Pennsylvania Co. v. Scofield

• Decision Date: 17 April 1903
• Docket Number: 1,140.
• Citation: 121 F. 814
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA CO. v. SCOFIELD.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

121 F. 814

PENNSYLVANIA CO. v. SCOFIELD.

No. 1,140.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 17, 1903

Before LURTON and SEVERENS, Circuit Judges, and COCHRAN, District judge.

SEVERENS Circuit Judge.

This case is now here for the second time. On the former occasion the judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. 112 F. 855, 50 C.C.A. 553, 56 L.R.A. 224. For a statement of the case and the matters determined, reference may be had to our former opinion, there reported. The action was for the wrongful expulsion of the plaintiff from the railway car of the defendant, the Pennsylvania Company, in which the plaintiff had taken passage over that part of the company's road running from Pittsburg, Pa., to Crestline Ohio. The action was retried before the court and a jury, and the result was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of $1,125. Certain rulings of the court during the trial, relating principally to the measure of damages, were excepted to, and errors are assigned thereon.

1. The plaintiff sought to recover, among other things, for his loss of time, which was one day, occasioned by his being put off the train. Evidence was given that he was a lawyer of prominence, and that his time was of value. But no evidence was given as to the extent of its value or his earnings at that time by the day, year, or for any period, or any other data other than as above stated, from which the value of his time could be estimated. Upon this subject the court charged the jury that in inquiring into the damages they might (to use the language employed) 'consider what would be a fair compensation for one day's time of the plaintiff, taking into consideration that he was a lawyer, having such a practice as you may find he had from the testimony-- such general practice. You may assume from the evidence that the plaintiff-it is shown by the plaintiff, and undisputed, that he was lawyer of some prominence-- that his time was of some value. ' The defendant excepted to this instruction upon the ground that there was no testimony offered by the plaintiff as to the damages sustained by him on account of the loss of one day's time.

We think the jury ought not to have been allowed to award damages to the plaintiff for the loss of time without some evidence to assist or guide them in estimating the value of it, showing either what was his income from his profession or what a lawyer of his capacity and standing might reasonably be expected to earn. It is quite true the jury would not be bound to follow in the very footsteps of witnesses upon this subject, and might correct the evidence by their own judgment in reaching a conclusion. It was so held in Head v. Hargrave, 105 U.S. 45, 26 L.Ed 1028. Juries generally have this right, and there is nothing peculiar in a case like this. But that is quite a different thing from leaving the jury without any guide whatever to enter a field of inquiry where approximation, at least, is necessary to any just result. The consequence of such a course would leave the jury without any restraint by the court, or any means for correcting any extravagance they might fall into.

From the necessity of the case, there are certain elements of damage the extent of which cannot be measured by proof, such as pain of mind or body. But such things are recognized as grounds for recovery in damages, and all that can be done is to prove the facts, and leave the jury to fix the sum they will award by the exercise of a sound discretion. It is a rude way of administering justice, but it is deemed better to pursue it than to afford no remedy at all. But there is no such necessity when the damages are susceptible of proof, and it is contrary to right reason and...