Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation495 U.S. 552,109 L.Ed.2d 588,110 S.Ct. 2126
Docket NumberNo. 89-156,89-156
PartiesPENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, et al., Petitioners v. Edward J. DAVENPORT et ux
Decision Date29 May 1990
Syllabus

Respondents pleaded guilty to welfare fraud and were ordered by a Pennsylvania court, as a condition of probation, to make monthly restitution payments to petitioner county probation department for petitioner state welfare department. Subsequently, respondents filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court, listing the restitution obligation as an unsecured debt. After the probation department commenced a probation violation proceeding in state court, alleging that respondents had failed to comply with the restitution order, respondents filed an adversary action in the Bankruptcy Court seeking both a declaration that the restitution obligation was a dischargeable debt and an injunction preventing the probation department from undertaking any further efforts to collect on the obligation. The Bankruptcy Court held that the obligation was an unsecured debt dischargeable under Chapter 13. The District Court reversed, relying on Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216, which held that restitution obligations are nondischargeable in Chapter 7 proceedings because they fall within Code § 523(a)(7)'s exception to discharge for a debt that is a government "fine, penalty, or forfeiture . . . and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." The District Court emphasized the Court's dicta in Kelly that Congress did not intend to make criminal penalties "debts" under the Code. The court also emphasized the federalism concerns that are implicated when federal courts intrude on state criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Held: The Code's language and structure demonstrate that restitution obligations constitute "debts" within the meaning of § 101(11) and are therefore dischargeable under Chapter 13. Pp. 557-564.

(a) Section 101(11)'s definition of "debt" as a "liability on a claim" reveals Congress' intent that the meanings of "debt" and "claim" be coextensive. Furthermore, § 101(4)(A)'s definition of a "claim" as a "right to payment" broadly contemplates any enforceable obligation of the debtor, including a restitution order. Petitioners' reliance on Kelly's discussion emphasizing the special purposes of punishment and rehabilitation that underlie the imposition of restitution obligations is misplaced. Unlike § 523(a)(7), which explicitly ties its application to the purpose of the compensation, § 104(4)(A) makes no reference to the objectives the State seeks to serve in imposing an obligation. That the probation department's enforcement mechanism is criminal rather than civil also does not alter the restitution order's character as a "right to payment" and, indeed, may make the right greater than that conferred by an ordinary civil obligation, since it is secured by the debtor's freedom rather than his property. Pp. 557-560.

(b) Other Code provisions do not reflect a congressional intent to exempt restitution orders from Chapter 13 discharge. Section 362(b)(1), which removes criminal prosecutions of the debtor from the operation of the Code's automatic stay provision, is not inconsistent with granting him sanctuary from restitution orders under Chapter 13. Congress could well have concluded that maintaining criminal prosecutions during bankruptcy proceedings is essential to the functioning of government, but that a debtor's interest in full and complete release of his obligations outweighs society's interest in collecting or enforcing a restitution obligation outside the agreement reached in a Chapter 13 plan. Nor must § 726(a)(4)—which in effect establishes the order for settlement of claims under such plans, assigning a low priority to a claim "for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture"—be construed to apply only to civil fines and not to criminal restitution orders in order to assure that governments do not receive disfavored treatment relative to other creditors. That construction conflicts with Kelly's holding that the quoted phrase, when used in § 523(a)(7), applies to criminal restitution obligations. It also highlights the tension between Kelly's interpretation of § 523(a)(7) and its dictum suggesting that restitution obligations are not "debts." If Congress believed that such obligations were not "debts" giving rise to "claims," it would have had no reason to except the obligations from discharge, and § 523(a)(7) would be mere surplusage. Moreover, Kelly is faithful to the language and structure of the Code: Congress defined "debt" broadly and carefully excepted particular debts from discharge where policy considerations so warranted. In thus securing a broader discharge of debtors under Chapter 13 than Chapter 7, Congress chose not to extend § 523(a)(7)'s exception to Chapter 13. Thus, it would override the balance Congress struck in crafting the appropriate discharge exceptions to construe "debt" narrowly in this context. Pp. 560-563.

(c) This holding does not signal a retreat from the principles applied in Kelly. The Code will not be read to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure. However, where, as here, congressional intent is clear, the Court's function is to enforce the statute according to its terms, even where this means concluding that Congress intended to interfere with States' administration of their criminal justice systems. Pp. 563-564.

871 F.2d 421 (CA3 1989), affirmed.

MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 564.

Walter W. Cohen for petitioners.

David A. Searles, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondents.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50, 107 S.Ct. 353, 361, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986), this Court held that restitution obligations imposed as conditions of probation in state criminal actions are nondischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The Court rested its holding on its interpretation of the Code provision that protects from discharge any debt that is "a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." § 523(a)(7). Because the Court determined that restitution orders fall within § 523(a)(7)'s exception to discharge, it declined to reach the question whether restitution orders are "debt[s]" as defined by § 101(11) of the Code. In this case, we must decide whether restitution obligations are dischargeable debts in proceedings under Chapter 13, § 1301 et seq. The exception to discharge relied on in Kelly does not extend to Chapter 13. We conclude, based on the language and structure of the Code, that restitution obligations are "debt[s]" as defined by § 101(11). We therefore hold that such payments are dischargeable under Chapter 13.

I

In September 1986, respondents Edward and Debora Davenport pleaded guilty in a Pennsylvania court to welfare fraud and were sentenced to one year's probation. As a condition of probation, the state court ordered the Davenports to make monthly restitution payments to the county probation department, which in turn would forward the payments to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the victim of the Davenports' fraud. Pennsylvania law mandates restitution of welfare payments obtained through fraud, Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 62, § 481(c) (Purdon Supp.1989), and directs the probation section to "forward to the victim the property or payments made pursuant to the restitution order," 18 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 1106(e) (1988).

In May 1987, the Davenports filed a petition under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In their Chapter 13 statement, they listed their restitution obligation as an unsecured debt payable to the Department of Public Welfare. Soon thereafter, the Adult Probation and Parole Department of Bucks County (Probation Department) commenced a probation violation proceeding, alleging that the Davenports had failed to comply with the restitution order. The Davenports informed the Probation Department of the pending bankruptcy proceedings and requested that the Department withdraw the probation violation charges until the bankruptcy issues were settled. The Probation Department refused, and the Davenports filed an adversary action in Bankruptcy Court seeking both a declaration that the restitution obligation was a dischargeable debt and an injunction preventing the Probation Department from undertaking any further efforts to collect on the obligation.

While the adversary action was pending, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Davenports' Chapter 13 plan without objection from any creditor.1 Although notified of the proceedings, neither the Probation Department nor the Department of Public Welfare filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy action. Meanwhile, the Probation Department proceeded in state court on its motion to revoke probation. Although the court declined to revoke the Davenports' probation and extended their payment period, it nonetheless ruled that its restitution order remained in effect.

The Bankruptcy Court subsequently held that the Davenports' restitution obligation was an unsecured debt dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). 83 B.R. 309 (ED Pa.1988). On appeal, the District Court reversed, holding that state-imposed criminal restitution obligations cannot be discharged in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 89 B.R. 428 (ED Pa.1988). The District Court emphasized the federalism concerns that are implicated when federal courts intrude on state criminal processes, id., at 430, and relied substantially on dicta...

To continue reading

Request your trial
903 cases
  • Cal. Equity Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Sinclair (In re Sinclair)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Ninth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of California
    • November 29, 2017
    ...of the objectives . . . to [be] served in imposing the obligation.'" Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 559, 109 L. Ed. 2d 588, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990)).. . .We therefore conclude that the language on its face does not clearly limit nondischargeable d......
  • U.S., In re
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • November 23, 1993
    ...v. Commissioner, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991); Pennsylvania Public Welfare Dept. v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2133, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990). For example, as the district court in the instant case points out, a jury verdict must under F......
  • Jaekel v. Equifax Marketing Decision Systems, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • June 26, 1992
    ...provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment." (quoting Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990)); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, 486 U.S. 825, 837, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 100 L.Ed.2......
  • In re Kilen
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • June 28, 1991
    ...See Johnson v. Home State Bank, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991); Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2130, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990); In re Amfesco Indus., Inc., 81 B.R. 777 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.1988); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 309, U.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
4 books & journal articles
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Appendices
    • March 30, 2022
    ...§7:77 Pedus Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 140, §8:12.1 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport (1990) 495 U.S. 552, §14:50 Pennsylvania v. Barud, 681 A2d 162 (Pa SupCt, 1996), §1:11.5 Pennsylvania v. Bruder (1988) 488 U.S. 9, §8:22.1 Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1......
  • Coming to terms with strict and liberal construction.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 64 No. 1, September 2000
    • September 22, 2000
    ...to suggesting, especially in dissent, that the majority is engaged in dubious behavior. See Pa. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 566 (1990) (Blackmun, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The majority simply asserts that the plain meaning of `right to payment' is an `enforce......
  • It's Time to Return to Our Roots: The Bankruptcy Common Law That Governs Insolvent Estates.
    • United States
    • American Bankruptcy Law Journal Vol. 95 No. 3, September 2021
    • September 22, 2021
    ...In re Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989). Pa. Dept, of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Cohen v. de la Crus, 523 U.S. 213 (182) Rodriguez, 140 S. Ct. at 718 ("Bob Richards made the mistake of moving too quickly past impor......
  • The Inequities of Equitable Subordination.
    • United States
    • American Bankruptcy Law Journal Vol. 96 No. 1, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...corollary survived the Bankruptcy Code's enactment), appeal den. as moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994). (55) Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990), superseded by statute only as to holding, Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, [section] 3, 104 Stat.......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT