Pennbild Realty Co. v. People

• Decision Date: 30 March 1955
• Citation: 208 Misc. 825,145 N.Y.S.2d 129
• Parties: PENNBILD REALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 129

145 N.Y.S.2d 129

208 Misc. 825

PENNBILD REALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part III.

March 30, 1955.

Carb, Reichman & Luria, New York City, Herbert M. Horowitz, New York City, of counsel, for plaintiff.

Jacob K. Javits, Atty. Gen., Irving L. Rollins, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for defendant. GREENBERG, Justice.

Plaintiff moves to dismiss the defense for insufficiency. It claims to bring this action pursuant to Article 15 of the Real Property Law, § 500 et seq., for a determination that defendant's possession is without plaintiff's consent, is improper and unlawful and that possession be awarded to it. The defense is based on the Emergency Business Space Rent Control Law, L.1945, ch. 314, as amended, McK.Unconsol.Laws, § 8551 et seq. Plaintiff contends the defendant, the State of New York, is not bound by the statute which does not and was not intended to apply to a sovereign. It relies on the principle that a sovereign is not bound by the provisions of a statute unless it is made manifest that it is bound thereby. The lease was made August 8, 1944 for a term beginning November 1, 1944 and ending October 31, 1949. The parties adjusted rent twice with respect to the emergency rent as of June 1, 1944, and in accordance with successive amendments granting increases of 15%. Despite a notice given May 28, 1954, to remove and deliver possession on June 30, 1954, defendant remains in possession and claims right of possession as a statutory tenant. In City of Buffalo v. Hanna Furnace Corp., 305 N.Y. 369, 374-375, 113 N.E.2d 520, 522, the court stated:

'The canon of construction thus invoked is usually phrased in terms of a presumption that 'statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.' See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272-273, 67 S.Ct. 677, 686, 91 L.Ed. 884; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251 87 U.S. 251, 263, 22 L.Ed. 275; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 348. There are, on the other hand, indications that that canon serves, not as an inflexible rule of construction, but rather as one available signpost to legislative intent or design. Cf. State of Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370, 54 S.Ct. 725, 78 L.Ed. 1307; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 92-93, 55 S.Ct. 50, 79 L.Ed. 211; United States v. State of California, 297 U.S. 175, 186, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567; State of Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill, 33, 38. We need not, however, here determine the exact nature or force of the canon in question, since the impact of the statute in the present case falls, not on the state, but on an individual officer or agent thereof, and there is no showing that the proposed application of the statute will seriously prejudice the state.' See also United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884.

Distinction has been made in cases tendering issues arising from such statutes where the state on the one hand was a landlord or lessor and on the other hand a lessee. In the former, the statute is held not to apply. Port of New York Authority v. J. E. Linde Paper Co., 205 Misc. 110 127 N.Y.S.2d 155; United States v. Weisenbloom, 2 Cir., 168 F.2d 698. Such holding is upon the principle that the sovereign may not be restricted or its rights and interests derogated unless it is...