Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania

• Decision Date: 01 April 1935
• Docket Number: 395,397,393,400,394,402,398,401,392,396,399,391
• Citation: 178 A. 291,318 Pa. 401
• Parties: Penn Anthracite Mining Co., Appellant, v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

178 A. 291

Penn Anthracite Mining Co., Appellant, v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania et al

318 Pa. 401

Nos. 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

April 1, 1935

Argued December 3, 1934

Appeals, Nos. 391-402, inclusive, Jan. T., 1934, by plaintiff, from judgments of Superior Court, Feb. T., 1934 Nos. 49-59, inclusive, reversing judgments and sentences of C.P. Lackawanna Co., March T., 1934, No. 1, in case of Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania et al. Judgments of Superior Court are affirmed.

Rule to show cause why defendants should not be adjudged in contempt of court for violation of injunction.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Jury trial refused, and defendants adjudged guilty of contempt opinion by NEWCOMB, P.J. Defendants appealed to Superior Court. Judgment reversed. Appeal by plaintiff to Supreme Court allowed.

Error assigned, among others, was judgment of Superior Court.

The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.

George Wharton Pepper, with him J. A. Montgomery, Jr., Wm. A. Skinner, J. Hayden Oliver and John P. Kelly, for appellant.

Francis Biddle, with him James M. Stack, Samuel H. Torchia, Robert E. Dolphin and E. C. Marianelli, for appellees.

Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE LINN:

These appeals are from judgments of the Superior Court reversing the judgments entered in the Common Pleas of Lackawanna County in contempt proceedings. The appeals were allowed for consideration of the contention, made and sustained in the common pleas, that the Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 925, was unconstitutional in that it conferred the right to a jury trial on one charged with indirect criminal contempt of a restraining order. It appears that, on the application of appellant, the Penn Anthracite Mining Co., an injunction was granted January 26, 1934, restraining Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania and members thereof from interfering with the operation of appellant's mines and collieries and from intimidating its employees.

On January 31, 1934, the Penn Anthracite Mining Co. presented its petition in the trial court for a rule to show cause why the appellees here should not be adjudged in contempt of court for violation of the injunction. When the rule came on for hearing, appellees objected to the proceedings on the ground that by the Act of 1931, supra, they were entitled to be admitted to bail, to be notified of the accusations against them, to be given a reasonable time to make defense and to be granted a jury trial as in the act provided. The court declined to accept that view. Testimony was taken, from which the court made findings of fact establishing that, on January 31, 1934, while appellant's employees were on their way to work at Raymond Colliery in the Borough of Archbald, a large crowd, including appellees, gathered about the automobiles containing the employees and threw stones at them, breaking the windows of the cars and striking and injuring some of the occupants. These acts were intended to, and did, intimidate many of appellant's employees, and prevented them and others from returning to work at the colliery. The appellees were adjudged guilty of contempt and fined $50 each, to be collected by the sheriff, the parties to "stand committed in his [the sheriff's] custody until the order is complied with." The court was of opinion that the power to find the fact of violation of its injunction and to inflict punishment therefor was inherent in the court -- a court created by the Constitution -- and, therefore, beyond the power of the legislature. The convicted parties appealed to the Superior Court and there contended that the constitutional provision for chancery powers, in the exercise of which the injunction was granted, conferred legislative authority to enact the statute. The Superior Court sustained the contention in an opinion reported in 114 Pa.Super. 7. The appeal to this court limited consideration to that constitutional question.

The act is as follows: "Section 1. . . . That in all cases where a person shall be charged with indirect criminal contempt for violation of a restraining order or injunction issued by a court or judge or judges thereof, the accused shall enjoy -- (a) The rights as to admission to bail that are accorded to persons accused of crime; (b) The right to be notified of the accusation and a reasonable time to make a defense, provided the alleged contempt is not committed in the immediate view or presence of the court; (c) Upon demand, the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the judicial district wherein the contempt shall have been committed, provided that this requirement shall not be construed to apply to contempts committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere directly with the administration of justice, or to apply to the misbehavior, misconduct, or disobedience of any officer of the court in respect to the writs, orders, or process of the court; and (d) The right to file with the court a demand for the retirement of the judge sitting in the proceeding, if the contempt arises from an attack upon the character or conduct of such judge, and if the attack occurred otherwise than in open court. Upon the filing of any such demand, the judge shall thereupon proceed no further but another judge shall be designated by the presiding judge of said court. The demand shall be filed prior to the hearing in the contempt proceeding. Section 2. Punishment for a contempt specified in section one may be by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding fifteen days in the jail of the county where the court is sitting, or both, in the discretion of the court. Where a person is committed to jail for the nonpayment of such a fine, he must be discharged at the expiration of fifteen days, but where he is also committed for a definite time, the fifteen days must be computed from the expiration of the definite time."

It is not disputed that the acts alleged to have constituted the contempt of court occurred ten miles from the courthouse and were, therefore, an indirect contempt; it is likewise undisputed that indictments would lie for the various crimes involved in the acts said to have been committed. The appeal does not, therefore, require us to determine the general scope of the term "indirect criminal contempt" as used in the statute. The provision of the Constitution directly involved is section 20 of article V, in these words: "The several courts of common pleas, besides the powers herein conferred, shall have and exercise within their respective districts, subject to such changes as may be made by law, such chancery powers as are now vested by law in the several courts of common pleas of this Commonwealth, or as may hereafter be conferred upon them by law."

"That one who asks to have a law declared unconstitutional takes upon himself the burden of proving beyond all doubt that it is so, has been so often declared that the principle has become axiomatic. In Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, Mr. Justice BLACK said (page 164): 'There is another rule which must govern us in cases like this; namely, that we can declare an act of assembly void, only when it violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, plainly; and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation on our minds. This principle is asserted by judges of every grade, both in the federal and in the state courts.' And again in Erie and North-East R.R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287, the same Justice said (page 300): 'The right of the judiciary to declare a statute void, and to arrest its execution, is one which, in the opinion of all courts, is coupled with responsibilities so grave that it is never to be exercised except in very clear cases; one department of the government is bound to presume that another has acted rightly. The party who wishes us to pronounce a law unconstitutional, takes upon himself the burden of proving, beyond all doubt, that it is so.' In Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. 154, Mr. Justice AGNEW said (page 159): 'We cannot declare this act unconstitutional unless we can say, in the language of Judge TILGHMAN, that 'its violation of the Constitution is so manifest as to leave no reasonable doubt': Com. v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117.' And Chief Justice SHARSWOOD said, in Com. v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535 (540): 'To justify a court in pronouncing an act of the legislature unconstitutional and void, either in whole or in part, it must be able to vouch some exception or prohibition clearly expressed or necessarily implied. To doubt is to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act'": Gottschall v. Campbell, 234 Pa. 347, 363. See also Com. ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 56, 161 A. 697.

The question, therefore, is: May the legislature grant the right to a jury trial to one charged with an "indirect criminal contempt for violation of a restraining order" and limit the punishment? Certainly there is no direct prohibition. The Constitution authorizes the legislature to deal with "chancery powers." What is the meaning of the words as used in the Constitution?

This term has a meaning peculiar to the equity jurisprudence of Pennsylvania, growing out of the peculiar history of equity and its administration in this Commonwealth. ^[1] By 1873, when the Constitution was adopted, the words had acquired a well understood meaning. Equity has always been part of the law of Pennsylvania (Jordan v. Cooper, 3 S. & R. *564 *578), but it was found that the common law courts could not do justice in particular cases, because they lacked the powers of a court of chancery;...