [sic ] accommodate her restrictions.” After her surgery and before her termination, Adkins applied for several different positions, including Patient Services Rep—Medical Group and Core Technician.⁵ She also emailed Scott Phillips, director of the Materials Management Department, and Laura McIntyre, Operations Room Materials Manager, asking to be considered for an inventory control coordinator position, writing:

I was informed that there is now an open position for Inventory Control [Coordinator] in the Cath Lab. With my prior position in the Cath Lab as the [inventory control] assistant I was wondering if I would be considered for the position. I am still released under Doctors orders under sedentary work but [from] prior knowledge of the job I know that the job is mostly sedentary and I do have the experience and know how for the position[.]

She was not hired for any of these positions.

On or around November 17—the day Adkins's 12–week FMLA leave was set to expire—PRMC granted her an additional 14 weeks of leave until February 2012. PRMC encouraged her to apply to open positions, but did not identify any specific positions. During this time, Adkins learned that her storekeeper position had been filled. On January 12, 2012, Adkins went back to her doctor for an appointment and received another medical report form, which maintained the “light duty” work restrictions.⁶ Adkins testified in her deposition that she also gave this note to PRMC.

On February 25, 2012, at the end of the 14–week extended leave, Adkins was terminated. Adkins applied to four more positions after her termination, but was not hired for any of these positions.

In February 2013, Adkins filed a three-count complaint against PRMC in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County under FEPA, alleging intentional disability discrimination based on actual disability, intentional disability discrimination based on being regarded as having a disability, and failure to accommodate. PRMC thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment.⁷ In May 2014, the Circuit Court issued an order and opinion granting summary judgment in favor of PRMC. Adkins appealed the Circuit Court's ruling as to disability discrimination based on actual disability and failure to accommodate, but did not challenge the trial court's decision on disability discrimination based on being regarded as having a disability.

The Court of Special Appeals, however, reversed the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment on Adkins's disability discrimination based on actual disability claim and her reasonable accommodation claim. The intermediate appellate court ruled that the evidence contained in the record reflected genuine disputes of material fact as to these claims. PRMC appealed and we granted its Petition for Writ of Certiorari. PRMC presented two questions for review,⁸ which we simplify into the following questions:

(1) Does the definition of “qualified individual with a disability” include employees who could perform the essential functions of a reassignment position, with or without a reasonable accommodation, even if they cannot perform the essential functions of their current position?

(2) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in reversing the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PRMC?

Because we answer yes as to question one and no as to question two, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand for further proceedings. Additional facts shall be included as necessitated by our discussion of the issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A circuit court may grant a motion for summary judgment if there is no dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maryland Rule 2–501(f)

. “The court is to consider the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and consider any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the undisputed facts against the moving party.” Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Md., Inc., 435 Md. 584, 598, 80 A.3d 269 (2013). When a circuit court's grant of summary judgment hinges on a question of law, not a dispute of fact, we review whether the circuit court was legally correct without according deference to that court's legal conclusions. Id.

DISCUSSION

There are relatively few appellate decisions interpreting Maryland's FEPA. On the other hand, the federal courts have provided “substantial guidance” on the interpretation and application of federal disability legislation. Barbara T. Lindemann et al., Employment Discrimination Law 13–7 (5th ed.2012). Because FEPA is modeled after federal law, see Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 503–04, 914 A.2d 735 (2007)

(Battaglia, J., dissenting), a brief overview of federal disability law is necessary.

The...