Pennington v. Ritchie

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COOK, J.
• Citation: Pennington v. Ritchie, 102 Miss. 133, 58 So. 657 (Miss. 1912)
• Decision Date: 04 June 1912
• Docket Number: 15323
• Parties: W. E. PENNINGTON v. J. T. RITCHIE

58 So. 657

102 Miss. 133

W. E. PENNINGTON v. J. T. RITCHIE

No. 15323

Supreme Court of Mississippi

June 4, 1912

APPEAL from the circuit court of Lincoln county, HON. D. M. MILLER Judge.

Suit by W. E. Pennington against J. T. Ritchie. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

M McCullough, for appellant.

A deed of conveyance from Ritchie to Pennington, properly executed and delivered, precludes Ritchie from recovering rent from any source in an action at law. The deed is regular in form and the description of the land perfect. The legal title to the land was out of Ritchie and wife and was in Rockhold. Ritchie's right to recover rent from Rockhold necessitated the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. This deed bars Ritchie in any court of law from any relation of any landlord and tenant with Rockhold. By virtue of this deed the only right left to Ritchie is the equitable right to enforce his vendor's lien. He cannot be the grantor in the deed and the holder of the legal title to the land. In this case it cannot be held that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between Ritchie, the grantor in this deed, and Rockhold, the grantee.

There is no privity of contract between Ritchie and Pennington. Unless some rent contract is proved or shown existing between these two men then the appellant must have a new trial. The want of proof to show this contractual relation between Ritchie and Pennington made it incumbent on the trial judge to grant the peremptory instruction asked by Pennington and refused by the court.

As conclusive on this point see the case of Ashley v Young, 79 Miss. 129, 29 So. 822.

J. H Sumrall, for appellee.

In his discussion of the second proposition in his brief, counsel for appellant simply announced his conclusion as to the law controlling a state of facts which is also the product of his own conclusion. He states that "a deed of conveyance from Ritchie to Pennington (probably meaning Rockhold), precluded Ritchie from recovering rent from any source in an action of law"--and again--"Ritchie's right to recover rent from Rockhold necessitated the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant between them"--and again--"He cannot be grantor in the deed and the holder of the legal title to the land."

Counsel in coming to these conclusions evidently did not take into consideration all of the evidence in the case, as the evidence introduced by Ritchie tended to show that the execution of the deed by Ritchie and wife to Rockhold, and the execution of the rent note by Rockhold to Ritchie, occurred at the same time, the latter immediately following the former, and being a part of the same transaction; the note providing for the payment of cotton to Ritchie "as rent on the place I bought from him, if I should decide not to take the place and give it up," thus it will be seen that the deed not having been acknowledged, and therefore not recordable, amounted only to a contract between Ritchie and Rockhold, and the note having been executed immediately after the deed and relating to the same transaction, must be construed as a part of the contract, and its operation depending only on the happening of a future contingency, which happened right on the heels of the execution of the contract, it became immediately operative and created the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties to the contract, as shown by the testimony of both Pennington and his witness Rockhold, for the moment Rockhold decided to leave the place and rent it to Pennington, the future contingency contemplated by the contract and provided by the note, had happened.

If Pennington really relied upon the fact that Rockhold was in possession of a deed to the land, which he claims was shown to him, when he rented the land from Rockhold, then he should not only have informed himself as to all the provisions of the contract which the form of the deed suggested, but all the evidence shows that he was immediately notified by Ritchie of the existence of the note and its effect, at a time that he admits was "two or three days after he had rented from Rockhold, and before he had gone to any trouble or expense, so ...