Pennsylvania General Ins. Co. v. Barr

Decision Date09 October 1969
Citation435 Pa. 456,257 A.2d 550
PartiesPENNSYLVANIA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Emma S. BARR, Executrix of the Estate of Norman Barr, Deceased, Insurance Company of North America and American Arbitration Association.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

E. Paul Maschmeyer, Marshall, Dennehey & Warner Philadelphia, for appellant.

John J. Tinaglia, Philadelphia, for Insurance Co. of North America.

Howard Richard, Richard, Brian & DiSanti, Alexander A. DiSanti Upper Darby, for Emma S. Barr.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

POMEROY Justice.

This appeal by the Pennsylvania General Insurance Company (General) is from a decree of the lower court dismissing appellant's complaint in equity and sustaining appellee Emma S. Barr's preliminary objections thereto. At issue is the availability of arbitration to resolve a dispute between the parties as to the amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided by certain policies issued by General to Norman Barr, deceased husband of appellee.

On November 10, 1967, Norman Barr, while on duty as a police officer of Haverford Township, was struck and killed by an automobile driven by one James Gallagher. At the time of his accident, Barr was insured under two separate contracts issued by General. Each contract provided coverage for damages for bodily injury caused by uninsured automobiles, but neither policy specified the limits of appellant's liability under this provision. The uninsured motorist clause of each policy contained an arbitration provision which in pertinent part reads as follows:

'ARBITRATION: If any person making claim hereunder and the company * * * do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this Part, then, upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.'

Decedent was also covered under a contract issued to his employer, the Township, by the Insurance Company of North America (I.N.A.).

After the death of her husband, Emma S. Barr, as executrix of his estate, filed a demand upon general and I.N.A. for arbitration under the uninsured motorist provision of each of the General policies. The amount claimed was initially $25,000 under each policy, but this was later amended in writing to 'unlimited'.

Appellant thereafter filed a complaint in equity praying for a preliminary injunction to restrain appellee from proceeding to arbitration until the nature and extent of the coverage provided by the uninsured moorist provisions had been judicially determined. The two insurance companies, the executrix, Emma S. Barr, and the American Arbitration Association were the named defendants. A preliminary injunction was entered on the basis of an injunction affidavit. The executrix, appellee Barr, filed preliminary objections contending that venue was improper and that appellant had a complete nonstatutory remedy at law available by way of arbitration. After argument, the lower court dismissed appellee's objection as to venue but sustained the objection that arbitration, not judicial proceedings, was the sole forum for resolution of the issues raised. It accordingly dismissed appellant's complaint. This appeal followed.

It is appellant's contention that the dispute in the present case should not be submitted to arbitration without prior judicial construction of the contractual provisions in question, and that the lower court in the exercise of its equitable powers should have reformed the insurance contracts in question. We are unable to accept either contention.

Appellant argues that the present dispute was not a fit subject for arbitration because neither of the policies contained any express limit on the uninsured motorist coverage. The argument is difficult to understand given the circumstances of the case and the language of the insurance policies. It is uncontested that uninsured motorist coverage was provided. [1] This dispute between the parties concerns the amount of recovery possible, and more specifically whether the coverage is limited, whether recovery may be had under both policies, and whether the amount recoverable from General is excess to the I.N.A. coverage. Each of these questions is a point of disagreement between appellee and appellant. The issue central to each question is the amount of payment which is due the decedent's estate, and that is a matter specifically...

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