Pennington v. City of Huntsville

Decision Date17 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-12757,00-12757
Citation261 F.3d 1262
Parties(11th Cir. 2001) Michael Joel PENNINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, and HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Michael Pennington appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Huntsville ("City") on his employment discrimination and retaliation claims. Pennington alleged discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Because we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

As part of a pretrial order, the parties submitted an agreed summary of the facts of the case. Below we set forth a condensed version of the facts relevant to the issues we discuss. Beginning in 1988, Pennington worked as a Recreational Aide for the City at the Scruggs Center. In 1994, he filed a grievance with the City, seeking a religious accommodation. Following the grievance, Pennington was transferred to the Westside Center as a Recreational Aide.

Pennington applied for a promotion to the position of Neighborhood Services Programmer ("Programmer") in March of 1996. The City's personnel department selected five people, including Pennington, for interviews. After the interviews, Joey Flanders was selected for the position. Pennington then filed a grievance with the City, alleging that he was denied the promotion because of retaliation and race discrimination. Mia Puckett, the City's Equal Employment Officer, determined that Pennington's prior religious accommodation may have been considered in the selection process. The record indicates that Puckett sent a memorandum to Richard Liles, the head of the Department of Parks and Recreation, stating:

In this selection process, the initial recommendation was biased. The Zone Coordinator [Hughes] was heavily involved in the religious accommodation of Mr. Pennington. It is my opinion that the Zone Coordinator was unable to separate the emotions and events surrounding the religious accommodation in late 1994/early 1995 and the qualifications of Mr. Pennington for the position.

(Puckett Mem. (Doc. 002179-80).) She concluded that the selection process "resulted in retaliation against Mr. Pennington." (Id.)

Following this finding, the City rescinded Flanders' job offer. Liles conducted new interviews and, according to the record, evaluated the candidates' writing samples. After the new interviews and writing evaluations, Flanders was again selected as a Programmer for the Scruggs Center. However, this time Pennington was offered the Programmer position at the Calvary Hills Center. In addition, Pennington's offer was subject to conditions that were not imposed on Flanders.

Although not mentioned in the parties' summary of the facts, our review of the record indicates the following facts are undisputed. Pennington's promotion was premised on two conditions: (1) participation in a writing skills program and (2) agreeing to additional evaluations at three months and six months after the promotion. Liles explained that the additional performance evaluations were necessary because Pennington had never worked at the Calvary Hills facility before and he was concerned about Pennington's familiarity with other community activities there. Liles also indicated that he wanted to personally conduct these evaluations himself to make sure that Pennington did not receive any retaliation for his past religious accommodation from his supervisors. The writing skills were necessary because Liles found that Pennington's writing lacked detail.

Pennington claims that he communicated his acceptance to Liles both verbally and in writing, even though it was not required to be in writing. The City asserts that Pennington would one day verbally accept and another day deny acceptance of the promotion. It is undisputed that Liles then wrote a memo to Pennington, requesting that he respond in writing that he was accepting the promotion and all its conditions. Pennington responded that he would submit a written acceptance when the City placed its conditions in writing. Liles did not put the conditions in writing, and Pennington never accepted in writing.

Pennington filed this retaliation lawsuit1 in 1998, claiming that the City retaliated against him for his prior request for religious accommodation. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Pennington had not established a prima facie case of retaliation and that Pennington had not refuted the City's legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its decisions. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 93 F.Supp.2d 1201 (N.D.Ala.2000). Throughout the pendency of this lawsuit, Pennington has remained in his position as a Recreational Aide.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court's order granting summary judgment. See Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, we review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Whatley, 189 F.3d at 1313.

All of Pennington's claims relate to two incidents in 1996: Hughes' initial decision to promote Flanders instead of Pennington to Programmer at the Scruggs Center; and Liles' decision to offer Pennington a conditional promotion at the Calvary Hills Center.2 Because Pennington's claims under § 1983 and Title VII generally have the same elements of proof and use the same analytical framework, we will only explicitly address the Title VII claims unless otherwise noted. See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.1998); Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.1995).

Pennington has not challenged the district court's finding that no direct evidence of retaliation exists. Hence, the only dispute on appeal is whether Pennington presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to avoid summary judgment. We address Pennington's claims in reverse chronological order, starting with the conditional promotion decision.

A.Conditional Promotion

Pennington argues that the City retaliated against him by placing conditions on his promotion to the Calvary Hills position.3 "To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is some causal relation between the two events." Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Meeks v. Computer Associates Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir.1994)). The causal link element is construed broadly so that " 'a plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely unrelated.' " Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir.1993)). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer then has an opportunity to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment action. Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460; Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1021. The ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct remains on the plaintiff. Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460.

Although we have considerable doubt about whether Pennington can satisfy the elements of a prima facie case, particularly the adverse employment action prong,4 we assume arguendo that Pennington has established a prima facie case, because we find the City's legitimate reasons for the decision are dispositive. Richard Liles decided that two conditions should be attached to Pennington's promotion at Calvary Hills participation in a writing program, and agreeing to evaluations after three and six months as a Programmer. As to both of these conditions, Liles proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons. On the first condition, Liles stated that his review of Pennington's writing sample indicated that his writing lacked detail. As to the additional performance evaluations, Liles explained that he had concerns about Pennington's ability to handle community-based programming at Calvary Hills because plaintiff had been exposed to mostly athletic programming previously; and he also explained that he wanted to make sure that Pennington would not experience retaliation from his supervisors.

The City having proffered legitimate reasons, Pennington has the burden of establishing that the City's reasons are pretextual. Pennington is not able to do so. Pennington points out that in his interview Liles mentioned the prior interview and the possible bias that was involved, but nothing in the depositions suggests that these remarks were evidence of a retaliatory motive toward Pennington. Rather, the record indicates that Liles raised these issues to explain the need for the re-interview.

Pennington next argues that the writing program was not necessary because Liles stated that he had passed the writing test and because Liles had no specialized training in the area to enable him to discern which employees needed additional writing training. These objections are insufficient because "a plaintiff employee may not establish that an employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer's reason" as long as "the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir.1997) ("[F]ederal courts do not sit to second-guess the business judgment of employers.")...

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