Pennsylvania Human Relations Com'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 03 November 1995 |
| Citation | 667 A.2d 1173 |
| Parties | 105 Ed. Law Rep. 598 PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent, and Harry and Annemarie Gwynne, Aspira of Pennsylvania, Intervenors. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Michael Hardiman, Assistant Chief Counsel, for petitioner.
William H. Brown, III, for respondent.
Michael Churchill and Patricia A. Lowe, for intervenors.
The subject matters before the Court involve the renewed motion of the School District of Philadelphia to join the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Governor Thomas J. Ridge (hereafter Governor) and the renewed motion of Intervenor ASPIRA to join the Commonwealth and Governor and the City of Philadelphia and Mayor Edward Rendell (hereafter Mayor) for purposes of assessing liability for additional funding claimed by the School District to be necessary for it to comply with the Court's November 28, 1994 remedial order entered in this school desegregation case. The history of this litigation is set out in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. School Dist. of Philadelphia (HRC VI), 161 Pa.Cmwlth. 658, 638 A.2d 304 (1994), and the Court's remedial order is found at Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. School Dist. of Philadelphia (HRC VII), 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 542, 651 A.2d 186 (1994).
By order dated August 22, 1995, the Court directed the Commonwealth and Governor and the City and Mayor to appear at hearing (argument) to show cause why they should not be joined as defendants in this proceeding for purposes of providing additional funding to the School District to comply with the remedial order of the Court. The Governor
in turn filed an application for recusal of the presiding judge, and thereafter the parties filed their respective responses to the renewed joinder motions, raising various defenses discussed below. At argument on October 6, 1995, Counsel for the City and Mayor joined in the Governor's application for recusal.
The Court will first consider the issue of recusal. The application for recusal requests the Court to recuse herself pursuant to conduct standards articulated in Canon 3C. of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3C. states in relevant part:
(1) A judge should disqualify [herself] in a proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) [She] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) [She] served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom [she] previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it....
The application seeks recusal on two stated premises: The impartiality of the Court might reasonably be questioned because of her prior service as a Commissioner on the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (hereafter Commission), through gubernatorial appointment, from December 1974 through January 1980, and an appearance of bias arises from the alleged commingling of prosecutorial functions of the Commission and the adjudicatory and appellate functions of the Court that deprives the Governor of due process of law.
At the outset, the Court sets forth the following guiding principles in considering a request for recusal. Underlying Canon 3C. is the principle that a party seeking recusal must produce evidence to support the request for disqualification, and the alleged bias, prejudice or unfairness must be directed against the moving party or in favor of the non-moving party. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985). Accord Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83 (3d Cir.1978). Another important principle is that a judge cannot be disqualified merely because the judge believes in upholding the law. Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, Int'l. Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F.Supp. 155, 159 (E.D.Pa.1974). 1
Of particular note is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983), relied upon by the Governor, where the Supreme Court vacated a judgment of sentence of 2 1/2 to 5 years imprisonment against the defendant appellant who was convicted of various crimes. The Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing to a trial judge whose impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. The original trial judge was ostensibly overheard making derogatory remarks about the defendant, including a statement that "[w]e want to get people like him out of Potter County." In reviewing the subject of judicial recusal, the Supreme Court stated:
The party who asserts that a trial judge must be disqualified bears the burden of producing evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating recusal. Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 364 A.2d 312 (1976). Furthermore, the "decision by a judge against whom a plea of prejudice is made will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Kane, 199 Pa.Super.Ct. 89, 91, 184 A.2d 405, 406 (1962).
.... However, we have never held and are unwilling to adopt a per se rule that a judge who had participated in the prosecution of a defendant may never preside as judge in future unrelated cases involving that defendant. Absent some showing of prejudgment or bias we will not assume a trial court would not be able to provide a defendant a fair trial based solely on prior prosecutorial participation. The record reveals no prejudgment or bias, but rather an evenhanded treatment of both sides.
Id., 501 Pa. at 21-22, 459 A.2d at 731.
The Court does not take lightly a request for recusal, even in the present matter where the moving parties lack standing to assert the application. 2 The Court shall therefore fully examine the arguments in support of the application. Before doing so, however, the Court takes particular notice of statements contained in the Governor's memorandum of law in support of the application for recusal. The Governor states, inaccurately, that neither the School District nor Intervenors responded to the Court's November 1994 "invitation" to seek joinder and that on June 13, 1995, the Court extended another invitation to the School District to renew its motion to join the Commonwealth and the Governor.
In the November 1994 order, the Court refused to entertain joinder motions because a plan had not been submitted by the School District to eliminate racial disparities in the Philadelphia public schools. It was not until June 13, 1995, seven months later, when the Court permitted the School District and ASPIRA to file their renewed motions for joinder, having determined that the School District's February 1995 reform plan and subsequent modifications were in compliance or substantial compliance with the Court's order, except as noted hereafter.
The Court further notes that the Governor's application failed to acknowledge, directly or indirectly, that the Court has ruled against the Commission on a central claim raised by it from the inception of administrative proceedings against the School District. The Commission consistently advanced the position that mandatory busing was required to achieve maximum feasible desegregation of the public schools. The Court rejected the Commission's demand for mandatory busing to achieve desegregation and rejected the Settlement Team Report filed with the Court on November 25, 1992, recommending mandatory busing as a remedy in this case.
The following factors, among others, are relevant to the recusal issue:
(1) The investigation, prosecution and adjudication of the Commission's complaint against the School District was completed prior to the Court's appointment to the Commission, thereby making the Court's participation in that process a legal impossibility.
(2) The matters before the Commission from December 1974 through January 1980 involved the 1972 and 1976 desegregation plans, both of which were rejected by the Commission and have no connection to the proceedings presided over by the Court. Current enforcement proceedings concern the School District's 1983 modified desegregation plan.
(3) Neither the Commonwealth nor the Governor was specifically named as a defendant in the administrative proceedings before the Commission or any of the prior enforcement proceedings before Commonwealth Court.
(4) The issue of funding of remedies to cure the discrimination against Black and Hispanic students was never adjudicated or otherwise dealt with by the Commission, and consequently, it is inconceivable that the Court gained personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts relevant to the current proceedings or, for that matter, relevant to any of the issues decided in the current enforcement action.
(5) The Governor has offered no evidence to prove actual bias or prejudice in (6) At the initial status conference with Counsel in 1990, the Court sua sponte raised her prior service on the Commission and allowed Counsel an opportunity to present any objections to the Court presiding over the case.
favor of the Commission, the School District or Intervenors, nor has the Governor offered evidence of bias or prejudice against any of the proposed additional defendants.
(7) No objections were raised by Counsel.
(8) Counsel for the Commission, School District and Intervenors have argued against recusal and accurately note that the record is devoid of any evidence of bias, prejudice or unfairness, appearance of impropriety or any other basis for recusal.
(9) The record demonstrates an even-handed treatment of the parties.
The courts of this Commonwealth have long recognized that judges are presumed to be unbiased and impartial and that they have an obligation to refuse recusal where there is no reason for recusal. Reilly by Reilly. See also, Local Union 542....
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