Pennsylvania Motor T. Ass'n v. Port of Phila. MT Ass'n

• Decision Date: 19 May 1960
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 27904.
• Citation: 183 F. Supp. 910
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR TRUCK ASSOCIATION et al., v. PORT OF PHILADELPHIA MARINE TERMINAL ASSOCIATION et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

183 F. Supp. 910

PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR TRUCK ASSOCIATION et al., v. PORT OF PHILADELPHIA MARINE TERMINAL ASSOCIATION et al.

Civ. A. No. 27904.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

May 19, 1960.

Paul F. Barnes, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Francis A. Scanlan and Robert G. Kelly, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

David Berger, City Sol., by Levy Anderson, First Deputy City Sol., Philadelphia, Pa., for City of Philadelphia.

James J. Leyden, Philadelphia, Pa., for Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc.

Richard H. Markowitz, Philadelphia, Pa., for Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, Internatl. Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Abraham E. Freedman, Philadelphia, Pa., amicus curiae.

LORD, District Judge.

This is an equity proceeding in which the plaintiff and defendant by their respective applications for a Preliminary Injunction and a Motion to Dismiss, have brought the following issues before the Court: (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction to enjoin the sudden imposition by pier operators of a compulsory truck loading and unloading regulation which abrogates a long standing practice of truckers' choice in the Port of Philadelphia, where the only relief sought is the maintenance of the status quo pending an administrative determination on the merits of the regulation by the Federal Maritime Board?; and (2) Assuming such jurisdiction, upon a balancing of the equities, has the plaintiff shown that irreparable harm will result without injunctive relief?

Plaintiff, Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association, (P.M.T.A.) is a non-profit corporation, comprising some 3,500 members of which a substantial number are truckers, shippers and consignees regularly utilizing the facilities and services of the marine terminals of the Port of Philadelphia. Defendant, Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Association (Terminal Operators), is comprised of operators of many of the marine terminals of the Port of Philadelphia so utilized by the members of the P.M.T.A. The operations of both parties to this litigation have a great impact on the movement of goods in both interstate and foreign commerce.

The City of Philadelphia has appeared in these proceedings as amicus curiae. In this regard, the City is rightly concerned with the smooth and continued flow of cargo into and through the Port of Philadelphia. Further, not only does the City have an investment of approximately $50,000,000 in the Port of Philadelphia, but it is also deeply concerned with port operations as they affect industrial development, and the economic well-being of thousands of its citizens.

Federal Maritime Board Agreement No. 8425 and Terminal Tariff No. 1

Believing that marine terminal operations in the Port of Philadelphia might best be managed by the establishment of uniform rates and practices, seventeen members of the defendant association submitted an Agreement to the Federal Maritime Board for approval on August 13, 1959. The Agreement, submitted in accordance with § 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended, was finally approved by the Board on December 21, 1959, as Federal Maritime Board Agreement No. 8425. The Agreement, as approved, exempts the seventeen signatories thereto from the operation of the anti-trust laws of the United States. 46 U.S.C.A. § 814.

As pertinent to practices relating to the loading and unloading of trucks at marine terminals in the Port of Philadelphia, Agreement No. 8425 provides:

"Third: this agreement shall cover the following subject matters and all services, facilities, rates, and charges incidental thereto: wharfage, dockage, railroad carloading and railroad car unloading, lighterage loading and lighterage unloading, truck loading and truck unloading, free time, and wharf demurrage." Emphasis supplied.

Following the approval of the Agreement, conferences were held by the seventeen signatories who are all members of the defendant association. As a result of these meetings, "Terminal Tariff No. 1" was promulgated. Section VII (5) of this tariff contains the disputed provision which initiated this litigation. It provides:

"(5) Right to Load or Unload Trucks:

"All truck loading and unloading at any pier or waterfront terminal operated by a participating Terminal Operator in the Port of Philadelphia who is a party to this Tariff shall be performed solely by such Terminal Operator, his agents, servants and employees at the rates and subject to the rules, regulations and practices contained in this Tariff.

"The trucker, shipper or consignee shall provide a truck or other vehicle which is adequate and suitable for safe loading or unloading." Emphasis supplied.

Terminal Tariff No. 1 was formally filed with the Federal Maritime Board on March 31, 1960. On the same date, March 31, 1960, the tariff was for the first time distributed to parties in interest and this date likewise constituted the first public notice of the promulgation of the compulsory truck loading and unloading requirement.

The tariff became effective April 1, 1960.

Jurisidiction

On the effective date of the tariff, April 1, 1960, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime Board charging, inter alia, that defendant's tariff violates the provisions of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended. Defendant has filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint and both parties have requested an immediate disposition of the controversy by the Board.

In this posture of the case, the prayer of plaintiff's Complaint, is as follows:

"That this Court enter an injunction directing defendants to cancel and withdraw their exclusive loading and unloading rule as contained in subparagraph 5, Section VII, and to permit motor carriers and shippers to load and unload their vehicles on waterfront terminals maintained by defendant Terminal Operators as such practice existed prior to March 1959, and to maintain the status quo pending action by the Federal Maritime Board on the Complaint now pending before it."

The plaintiff likewise alleges that irreparable harm will result to it and its members unless such equitable relief as prayed for in the Complaint is afforded. This aspect of the case will be discussed hereinafter.

At the outset, all parties agree that the jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the basic controversy between the parties lies initially in the Federal Maritime Board, and not this Court. The thrust of defendant's argument however, is summed up by the following statement from their brief: (p. 13)

"* * * it is clearly established that in proceedings of this type wherein violations of the Shipping Act are averred the Federal Maritime Board has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, and the Terminal Operators herein must exhaust their administrative remedies before the Board before they are entitled to any judicial relief."

In short, it is the defendant's contention that the doctrines of "primary jurisdiction" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies" deprive this Court of jurisdiction. The controlling issue in this regard however, is whether the instant action is of the type which is subject to the above doctrines.

Plaintiff seeks in this action but one type of relief—the maintenance of the status quo. The hub of its plea is that the Federal Maritime Board cannot, or will not, stay the enforcement of the disputed provision of the tariff pending its determination. See Pacific Coast European Conference—Payment of Brokerage, 4 FMB 696 (1955), and 5 FMB 65 (1956); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1948, 81 F.Supp. 544. In any event, regardless of the power of the Board, no steps have been taken by the Board to stay the imposition of § VII (5) pending a determination on the merits. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks the assistance of this Court merely as an aid in the administrative process.

The plaintiff has pleaded, inter alia, that this Court has jurisdiction by virtue of § 1337 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337. This section provides:

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."

For reasons to be more fully developed hereinafter, the Court holds that this action arises under the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq. and in accordance with § 1337 jurisdiction rests in this tribunal.

As pertinent to the issues of this case, § 15 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 814 provides:

"All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made after the organization of the Federal Maritime Board shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the Board, and before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification, or cancellation."

The clear wording of the above provision makes unlawful the carrying out of "all agreements, modifications, or cancellations" until approval has been procured from the Federal Maritime Board.

The issue is: Can this Court determine whether the disputed provision of the tariff is an "agreement", "modification" or "cancellation" as those terms are employed in § 15 of the Shipping Act? Without doing violence to the role of the administrative agency in the judicial process, this Court concludes that such a determination can be made under the circumstances of this case. This conclusion is predicated upon the fact that the decision called for in the instant controversy is in no way contingent upon the expertise of the Federal Maritime Board.

The compulsory unloading and loading provision as embodied in § VII (5) first appeared in the Terminal Tariff No. 1 which was filed by the Terminal Operators on March 31, 1960—to be effective the next day. It did not appear in the Section 15 Agreement which preceded the filing of the tariff and there was no indication in that agreement that free choice loading and unloading practices which had...