Penn Plate Glass Co. v. James H. Rice Co.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1905
• Citation: 75 N.E. 246,216 Ill. 567
• Parties: PENN PLATE GLASS CO. v. JAMES H. RICE CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

216 Ill. 567

75 N.E. 246

PENN PLATE GLASS CO.

v.JAMES H. RICE CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 23, 1905.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.

Action by the Penn Plate Glass Company against the James H. Rice Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Court (117 Ill. App. 356), reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff, but rendering one in plaintiff's favor, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Rehearing denied October 24, 1905.

Winston, Payne & Strawn (John Barton Payne, of counsel), for appellant.

Smoot & Eyer, for appellee.

This was an action of assumpsit commenced by plaintiff against the defendant in the circuit court of Cook county. The case was tried before a jury, and resulted in a verdict and judgment against the defendant for the sum of $15,000. An appeal was prosecuted to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgment was reversed, and the cause was remanded for a new trial. 88 Ill. App. 407. On the case being reinstated in the circuit court, a jury was waived, and a trial was had before the court, which resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $16,595.20. The defendant prosecuted a second appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgement of the circuit court was again reversed, and judgment was rendered in the Appellate Court in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $9,121.30, and the plaintiff has prosecuted an appeal to this court.

It appears from the evidence that on the 26th day of June, 1896, the plaintiff sold to the defendant, at an agreed price per square foot, 120,000 square feet of polished plate glass stock sheets, which it was to deliver to the defendant in lots of 10,000 feet per month, beginning November 1, 1896, at its factory at Irwin, Pa. Plaintiff delivered prior to February 25, 1897, to defendant 35,345 square feet of glass, and the defendant paid the plaintiff therefor the sum of $18,072.15. On that date the defendant wrote the plaintiff that it was unable to accept or pay for any further shipments of glass, and notified the plaintiff not to manufacture for it or ship to it any more glass after that date. On March 1st the plaintiff, replying thereto, said it had a contract with the defendant under which it had been shipping it glass, and upon which contract there was still due it about 85,000 feet of glass; that it was ready to perform on its part, and, unless there was some arrangement to the contrary, it should expect to continue shipments. On March 3d the defendant replied it meant what it said in its letter of February 25th, and again notified the plaintiff not to manufacture for it or ship to it any more glass. On the 11th of March the plaintiff replied it understood the defendant had repudiated the contract of June 26th, and it should hold defendant responsible for all loss or damage incurred in consequence of its action. On April 10, 1897, the plaintiff commenced suit. Upon the trial the defendant did not deny that there had been a breach of the contract, or that it was liable for damages by reason of such breach; the only controversy between the parties being as to the amount for which defendant should be held liable to the plaintiff by reason of its failure to receive and pay for said glass.

The Appellate Court incorporated in its judgment the following findings of fact: ‘The court finds that there was no market price at the time of the breach for the undelivered glass contracted for, and no evidence of sales or other evidence reasonably tending to prove market value at the time of the breach, and that the damages assessed by the trial court, and for which judgment was rendered, are $7,473.90 in excess of the damages warranted by the evidence; also that the appellant requested appellee to sell, and appellee sold, the undelivered glass for the best obtainable prices. And the court doth further find that the said appellee, the Penn Plate Glass Company, a corporation, ought to have and recover of and from the said appellant, the James H. Rice Company, a corporation, its damages by it in this behalf sustained herein by reason of the premises; and the court, upon the allegations and proofs in the record in this cause, and being fully advised in the premises, doth assess the damages of said appellee against said appellant to the sum of nine thousand on hundred and twenty-one dollars and thirty cents ($9,121.30).’

HAND, J. (after stating the facts).

The only controversy between the parties to this suit is over the amount for which the plaintiff is entitled to recover judgment against the defendant for the breach of the contract entered into by them June 26, 1896; the liability of the defendant being admitted. The question of the amount for which judgment shall be rendered in a case like this is a question of fact, and the Appellate Court having fixed the amount of the defendant's liability by its findings of fact, and having rendered judgment against the defendant for the amount thus found, its findings of fact upon the question of the amount of defendant's liability are binding upon this court, unless, in arriving at the amount for which it rendered judgment against the defendant, it misapplied the law; that is, adopted a wrong measure of damages in fixing the amount of the defendant's liability.

It appears from the undisputed evidence that at the time of the breach of the contract there remained undelivered of the glass which the defendant had purchased, 84,655 feet; and the Appellate Court found that the defendant requested the plaintiff to sell, and that the plaintiff sold, the undeliveredglass for the best obtainable prices, and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for $9,121.30. There has been a great deal of discussion in the briefs filed as to whether the contract between the parties constitutes a contract of sale, or one for the manufacture and sale, of said glass. In view of the findings of fact by the Appellate Court, we think those questions immaterial. If the plaintiff had the glass on hand, ready to be delivered, at the time the defendant repudiated the contract, or, if the glass was not in existence at the time the defendant broke the contract, we are unable to see that either of those conditions affects in any way the amount the defendant should pay the plaintiff as damages if the plaintiff, after the breach of the contract, at the request of the defendant, sold the glass it had on hand, or continued to manufacture glass, and afterwards sold the glass so manufactured. The plaintiff would have received from the defendant for the undelivered glass, had the...