Penney v. First Nat. Bank of Boston

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: O'CONNOR
• Citation: Penney v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 433 N.E.2d 901, 385 Mass. 715 (Mass. 1982)
• Decision Date: 06 April 1982
• Parties: , 33 UCC Rep.Serv. 433 Frederick PENNEY v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON. 1

Page 901

433 N.E.2d 901

385 Mass. 715, 33 UCC Rep.Serv. 433

Frederick PENNEY v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 10, 1981.

Decided April 6, 1982.

Gary S. Sackrider, Salem, for plaintiff.

Edward B. Ginn, Boston, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

O'CONNOR, Justice.

Frederick Penney, a commercial fisherman who borrowed money from the defendant bank, appeals from a summary judgment for the bank on his complaint and from an award of attorney's fees in favor of the bank on its counterclaim. We affirm.

On March 28, 1975, Penney borrowed $32,802.39 from the bank, and executed a promissory note and a security agreement involving a lobster boat. The back of the note provided that upon default all obligations would become immediately due and payable without notice or demand and the holder would then have the rights and remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code of Massachusetts (UCC). G.L. c. 106. The security agreement provided as follows: "Borrower may have possession and use of the Collateral until default. Upon the happening of any of the following events or conditions, namely: (a) default in the payment or performance of any of the obligations ... contained or referred to herein or in any note evidencing any of the obligations ..., thereupon, and as long as such default continues Bank may declare all of the Obligations to be immediately due and payable, and Bank shall then have ... in addition to all other rights and remedies, the rights and remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code of Massachusetts, including without limitation thereto the right to take immediate possession of the Collateral .... Bank will give Borrower at least five days' prior written notice of the time and place of any public sale of the Collateral or of the time after which any private sale thereof is to be made." Penney's obligation was guaranteed by William Regan, who agreed to pay in the event Penney defaulted.

On March 4, 1976, Penney executed another note, payable to the bank on demand, in the amount of $4,244.40. This note also expressly gave the bank the rights and remedies of a secured party under the UCC.

Penney defaulted on both notes. On July 29, October 11, November 4, and December 30, 1977, the bank wrote to Penney demanding full payment of all sums due. Penney made some further payments after each letter except the last, but he remained in default on both notes throughout that period. The bank brought an action on Regan's guaranty and on August 25, 1977, attached Regan's real estate in the amount of $18,500. The bank never exercised its remedies against Regan. The bank seized the lobster boat without prior notice on January 19, 1978, at which time Penney's total indebtedness to the bank was approximately.$19,000. The bank notified Penney five days later of the repossession, of its intention to sell the boat, and of his right to redeem. Penney did not exercise his right to redeem, and the boat was sold at public auction for $13,500. Penney asserts by affidavit that as a result of the repossession he lost $34,000 worth of fishing equipment which was at sea.

Penney commenced this action to recover for the losses he alleges resulted from a wrongful seizure and sale of the boat. He claims that the seizure and sale violated G.L. c. 93A, § 2, and his due process rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The bank answered and counterclaimed for the balance due on the two notes together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees. The bank's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim was allowed by agreement, subject to later assessment of interest, costs, and attorney's fees, on the condition that no execution would issue until Penney's action was decided. The bank then moved for summary judgment on Penney's action and the motion was allowed, based on pleadings, affidavits, a deposition, admissions, and answers to interrogatories. Thereafter, interest, costs, and attorney's fees were assessed in connection with the counterclaim. Penney appeals from the summary judgment on his complaint and from the assessment of attorney's fees on the counterclaim. Penney claims that the award of attorney's fees in connection with the bank's defense against his complaint was erroneous.

1. Constitutionality of G.L. c. 106, § 9-503. We interpret the security agreement as neither adding to nor detracting from the bank's right to repossess without notice under G.L. c. 106, § 9-503 (UCC § 9-503). Penney attacks that section as violating the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. ² Section 9-503, as appearing in St.1979, c. 512, § 7, provides in pertinent part that "(u)nless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action." The Fourteenth Amendment by its terms applies only to the States. In order for the Fourteenth Amendment to be invoked against a private actor, the government must not only act but must be "significantly involved" in the actor's underlying conduct. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972), quoting from Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 1633, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967). Penney argues that the Legislature's enactment of § 9-503 was sufficient State action to render unconstitutional a private party's self-help repossession in reliance thereon.

Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has reached this precise question. The constitutionality of UCC § 9-503 has been considered in many other jurisdictions, however, and has been almost uniformly held to involve no State action. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039, 95 S.Ct. 526, 42 L.Ed.2d 316 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 517, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1974); Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, Inc., 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 328, 42 L.Ed.2d 283 (1974); Bichel Optical Laboratories v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 325, 42 L.Ed.2d 282 (1974); John Deere Co. of Kansas City v. Catalano, 186 Colo. 101, 525 P.2d 1153 (1974); King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974); Colonial Swimming Pool Co. v. Camperama of Vt., Inc., 134 Vt. 463, 365 A.2d 262 (1976).

Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978), is persuasive authority for the proposition that there is no State action in mere legislative authorization of creditors' self-help remedies that do not involve the participation of any governmental employees. In Flagg Bros., the Court rejected a due process attack on a warehouseman's sale, pursuant to UCC § 7-210, of another's goods to satisfy overdue storage charges because the sale involved no State action. Section 9-503, like § 7-210, authorizes but does not compel private action and does not delegate a function traditionally reserved to the State. Id. at 161-162, 164-166, 98 S.Ct. at 1736, 1737-1738. See Annotation to G.L. c. 106, § 9-503, Mass.Ann.Laws, Uniform Commercial Code at 428 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (creditor's right to repossess on default predates enactment of § 9-503).

We hold that self-help repossession by a private party pursuant to G.L. c. 106, § 9-503, does not involve State action and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Our holding is consonant with our decision in Debral Realty, Inc. v. DiChiara, --- Mass. ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1140, 420 N.E.2d 343, where we held that the lis pendens procedure under G.L. c. 184, § 15, does not violate due process.

2. Consumer Protection Act violations. Penney contends that summary judgment was improper even if § 9-503 is constitutional. He argues that the bank's repossession without prior notice in the circumstances presented here constituted an "unfair or deceptive" act entitling him to damages under G.L. c. 93A, §§ 2 & 11. Chapter 93A applies to the conduct of banks. Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1870, 1879, 424 N.E.2d 515. The precise question presented is whether there is any substantial question of fact material to whether the bank's conduct was unfair or deceptive. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 730, 824 (1974).

Penney asserts that there are four facts, each of which is either established or subject to substantial dispute, that show a violation of c. 93A when taken together. These are (1) that the bank repossessed without notice (2) when it had previously attached real property with a value in excess of the attachment under the guaranty (3) leaving a balance owed of $600 over the attachment amount (4) when it knew or should have known Penney had equipment at sea that he would be unable to retrieve.

Chapter 93A, § 2, provides that unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful (§ 2(a) ), and that in construing § 2(a) the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal courts to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) ), as from time to time amended. Section 2 (c) authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate rules and regulations defining "unfair or deceptive." No case or Federal Trade Commission interpretation, or rule or regulation of the Attorney General, has been brought to our attention making repossession without prior notice in the circumstances of this...