Pennsylvania Lumberman's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer

• Decision Date: 24 November 1903
• Docket Number: 17.
• Citation: 126 F. 352
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA LUMBERMAN'S MUT. FIRE INS. CO. v. MEYER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

126 F. 352

PENNSYLVANIA LUMBERMAN'S MUT. FIRE INS. CO. v. MEYER.

No. 17.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

November 24, 1903

Herbert H. Harris, for plaintiff in error.

Heman W. Morris, for defendant in error.

Before LACOMBE, TOWNSEND, and COXE, Circuit Judges.

COXE Circuit Judge.

On May 26, 1900, the property covered by the policies of insurance was destroyed by fire. The principal question involved is whether or not the policies were in force at that time. On May 15th, the defendant sent notices of cancellation pursuant to the terms of the policies. The plaintiff strenuously contends that these notices were ineffectual to terminate the policies. In view of what afterwards occurred we deem it unimportant to determine this question. However, in order to simplify the discussion, let it be assumed that the policies were canceled prior to May 23, 1900.

On that day the defendant wrote to the plaintiff a letter in which after reciting its contention that the policies were canceled, it says:

'We regret we cannot see our way clear to allow this matter to run along any further unpaid on our books, so if you still desire these policies to again be put in force we ask you kindly to send us check for the full amount by return mail.'

On receipt of this letter on May 25, 1900, the plaintiff mailed his check on the Commercial Bank of Rochester to the order of the defendant for $274.17, the full amount demanded. This letter and check were received by the defendant on the morning of the 26th and receipted bills for the premiums were returned to the plaintiff. Early in the morning of the 26th of May, and before the receipt by the defendant of the letter and check the fire occurred, but this was not known to the defendant until two days thereafter. The letter of May 23d contained an explicit agreement by the defendant to reinstate the policies if the check for the premiums was mailed. The offer of the defendant was accepted by the plaintiff. When the check was deposited in the mail pursuant to this agreement to reinstate the policies, the plaintiff did all in his power to comply with defendant's offer. The minds of the parties met; the agreement was consummated.

It is stated in the defendant's brief that:

'While the general rule is that where a definite proposition is made by mail, the contract becomes binding at the time the accepting letter is posted, it is submitted that under the facts of this case the insurance was not to be in force until the company received Mr. Meyer's answer.'

The rule is correctly stated, but we are unable to perceive why the facts in the case at bar constitute an exception. 'The unqualified acceptance by the other, transmitted by due course of mail is regarded as closing the bargain, from the time of the transmission of the acceptance. ' Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. 390, 402, 13 L.Ed. 187. The defendant, had it desired to do so, could have limited the time of the reinstatement of the policies to the actual receipt by it in Philadelphia of the letter and check, but this it did not do. The...