Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Abramson, 86-1735.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1735.,86-1735.
• Citation: 530 A.2d 1202
• Parties: PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Frederick B. ABRAMSON, et al.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

530 A.2d 1202

PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Frederick B. ABRAMSON, et al.

No. 86-1735.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 13, 1987.

Decided September 15, 1987.

Michael F. Curtin, Washington, D.C., guardian ad litem, for Dania L. Ibn-Tamas.

Robert P. Stranahan, Jr., Washington, D.C., guardian ad litem, for Adam Y. Ibn-Tamas.

Before MACK and BELSON, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER,^* Associate Judge, Retired.

NEBEKER, Associate Judge, Retired:

This opinion results from a question of law certified to this court by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-723 (1987 Supp.). We have been asked by that court to determine under District of Columbia law whether the life insurance policy of Abdur Rahman Y. Ibn-Tamas (the insured) may be reformed to designate as a beneficiary the insured's son, Adam Y. Ibn-Tamas, who was born to the insured's second wife five months after his death in February 1976. For the reasons discussed below, it is our view that the life insurance policy may not be reformed to benefit the insured's after-born son.

I

As set forth in its certification memorandum, the court of appeals has deemed the following facts relevant to the question of law certified to this court:

Abdur Ibn-Tamas, the insured, purchased the life insurance policy in question in 1974 after he had divorced his first wife and remarried. At the time the insured purchased the policy, he had two children from his first marriage and one child from his second marriage. He designated his second wife, Beverly Ann Ibn-Tamas, as beneficiary of all proceeds payable under the policy provided she survived him; otherwise, one half of the proceeds was to be paid in equal shares to Robert Gamble and Tamara Gamble, the two children of the insured's first marriage, and the remaining one half was to be paid to Dania Ibn-Tamas, the daughter of the insured's second marriage.

The precise terms of the policy pertaining to beneficiary designation are set out below.

BENEFICIARY OF ANY BENEFIT PAYABLE BY REASON OF INSURED'S DEATH

The proceeds of the policy, or the combined proceeds of all policies numbered above if more than one, payable by reason of the death of the Insured shall be paid as provided below and in the following General Provisions.

The proceeds shall be paid in one sum to BEVERLY ANN IBN-TAMAS, wife of the insured, if she survives the insured, otherwise in one sum as follows:

(a) As to ½ of the proceeds:

To DARIA IBN-TAMAS, daughter of the insured, if she survives the insured, otherwise to the executors or administrators of the insured.

(b) As to the remaining ½ of the proceeds:

In equal shares to such of ROBERT GAMBLE and TAMARA GAMBLE, children of the insured, who survive the insured, if any, otherwise to the executors or administrators of the insured.

Payment(s) becoming due a child while a minor shall be paid to ERNEST G. HAMMOND, of 2514 N.W., Longwood Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, as Trustee, to be used for the support, education and welfare of such child and to pay over to such child upon attaining legal age or to his personal representative upon earlier death, any balance then retained by the Trustee. The Trustee shall have the power while such child is a minor to exercise for the same purposes any privileges available to such child.

If the proceeds payable upon the death of the Insured are not completely distributed by payments as directed on the reverse side, any balance shall be paid to the executors or administrators of the Insured [¹]

The policy also contained a requirement that a change of beneficiary be effected in writing. This provision reads as follows.

Change of Owner and Beneficiary — The owner or beneficiary may be changed by filing a written designation at the Home Office in form acceptable to the Company. No owner or beneficiary designation shall be effective until so filed but when so filed shall take effect as of the date it was made, subject to any action taken by the Company before its receipt at the Home Office.

The policy thus designated all beneficiaries by name and provided, with respect to proceeds due a minor child, for administration of the funds by a trustee for the child's support, education and welfare.

In February 1976, the insured was murdered by his second wife, who, five months later, gave birth to the insured's fourth child, Adam Ibn-Tamas, the second child of his second marriage. Under D.C.Code § 19-320 (1981), the second wife, having been convicted of second-degree murder for the death of the insured, is ineligible to receive the proceeds of the insurance policy of which she had been designated the primary beneficiary.² The insurer, Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, has paid the proceeds, of about $70,000, into the registry of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; by an order of that court, half of the sum so paid has been distributed in equal shares to Robert and Tamara Gamble, the children of the insured's first marriage, whose interests were unaffected by the instant dispute over the remaining half share designated in the policy for Dania Ibn-Tamas.

The question of law certified to this court by the court of appeals is this: "Under District of Columbia law, and given the undisputed facts described [above], how should the proceeds of a life insurance policy be distributed among children of the deceased insured?" As to this question, the court of appeals in its certification memorandum states the "sole and dispositive issue in this cause" to be whether (1) as the guardian ad litem for Darla Ibn-Tamas (first child of the second marriage) contends, that child is entitled to the entire balance of the funds on deposit in the district court's registry, or (2) as the guardian ad litem for Adam Ibn-Tamas (second child of the second marriage, born after the insured's death) contends, and as the district court held, the insurance policy should be reformed to designate Adam as a beneficiary, entitled to share equally with Dania the currently undistributed policy proceeds.

We note that this question arose in an interpleader action in the United States District Court instituted by Penn Mutual for an order governing distribution of the proceeds. Finding no material fact in dispute, the district court held as a matter of law that the insurance policy should be reformed to include Adam as a beneficiary.³ The district court reasoned that the insurance policy established a trust fund for the insured's named children and that reformation of the trust to include the after-born child was appropriate to give effect to the insured's intent. In divining such intent, the district court, among other things, looked to evidence that the insured met with his children's trustee the day before he was murdered, expressed excitement over the prospect of Adam's birth, and informed the trustee of his "plans to provide for all four children, including insurance." The court also noted that statements in the record made by the insured's second wife supported the trustee's view that the insured "intended to provide for his unborn son and would have wanted his son to share equally with the other children in the proceeds of this policy." The guardian ad litem for Dania Ibn-Tamas noted an appeal which is now being held in abeyance pending this court's answer to the certified question.

II.

The legal issue presented is one of first impression in this jurisdiction and one appropriate for certification in accordance with the statutory authority contained in D.C.Code § 11-723. Inasmuch as this is our first occasion to answer a certified question, we begin with some observations about the process.

Our certification statute was enacted by the Congress of the United States as part of the District of Columbia Judicial Efficiency and Improvement Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-573, § 7, 1986 U.S.CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS (100 Stat. 3228) 10A. The Act was signed into law by the President on October 28, 1986, with § 7, codified at D.C.Code § 11-723, becoming effective that day. Section 11-723 was implemented to conform District law with the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1975). See S.REP. No. 477, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986); Annual Report of the District of Columbia Delegation to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 115 Daily Wash.L. Rptr. 1057, 1060 (May 22, 1987).⁴ It provides this court with jurisdiction to answer questions of law of the District of Columbia which may be determinative of the cause pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in our decisions. D.C.Code § 11-723(a).⁵ As prescribed in the statute, this court may entertain certified questions only from the Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals, or the highest appellate court of any state. Id. Section 11-723 further establishes, inter alia, the procedures by which the certifying court may invoke certification and by which this court may respond to such a request.⁶

One feature of § 11-723 which bears emphasis is the permissive language found in subsection (a) respecting the authority of this court to answer questions certified to it. Just as we "may" answer a question of law properly certified, we may decline to do so sua sponte or on motion of a party. See S.REP. No. 477, supra (court has discretion to act on a certified question); Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, supra, § 1 Commissioners' comment at 52 (same). Thus, for example, if in our view the question of local law which perplexed the certifying court would in no way be "determinative of the cause" within the meaning of § 11-723(a), we might refuse to answer the question. See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4248, at 527-28 (1978). And in an appropriate case we may, of course, decline certification where either...